§12.2.11quanquam ea non tam est minute atque concise in actionibus utendum quam in disputationibus, quia non docere modo, sed movere etiam ac delectare audientes debet orator, ad quod impetu quoque ac viribus et decore est opus; ut vis amnium maior est altis ripis multoque gurgitis tractu fluentium quam tenuis aquae et obiectu lapillorum resultantis.
However, these must not be used as minutely and concisely in actual speeches as in disputations, because the orator must not only instruct, but also move and delight his hearers, for which there is need also of impulse, strength, and grace; just as the force of rivers flowing between deep banks and with a great sweep of whirlpool is greater than that of thin water babbling against the obstruction of pebbles.
§12.2.12et ut palaestrici doctores illos, quos numeros vocant, non idcirco discentibus tradunt, ut iis omnibus ii, qui didicerint, in ipso luctandi certamine utantur (plus enim pondere et firmitate et spiritu agitur), sed ut subsit copia illa, ex qua unum aut alterum, cuius se occasio dederit, §12.2.13efficiant, ita haec pars dialectica, sive illam dicere malumus disputatricem, ut est utilis saepe et finitionibus et comprehensionibus et separandis quae sunt differentia, et resolvenda ambiguitate, distinguendo, dividendo, illiciendo, implicando, ita, si totum sibi vindicaverit in foro certamen, obstabit melioribus et sectas ad tenuitatem suam vires ipsa subtilitate consumet.
And just as gymnastic teachers do not deliver those movements which they call patterns to their pupils to the end that those who have learned them should use them all in the actual wrestling match (for the contest is conducted with more weight, firmness, and spirit), but that that abundance may be in reserve, from which they may perform one or two as opportunity presents itself; so this logical part, or if we prefer to call it the art of disputation, as it is often useful both for definitions and comprehensions, and for separating different things, and for resolving ambiguity, by distinguishing, dividing, enticing, and entangling, so, if it claims for itself the whole contest of the forum, will stand in the way of better things, and by its very subtlety will consume the forces that have been cut down to its own thinness.
§12.2.14itaque reperias quosdam in disputando mire callidos, cum ab ilia cavillatione discesserint, non magis sufficere in aliquo graviore actu quam parva quaedam animalia, quae in angustiis mobilia campo deprehenduntur.
Therefore you may find certain men wonderfully clever in disputing, who, when they have departed from that cavilling, are no more sufficient in any weightier action than certain small animals, which, though nimble in narrow spaces, are caught in an open field.
§12.2.15iam quidem pars illa moralis, quae dicitur Ethice, certe tota oratori est accommodata.
Now indeed that moral part, which is called Ethics, is certainly entirely suited to the orator.
nam in tanta causarum, sicut superioribus libris diximus, varietate, cum alia coniectura quaerantur, alia finitionibus concludantur, alia iure summoveantur vel transferantur, alia colligantur vel ipsa inter se concurrant vel in diversum ambiguitate ducantur, nulla fere dici potest, cuius non parte in aliqua tractatus aequi ac boni reperiatur, plerasque vero esse quis nescit, quae totae in sola qualitate consistant?
For in so great a variety of cases, as we have said in the preceding books, while some are investigated by conjecture, others concluded by definitions, others barred or transferred by law, others inferred, or clash among themselves, or are drawn in different directions by ambiguity, there is scarcely any of which it can be said that a discussion of the fair and the good is not found in some part of it; and who does not know that most of them consist entirely in quality alone?
§12.2.16in consiliis vero quae ratio suadendi est ab honesti quaestione seposita? quin ilia etiam pars tertia, quae laudandi ac vituperandi officiis continetur, nempe in tractatu recti pravique versatur.
In counsels, indeed, what method of persuasion is separated from the question of the honorable? Nay, even that third part, which consists in the duties of praising and blaming, is surely occupied with the treatment of the right and the wrong.
§12.2.17an de iustitia, fortitudine, abstinentia, temperantia, pietate non plurima dicet orator? sed ille vir bonus, qui haec non vocibus tantum sibi nota atque nominibus aurium tenus in usum linguae perceperit, sed qui virtutes ipsas mente complexus ita sentiat, nec in cogitando ita laborabit sed, quod sciet, vere dicet.
Or will the orator not speak most copiously of justice, fortitude, abstinence, temperance, and piety? But that good man, who has perceived these things not merely by words and names as far as the ear goes for the use of the tongue, but who, embracing the virtues themselves in his mind, feels them to be so, will not labor so much in thinking, but will speak truly what he knows.
§12.2.18cum sit autem omnis generalis quaestio speciali potentior, quia universo pars continetur, non utique accedit parti quod universum est, profecto nemo dubitabit, generales quaestiones in illo maxime studiorum more versatas.
But since every general question is more powerful than a special one, because the part is contained in the whole, whereas that which is whole does not necessarily attach to the part, surely no one will doubt that general questions are chiefly engaged in that manner of studies.
§12.2.19iam vero cum sint multa propriis brevibusque comprehensionibus finienda (unde etiam status causarum dicitur finitiuus), nonne ad id quoque instrui ab iis, qui plus in hoc studii dederunt, oportet? quid? non quaestio iuris omnis aut verborum proprietate aut aequi disputatione aut voluntatis coniectura continetur? quorum pars ad rationalem, pars ad moralem tractatum redundat.
Moreover, since many things are to be defined by proper and brief comprehensions (whence also the status of cases is called definitive), ought he not also for this to be instructed by those who have given more study to this? What? Is not every question of law contained either in the propriety of words, or in the discussion of equity, or in the conjecture of intention? Part of which overflows into the rational, part into the moral treatment.
§12.2.20ergo natura permixta est omnibus istis oratio, quae quidem oratio est vere.
Therefore speech, which is indeed truly speech, is by its nature mixed with all these.
nam ignara quidem huiusce doctrinae loquacitas erret necesse est, ut quae vel nullos vel falsos duces habeat.
For talkativeness, indeed, ignorant of this learning, must needs err, as one that has either no guides or false ones.
pars vero naturalis, cum est ad exercitationem dicendi tanto ceteris uberior, quanto maiore spiritu de divinis rebus quam humanis eloquendum est, tum illam etiam moralem, sine qua nulla esse, ut docuimus, oratio potest, totam complectitur.
But the natural part, while it is richer for the practice of speaking than the rest by as much as we must speak with greater spirit of divine things than of human, also embraces the whole of that moral part, without which, as we have taught, no speech can exist.
§12.2.21nam si regitur providentia mundus, administranda certe bonis viris erit res publica; si divina nostris animis origo, tendendum ad virtutem nec voluptatibus terreni corporis serviendum.
For if the world is ruled by providence, the state must certainly be administered by good men; if there is a divine origin to our minds, we must strive toward virtue and not serve the pleasures of the earthly body.
an haec non frequenter tractabit orator? iam de auguriis, responsis, religione denique omni, de quibus maxima saepe in senatu consilia versata sunt, non erit ei disserendum, si quidem, ut nobis placet, futurus est vir civilis idem? quae denique intelligi saltem potest eloquentia hominis optima nescientis?
Will the orator not treat these things frequently? Further, concerning auguries, responses, and indeed all religion, about which the greatest deliberations have often been engaged in the senate, will he not have to discourse, if indeed, as we desire, he is to be likewise a statesman? Finally, what eloquence can at least be understood of a man who is ignorant of the best things?