§3.36.1ἵνα δὲ μὴ τῶν τόπων ἀγνοουμένων παντάπασιν ἀσαφῆ γίνεσθαι συμβαίνῃ τὴν διήγησιν, ῥητέον ἂν εἴη πόθεν ὁρμήσας Ἀννίβας καὶ τίνας καὶ πόσους διελθὼν τόπους εἰς ποῖα μέρη κατῆρε τῆς Ἰταλίας.
In order that the narrative may not become altogether obscure through the places being unknown, it should be stated from where Hannibal started, and what and how many places he traversed, to arrive at what parts of Italy.
§3.36.2ῥητέον δʼ οὐκ αὐτὰς τὰς ὀνομασίας τῶν τόπων καὶ ποταμῶν καὶ πόλεων, ὅπερ ἔνιοι ποιοῦσι τῶν συγγραφέων, ὑπολαμβάνοντες ἐν παντὶ πρὸς γνῶσιν καὶ σαφήνειαν αὐτοτελὲς εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ μέρος.
But we must not state merely the names themselves of the places, rivers, and cities, as some writers do, supposing that in every case this part is of itself sufficient for knowledge and clearness.
§3.36.3οἶμαι δʼ, ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν γνωριζομένων τόπων οὐ μικρὰ μεγάλα δὲ συμβάλλεσθαι πεποίηκε πρὸς ἀνάμνησιν ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων παράθεσις· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀγνοουμένων εἰς τέλος ὁμοίαν ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐξήγησις ταῖς ἀδιανοήτοις καὶ κρουσματικαῖς λέξεσι.
For I think that, in the case of known places, the presentation of names contributes not a little, but greatly, to remembrance; but in the case of unknown ones, the explanation of names has a power altogether similar to unintelligible and meaningless sounds.
§3.36.4τῆς γὰρ διανοίας ἐπʼ οὐδὲν ἀπερειδομένης οὐδὲ δυναμένης ἐφαρμόττειν τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπʼ οὐδὲν γνώριμον, ἀνυπότακτος καὶ κωφὴ γίνεθʼ ἡ διήγησις.
For when the mind relies on nothing, and is unable to apply what is said to anything known, the narrative becomes disconnected and dumb.
§3.36.5διόπερ ὑποδεικτέος ἂν εἴη τρόπος, διʼ οὗ δυνατὸν ἔσται περὶ τῶν ἀγνοουμένων λέγοντας κατὰ ποσὸν εἰς ἀληθινὰς καὶ γνωρίμους ἐννοίας ἄγειν τοὺς ἀκούοντας.
Therefore, a method must be pointed out, by which it will be possible, when speaking of unknown things, to lead the hearers to some extent to true and familiar concepts.
πρώτη μὲν οὖν καὶ μεγίστη γνῶσις, §3.36.6ἔτι δὲ κοινὴ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἡμᾶς διαίρεσις καὶ τάξις, καθʼ ἣν πάντες, ὧν καὶ μικρὸν ὄφελος, ἀνατολάς, δύσεις, μεσημβρίαν, ἄρκτον γνωρίζομεν· §3.36.7δευτέρα δέ, καθʼ ἣν ἑκάστῃ διαφορᾷ τῶν προειρημένων τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς τόπους ὑποτάττοντες καὶ φέροντες ἀεὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπί τι τῶν προειρημένων εἰς γνωρίμους καὶ συνήθεις ἐπινοίας ἐμπίπτομεν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀγνώστων καὶ
Now, the first and greatest knowledge, and moreover common to all men, is the division and order of that which surrounds us, according to which all men, of whom there is even a little use, know East, West, South, and North; and the second is that, by subordinating the places on earth to each of the aforementioned divisions, and always referring in thought what is said to one of the aforementioned directions, we fall into known and familiar conceptions concerning unknown places; and...