§6nihil enim scribit ei praedictum.
For he writes that nothing was predicted for him.
Quid mirum igitur ex spelunca saxum in crura eius incidisse? puto enim, etiamsi Icadius tum in spelunca non fuisset, saxum tamen illud casurum fuisse.
What wonder is it then that a stone fell from a cave onto his legs? For I think that, even if Icadius had not been in the cave at that time, that stone would still have fallen.
Nam aut nihil omnino est fortuitum, aut hoc ipsum potuit evenire fortuna.
For either nothing at all is fortuitous, or this very thing could have happened by fortune.
Quaero igitur (atque hoc late patebit), si fati omnino nullum nomen, nulla natura, nulla vis esset et forte temere casu aut pleraque fierent aut omnia, num aliter, ac nunc eveniunt, evenirent.
I ask therefore (and this will be widely applicable), if there were absolutely no name, no nature, no force of fate, and either most or all things happened by chance, blindly and by accident, would they happen otherwise than they do now?
Quid ergo adtinet inculcare fatum, cum sine fato ratio omnium rerum ad naturam fortunamve referatur?
What then is the point of introducing fate, when without fate the explanation of all things can be referred to nature or fortune?
§7Sed Posidonium, sicut aequum est, cum bona gratia dimittamus, ad Chrysippi laqueos revertamur.
But let us dismiss Posidonius, as is fair, with good grace, and return to the snares of Chrysippus.
Cui quidem primum de ipsa contagione rerum respondeamus, reliqua postea persequemur.
To him indeed let us first reply concerning that very contagion of things; the rest we will pursue later.
Inter locorum naturas quantum intersit, videmus; alios esse salubris, alios pestilentis, in aliis esse pituitosos et quasi redundantis, in aliis exsiccatos atque aridos; multaque sunt alia, quae inter locum et locum plurimum differant.
We see how much difference there is among the natures of places; that some are healthy, others pestilential, that in some they are phlegmatic and as it were overflowing, in others parched and dry; and there are many other things which differ greatly from place to place.
Athenis tenue caelum, ex quo etiam acutiores putantur Attici, crassum Thebis, itaque pingues Thebani et valentes.
At Athens the air is thin, from which the Attics are also thought to be sharper, thick at Thebes, and therefore the Thebans are fat and strong.
Tamen neque illud tenue caelum efficiet, ut aut Zenonem quis aut Arcesilam aut Theophrastum audiat, neque crassum, ut Nemea potius quam Isthmo victoriam petat.
Yet neither will that thin air bring it about that someone listens to Zeno or Arcesilas or Theophrastus, nor the thick air that he seeks victory at Nemea rather than at the Isthmus.
Diiunge longius.
Extend the division further.
§8Quid enim loci natura adferre potest, ut in porticu Pompeii potius quam in campo ambulemus? tecum quam cum alio? Idibus potius quam Kalendis? Ut igitur ad quasdam res natura loci pertinet aliquid, ad quasdam autem nihil, sic astrorum adfectio valeat, si vis, ad quasdam res, ad omnis certe non valebit.
For what can the nature of a place bring about, so that we walk in the portico of Pompey rather than in the field? with you rather than with another? on the Ides rather than on the Kalends? Just as therefore the nature of a place has some relevance to certain things, but none to others, so let the influence of the stars be powerful, if you wish, over certain things, but it certainly will not be powerful over all.
At enim, quoniam in naturis hominum dissimilitudines sunt, ut alios dulcia, alios subamara delectent, alii libidinosi, alii iracundi aut crudeles aut superbi sint, alii a talibus vitiis abhorreant,—quoniam igitur, inquit, tantum natura a natura distat, quid mirum est has dissimilitudines ex differentibus causis esse factas?
But indeed, since there are differences in the natures of men, so that sweet things delight some and slightly bitter things others, some are lustful, others angry or cruel or proud, and others shrink from such vices—since therefore, he says, nature differs so much from nature, what wonder is it that these differences have been produced by different causes?
§9Haec disserens, qua de re agatur, et in quo causa consistat, non videt.
Discussing these things, he does not see what the issue is, and on what the case stands.
Non enim, si alii ad alia propensiores sunt propter causas naturalis et antecedentis, idcirco etiam nostrarum voluntatum atque adpetitionum sunt causae naturales et antecedentes.
For it does not follow that, if some are more inclined to certain things because of natural and antecedent causes, therefore there are also natural and antecedent causes of our wills and desires.
Nam nihil esset in nostra potestate, si ita se res haberet.
For nothing would be in our power if the case were so.
Nunc vero fatemur, acuti hebetesne, valentes inbecilline simus, non esse id in nobis.
But as it is, we confess that whether we are sharp or dull, strong or weak, this is not in us.
Qui autem ex eo cogi putat, ne ut sedeamus quidem aut ambulemus voluntatis esse, is non videt, quae quamque rem res consequatur.
But he who thinks it follows from this that not even our sitting or walking is of our will, does not see what consequence follows from what.
Ut enim et ingeniosi et tardi ita nascantur antecedentibus causis itemque valentes et inbecilli, non sequitur tamen, ut etiam sedere eos et ambulare et rem agere aliquam principalibus causis definitum et constitutum sit.
For although both the talented and the slow are born so from antecedent causes, and likewise the strong and the weak, it does not therefore follow that their sitting and walking and doing some action is defined and established by principal causes.
§10Stilponem, Megaricum philosophum, acutum sane hominem et probatum temporibus illis accepimus.
We have received that Stilpo, the Megarian philosopher, was indeed a sharp man and approved in those times.
Hunc scribunt ipsius familiares et ebriosum et mulierosum fuisse, neque haec scribunt vituperantes, sed potius ad laudem; vitiosam enim naturam ab eo sic edomitam et conpressam esse doctrina, ut nemo umquam vinulentum illum, nemo in eo libidinis vestigium viderit.
His own associates write that he was both fond of wine and fond of women, and they write these things not in blame, but rather to his praise; for they say that his vicious nature was so subdued and compressed by training that no one ever saw him drunk, nor saw any trace of lust in him.
Quid? Socraten nonne legimus quem ad modum notarit Zopyrus physiognomon, qui se profitebatur hominum mores naturasque ex corpore, oculis, vultu, fronte pernoscere? stupidum esse Socraten dixit et bardum, quod iugula concava non haberet, obstructas eas partes et obturatas esse dicebat;
What? Do we not read how Socrates was characterized by the physiognomist Zopyrus, who professed to know thoroughly the characters and natures of men from their body, eyes, face, and forehead?
addidit etiam mulierosum; in quo Alcibiades cachinnum dicitur sustulisse.
He said that Socrates was stupid and thick-witted because he did not have concave collarbones; he said those parts were obstructed and blocked up; he also added that he was fond of women; at which Alcibiades is said to have burst into laughter.