§1.54.1ὁ δʼ ἐν ταῖς Συρακούσαις ὑπολειφθεὶς στρατηγός, ἐπεὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν ἐπετέλεσεν, κάμψας τὸν Πάχυνον ἐποιεῖτο τὸν πλοῦν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ Λιλύβαιον, οὐδὲν εἰδὼς τῶν περὶ τοὺς προπλέοντας συμβεβηκότων. §1.54.2ὁ δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ναύαρχος, σημηνάντων τῶν σκοπῶν αὐτῷ πάλιν τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν τῶν ὑπεναντίων, ἀναχθεὶς ἔπλει μετὰ σπουδῆς, βουλόμενος αὐτοῖς ὡς πλεῖστον ἀπέχουσι τῶν οἰκείων νεῶν συμβαλεῖν. §1.54.3ὁ δʼ Ἰούνιος κατιδὼν ἐκ πολλοῦ τὸν στόλον τὸν τῶν Καρχηδονίων καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν σκαφῶν, οὔτε συμβαλεῖν τολμῶν οὔτʼ ἐκφυγεῖν ἔτι δυνατὸς ὢν διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς εἶναι τοὺς πολεμίους, ἐγκλίνας εἰς τόπους τραχεῖς καὶ κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἐπισφαλεῖς καθωρμίσθη, §1.54.4κρίνων αἱρετώτερον ὑπάρχειν ὅ,τι δέοι παθεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς πολεμίοις αὔτανδρον τὸ σφέτερον στρατόπεδον ὑποχείριον ποιῆσαι. §1.54.5συνιδὼν δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τούτου γεγονὸς ὁ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ναύαρχος τὸ μὲν παραβάλλεσθαι καὶ προσάγειν τοιούτοις τόποις ἀπεδοκίμασε, λαβὼν δʼ ἄκραν τινὰ καὶ προσορμισθεὶς ταύτῃ μεταξὺ τῶν στόλων ἐτήρει καὶ προσεῖχε τὸν νοῦν ἀμφοτέροις. §1.54.6ἐπιγενομένου δὲ χειμῶνος καὶ περιστάσεως προφαινομένης ἐκ τοῦ πελάγους ὁλοσχερεστέρας, οἱ μὲν τῶν Καρχηδονίων κυβερνῆται διά τε τὴν τῶν τόπων καὶ τὴν τοῦ πράγματος ἐμπειρίαν προορώμενοι τὸ μέλλον καὶ προλέγοντες τὸ συμβησόμενον ἔπεισαν τὸν Καρθάλωνα φυγεῖν τὸν χειμῶνα καὶ κάμψαι τὴν ἄκραν τοῦ Παχύνου. §1.54.7πεισθέντος δὲ νουνεχῶς, οὗτοι μὲν πολλὰ μοχθήσαντες καὶ μόλις ὑπεράραντες τὴν ἄκραν ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ καθωρμίσθησαν, §1.54.8οἱ δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων στόλοι, τοῦ χειμῶνος ἐπιγενομένου καὶ τῶν τόπων εἰς τέλος ὑπαρχόντων ἀλιμένων, οὕτως διεφθάρησαν ὥστε μηδὲ τῶν ναυαγίων μηδὲν γενέσθαι χρήσιμον, ἀλλʼ ἀμφοτέρους αὐτοὺς ἄρδην καὶ παραλόγως ἀχρειωθῆναι.
The commander who had been left behind in Syracuse, after he had completed his intended duties, rounded Cape Pachynus and made his voyage towards Lilybaeum, knowing nothing of what had happened to those who had sailed on ahead. But the Carthaginian admiral, when his scouts signaled to him again the appearance of the enemy, put to sea and sailed with haste, wishing to engage them while they were as far away as possible from their own ships. Junius, having sighted the Carthaginian fleet and the great number of their vessels from a distance, neither daring to engage them nor being able to escape because the enemy were so close, turned aside into rugged and in every way precarious places and anchored there, judging that it was preferable to suffer whatever they might have to suffer rather than deliver their own force, crew and all, into the hands of the enemy. The Carthaginian admiral, having perceived what had happened in this regard, rejected the idea of exposing his ships to risk by approaching such places; instead, holding a certain headland and anchoring there, he kept watch between the two fleets and directed his attention to both. But when a storm came on, and a more severe gale was visibly approaching from the open sea, the Carthaginian pilots, foreseeing the future and predicting what would happen owing to their experience both of the locality and of the weather, persuaded Carthalo to escape the storm and round Cape Pachynus. He having wisely followed their advice, they, after much labor and with great difficulty doubling the cape, anchored in safety. But the Roman fleets, when the storm fell upon them and the locality was utterly devoid of harbors, were so completely destroyed that not even any of the wreckage could be of any use, and both of them were utterly and unexpectedly rendered useless.