§16ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ὅθεν δὴ καὶ ὁ πρῶτος λόγος εἰκότως ἄν τις καὶ τὸ περὶ τῆς ἠρεμίας ἀπορήσειεν.
But among the principles—from which indeed the first argument also [starts]—one might reasonably be puzzled also about the matter of rest.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὡς βέλτιον ἀνάψειεν ἂν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, εἰ δ᾽ ὡς ἀργία καὶ στέρησις τῆς κινήσεως οὐκ ἀνάψει.
For if [rest is taken] as something better, one would connect it to the principles, but if as inactivity and privation of motion, one will not connect it.
ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ, τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀντιμεταλλακτέον ὡς προτέραν καὶ τιμωτέραν τὴν δὲ κίνησιν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς· ἐπεὶ τό γε διὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἠρεμεῖν ὡς ἀδύνατον ἀεὶ κινοῦν εἶναι τὸ κινοῦν ἄτοπον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη κίνδυνος πρῶτον μὴ λογοειδὲς καὶ ἄλλως οὐκ ἀξιόπιστον ἀλλὰ μείζω τινὰ αἰτίαν ζητεῖ.
But if indeed [one connects it], one must substitute activity as prior and more honorable, and place motion among sensible things; since at any rate to be at rest for this reason, namely that it is impossible for the mover to be always moving [something], is absurd; for there would be no danger of the first thing not being rational, and otherwise [this argument] is not credible, but seeks some greater cause.
δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις τρόπον τινὰ συναυδᾶν ὡς ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ ἀεὶ τὸ κινοῦν ἕτερον εἶναι καὶ ὃ κινεῖ διὰ τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν.
And sensation also seems in a way to agree that it is possible for the mover and that which is moved not always to be different, through acting and being acted upon.
ἔστι δὲ ἄν τις ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν ἄγῃ τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὸν θεόν.
And this is [so], if one leads [the argument] to the intellect itself and to God.
ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἕτερον λεχθὲν ὡς οὐ μιμοῦνται τὰ ὀρεγόμενα τοῦ ἠρεμοῦντος· εἰ γὰρ αὐτοῖς οὖσιν ἀκολουθείη τῶν ἄλλων.
And the other thing said is also absurd, namely that things which desire do not imitate that which is at rest; for if they [the principles] were existing [in rest], the [motion] of the other things would follow them.
πλὴν ἴσως οὐχ ὁμοίως ληπτέον ὡς εἰς τὸ ἀμερὲς ἄγοντας ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα σύμφωνον ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἀπηρτισμένον ὡς ἂν πόλις ἢ ζῶον ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν μεριστῶν, ἢ καὶ ὁ ὅλος οὐρανὸς ὃν δή φασιν εἶναι τελεώτατον. §17ἐπιποθεῖ δέ τινα καὶ τὰ τοιάδε λόγον πῶς ποτὲ τῶν ὄντων ὁ μερισμὸς εἰς ὕλην καὶ μορφήν· πότερον ὡς τὸ μὲν ὂν τὸ δὲ μὴ ὂν, δυνάμει μὲν ὂν καὶ ἀγόμενον εἰς ἐνέργειαν;
Except that perhaps we should not take it in the same way, as if leading to the indivisible, but so that it is as much as possible in harmony with itself and self-complete, like a city or an animal or any other of the things that have parts, or even the whole heaven, which indeed they say is most complete. And such matters also require some explanation, as to how on earth the division of beings into matter and form [takes place]: whether as one being and the other non-being, [the latter] being potentially and being led to activity?
ἢ ὂν μὲν, ἀόριστον δὲ καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς τέχναις, ἡ δὲ γένεσις τῆς οὐσίας ἕνεκα τὸ μορφοῦσθαι κατὰ τοὺς λόγους.
Or as being indeed, but undetermined as in the arts, and the generation of substance is for the sake of being shaped in accordance with the formulas?
ἀλλ᾽ οὕτω γ᾽ εἰς μὲν τὸ βέλτιον τάχ᾽ ἂν ἡ μετάβασις εἴη, τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι οὐθὲν ἂν ἦττον ἀληθὲς ὑπάρχοι κατ᾽ αὐτὴν — οὐ γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲ γίγνοιτο μὴ ὑπαρχούσης —, ἀλλὰ τὸ μήτε τόδε μήτε ποιὸν μήτε ποσὸν, ὡς ἀόριστον τοῖς εἴδεσι δύναμιν δέ τιν᾽ ἔχον.
But at least if it is so, the transition would perhaps be to the better, but being would belong to it [matter] itself no less truly—for nothing indeed would come to be if it did not exist—except as being neither a 'this' nor qualified nor quantified, as being undetermined in forms but having some potentiality.
ὅλως δὲ κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν ληπτέον ἐπὶ τὰς τέχνας καὶ εἴ τις ὁμοιότης ἄλλη. §18δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἔχειν ἀπορίαν, εἴ μὴ ἄρα περιεργίαν τοῦ ζητεῖν τί δή ποτε ἡ φύσις καὶ ἡ ὅλη δ᾽ οὐσία τοῦ παντὸς ἐν ἐναντίοις ἐστὶ, καὶ σχεδὸν ἰσομοιρεῖ τὸ χεῖρον τῷ βελτίονι, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ πολλῷ πλέον ἐστὶν, ὥστε δοκεῖν καὶ Κύριπίδην καθόλου λέγειν ὡς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο χωρὶς ἐσθλά.
In general, one must grasp this by analogy with the arts and whatever other similarity there may be. And this also would seem to present a difficulty—unless indeed the inquiry is superfluous: why on earth the nature and indeed the whole substance of the universe is in opposites, and the worse shares almost equally with the better, or rather is even much more abundant, so that Euripides also seems to speak generally that good things cannot come to be apart [from bad]?
ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος λόγος ἐγγὺς τοῦ ζητεῖν ὅτι οὐ πάντ᾽ ἀγαθὰ οὐδὲ πάντα ὅμοια· καὶ ὅτι κατὰ πάντων μὲν τὸ εἶναι λέγομεν, οὐθὲν δὲ ὅμοιον ἀλλήλοις καθάπερ τὰ λευκὰ καὶ μέλανα ἐν αὐτοῖς.
But such an argument is close to inquiring why all things are not good nor all things alike, and why, though we predicate being of all things, nothing is alike to one another, just as white and black things among themselves.
ἔτι δὲ τὸ δοκοῦν παραδοξότερον ὡς οὐχ οἷόν τε τὸ ὂν ἄνευ τῶν ἐναντίων.
And further, what seems more paradoxical, that being is not possible without opposites.
οἱ δ᾽ ἔτι πλέονι τῷ παραδόξῳ χρώμενοι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν μηδὲ γεγονὸς μηδὲ μέλλον προσκαταριθμοῦσιν εἰς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φύσιν.
And those who employ an even greater paradox reckon also non-being, which has neither come to be nor is going to be, as belonging in addition to the nature of the universe.
ἀλλ᾽ ἥδε μὲν οἷον ὑπέρβατός τις σοφία. §19τὸ δὲ ὂν ὅτι πολλαχῶς φανερόν· ἡ γὰρ αἴσθησις καὶ τὰς διαφορὰς θεωρεῖ καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ζητεῖ·
But this is, as it were, some transcendent wisdom. That being is [said] in many ways is clear; for sensation both contemplates differences and seeks causes.
τάχα δ᾽ ἀληθέστερον εἰπεῖν ὡς ὑποβάλλει τῇ διανοίᾳ, τὰ μὲν ἁπλῶς ζητοῦσα, τὰ δ᾽ ἀπορίαν ἐργαζομένη δι᾽ ἧς κἂν μὴ δύνηται προβαίνειν ὅμως ἐμφαίνεταί τι φῶς ἐν τῷ μὴ φωτὶ ζητούντων ἐπὶ πλέον.
But perhaps it is truer to say that it supplies [material] to thought, in some cases simply inquiring, in others producing a difficulty through which, even if one cannot advance, nevertheless some light appears in the non-light for those who inquire further.
τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἄρα οὐκ ἄνευ διαφορᾶς τινός. εἴτε γὰρ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων διαφορά τις·
Knowing, therefore, is not without some difference.
ἔν τε τοῖς καθόλου πλειόνων ὄντων τῶν ὑπὸ τὰ καθόλου διαφέρειν ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα, ἐάν τε γένη τὰ καθόλου ἐάν τε εἴδη.
For whether they are different from one another, there is some difference; and in the case of universals, when there are several things under the universals, these also must necessarily differ, whether the universals are genera or species.