§1quia pertinet ad mores, quod h)=qos illi vocant, nos eam partem philosophiae de moribus appellare solemus, sed decet augentem linguam Latinam nominare moralem; explicandaque vis est ratioque enuntiationum, quae Graeci a)ciw/mata vocant; quae de re futura cum aliquid dicunt deque eo, quod possit fieri aut non possit, quam vim habeant, obscura quaestio est, quam peri\ dunatw=n philosophi appellant, totaque est logikh/, quam rationem disserendi voco.
Because it pertains to character, which they call ethos, we are accustomed to call this part of philosophy 'on character', but it is fitting for one who is enriching the Latin language to name it 'moral'; and the force and logic of propositions, which the Greeks call axiomata, must be explained; as to what force they have when they say something about a future event and about that which can or cannot happen, this is an obscure question, which philosophers call 'concerning possibilities', and it is entirely logical, which I call the art of discussion.
Quod autem in aliis libris feci, qui sunt de natura deorum, itemque in iis, quos de divinatione edidi, ut in utramque partem perpetua explicaretur oratio, quo facilius id a quoque probaretur, quod cuique maxime probabile videretur, id in hac disputatione de fato casus quidam ne facerem inpedivit.
But whereas in other books, which are on the nature of the gods, and likewise in those which I published on divination, I did this—so that a continuous speech might be unfolded on both sides, in order that what seemed most probable to each person might be more easily approved by them—a certain circumstance prevented me from doing this in this discussion on fate.
§2Nam cum essem in Puteolano Hirtiusque noster, consul designatus, isdem in locis, vir nobis amicissimus et his studiis, in quibus nos a pueritia viximus, deditus, multum una eramus, maxime nos quidem exquirentes ea consilia, quae ad pacem et ad concordiam civium pertinerent.
For when I was in my Puteolan villa and our friend Hirtius, the consul-designate, was in the same places—a man most friendly to us and devoted to these studies in which we have lived since childhood—we were much together, especially seeking those plans which might pertain to the peace and harmony of the citizens.
Cum enim omnes post interitum Caesaris novarum perturbationum causae quaeri viderentur iisque esse occurrendum putaremus, omnis fere nostra in his deliberationibus consumebatur oratio, idque et saepe alias et quodam liberiore, quam solebat, et magis vacuo ab interventoribus die, cum ad me ille venisset, primo ea, quae erant cotidiana et quasi legitima nobis, de pace et de otio.
For since after the death of Caesar all the causes of new disturbances seemed to be sought out and we thought they had to be confronted, almost all our conversation was consumed in these deliberations, and that both often at other times and on a certain day more free than usual and more vacant of intruders, when he had come to me, [we discussed] at first those things which were daily and as it were regular for us, concerning peace and leisure.
§3Quibus actis Quid ergo? inquit ille, quoniam oratorias exercitationes non tu quidem, ut spero, reliquisti, sed certe philosophiam illis anteposuisti, possumne aliquid audire? Tu vero, inquam, vel audire vel dicere; nec enim, id quod recte existimas, oratoria illa studia deserui, quibus etiam te incendi, quamquam flagrantissumum acceperam, nec ea, quae nunc tracto, minuunt, sed augent potius illam facultatem.
These things having been done, 'What then?' he said, 'since you have not indeed, as I hope, abandoned your rhetorical exercises, but certainly have preferred philosophy to them, can I hear something?' 'You indeed,' I said, 'may either hear or speak; for neither have I deserted those rhetorical studies—as you rightly think—by which I also inflamed you, although I had received you already most burning, nor do these things which I now treat diminish, but rather increase that faculty.
Nam cum hoc genere philosophiae, quod nos sequimur, magnam habet orator societatem; subtilitatem enim ab Academia mutuatur et ei vicissim reddit ubertatem orationis et ornamenta dicendi.
For the orator has a great partnership with this kind of philosophy which we follow; for he borrows subtlety from the Academy, and in turn restores to it richness of speech and the ornaments of speaking.
Quam ob rem, inquam, quoniam utriusque studii nostra possessio est, hodie, utro frui malis, optio sit tua. Tum Hirtius: Gratissumum, inquit, et tuorum omnium simile; nihil enim umquam abnuit meo studio voluntas tua. §4Sed quoniam rhetorica mihi vestra sunt nota teque in iis et audivimus saepe et audiemus atque hanc Academicorum contra propositum disputandi consuetudinem indicant te suscepisse Tusculanae disputationes, ponere aliquid, ad quod audiam, si tibi non est molestum, volo.
Therefore,' I said, 'since the possession of both studies is ours, today let the choice be yours, which of the two you would prefer to enjoy.' Then Hirtius said: 'Most grateful, and like all your actions; for your goodwill has never refused anything to my desire.' 'But since your rhetoric is known to me, and we have both often heard you in those matters and will hear you, and the Tusculan Disputations indicate that you have undertaken this Academic custom of disputing against a proposition, I wish, if it is not troublesome to you, to propose something to which I may listen.' 'Can anything be troublesome to me,' I said, 'which will be pleasing to you?
An mihi, inquam, potest quicquam esse molestum, quod tibi gratum futurum sit? Sed ita audies, ut Romanum hominem, ut timide ingredientem ad hoc genus disputandi, ut longo intervallo haec studia repetentem. Ita, inquit, audiam te disputantem, ut ea lego, quae scripsisti.
But you will listen to me as a Roman, as one entering timidly into this kind of disputing, and as one returning to these studies after a long interval.' 'I will listen to you disputing,' he said, 'just as I read those things which you have written.
Proinde ordire.
Therefore, begin.
Considamus hic. §5quorum in aliis, ut in Antipatro poe+ta, ut in brumali die natis, ut in simul aegrotantibus fratribus, ut in urina, ut in unguibus, ut in reliquis eius modi, naturae contagio valet, quam ego non tollo, vis est nulla fatalis; in aliis autem fortuita quaedam esse possunt, ut in illo naufrago, ut in Icadio, ut in Daphita; quaedam etiam Posidonius (pace magistri dixerim) comminisci videtur; sunt quidem absurda.
Let us sit down here.' In some of these, as in the poet Antipater, as in those born on the winter solstice, as in brothers falling ill at the same time, as in urine, as in nails, as in other things of this kind, the contagion of nature is powerful, which I do not deny, but there is no fatal force; in others, however, there can be certain fortuitous things, as in that shipwrecked man, as in Icadius, as in Daphitas; some things indeed Posidonius (may I say so with my master's leave) seems to make up; they are indeed absurd.
Quid enim? si Daphitae fatum fuit ex equo cadere atque ita perire, ex hocne equo, qui cum equus non esset, nomen habebat alienum? aut Philippus hasne in capulo quadrigulas vitare monebatur? quasi vero capulo sit occisus.
For what? If it was Daphitas's fate to fall from a horse and so perish, was it from this horse, which, since it was not a horse, had a borrowed name? Or was Philip warned to avoid these little four-horse chariots on his sword-hilt? As if indeed he was killed by a hilt!
Quid autem magnum aut naufragum illum sine nomine in rivo esse lapsum? (quamquam huic quidem hic scribit praedictum in aqua esse pereundum); ne hercule Icadii quidem praedonis video fatum ullum;
And what is so great about that nameless shipwrecked man slipping in a stream? (although to this man indeed he writes it was predicted that he must perish in water); nor indeed by Hercules do I see any fate of the pirate Icadius.