§20σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμη πᾶσα τῶν ἰδίων· ἣ τε γὰρ οὐσία καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἴδιον, τά τε θεωρούμενα καθ᾽ αὑτὰ καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἦν ἄν τι κατά τινος.
And indeed almost all knowledge is of what is peculiar; for both the substance and the essence of each thing is peculiar [to it], and the things contemplated in themselves and not accidentally would be something predicated of something.
ὅλως δὲ τὸ ἐν πλείοσι τὸ αὐτὸ συνιδεῖν ἐπιστήμης, ἤτοι κοινῇ καὶ καθόλου λεγόμενον, ἢ ἰδίᾳ πως καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, οἷον ἀριθμοῖς γραμμαῖς ζώοις φυτοῖς.
But in general, to discern the same thing in several is characteristic of knowledge, whether expressed commonly and universally, or in some way peculiarly for each, as for numbers, lines, animals, and plants.
τέλος δ᾽ ἡ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν.
And the end is that from both.
ἔστι δ᾽ ἐνίων μὲν τὸ καθόλου τέλος, ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ τὸ αἴτιον· τῶν δὲ τὸ ἐν μέρει, καθ᾽ ὅσα διαίρεσις εἰς τὰ ἄτομα καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς καὶ ποιητοῖς· οὕτως γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ ἐνέργεια. §21ταὐτὸ δ᾽ ἐπιστάμεθα καὶ οὐσίᾳ καὶ ἀριθμῷ καὶ εἴδει καὶ γένει καὶ ἀναλογίᾳ καὶ εἰ ἄρα παρὰ ταῦτα διαιρέσει.
For of some things the universal is the end, for in this is the cause; and of others the particular, so far as division is into indivisible things, as in practical and productive matters; for in this way is their activity. And we know the same thing by substance, and number, and form, and genus, and analogy, and if indeed besides these, by division.
διὰ πλείστου δὲ τὸ κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν ὡς ἂν ἀπέχοντες πλεῖστον τὰ μὲν δι᾽ ἡμὰς αὐτοὺς τὰ δὲ διὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον τὰ δὲ διὰ τἄμφω. §22πλεοναχῶς δ᾽ ὄντος τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι πῶς ἕκαστον μεταδιωκτέον ἀρχὴ καὶ μέγιστον ὁ οἰκεῖος τρόπος, οἷον τὰ πρῶτα καὶ νοητὰ καὶ τὰ κινητὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τὴν φύσιν, αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰ ἐν ἀρχῇ καὶ τὰ ἑπόμενα μέχρι ζώων καὶ φυτῶν καὶ ἐσχάτων τῶν ἀψύχων.
But that which is by analogy is through the greatest distance, as if we were furthest removed, some because of ourselves, some because of the subject matter, and some because of both. And since knowing is in many ways, how each must be pursued, the starting point and greatest thing is the appropriate method, as for example the first and intelligible things, and the movable and natural things, and among these very things, those at the beginning and those that follow, down to animals and plants and the lowest of inanimate things.
ἔστι γάρ τι καθ᾽ ἕκαστον γένος ἴδιον ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς. §23ἔχει δὲ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ μαθήματα διαφορὰν καίπερ ὁμογενῆ πως ὄντα, διῄρηται δ᾽ ἱκανῶς.
For there is something proper to each genus, just as also in mathematical sciences. And the mathematical sciences themselves have difference, although being in a way of the same genus, and they have been sufficiently divided.
εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔνια γνωστὰ τῷ ἄγνωστα εἶναι, καθάπερ τινές φασιν, ἴδιος ἂν ὁ τρόπος εἴη, διαιρέσεως δέ τινος δεῖται· τάχα δ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ὧν ἐνδέχεται κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν οἰκειότερον λέγειν ἢ αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγνώστῳ, καθάπερ εἴ τις τῷ ἀοράτῳ τὸ ὁρατόν.
And if indeed some things are known by being unknown, as some say, the method would be peculiar, and requires some division; but perhaps, in cases where it is possible, it is more appropriate to speak by analogy than by the unknown itself, just as if one [were to speak of] the visible [in relation] to the invisible.
πόσοι δ᾽ οὖν τρόποι καὶ ποσαχῶς τὸ εἰδέναι πειρατέον διελεῖν. §24ἡ δ᾽ ἀρχὴ πρὸς αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ πρῶτον τὸ ἀφορίσαι τί τὸ ἐπίστασθαι.
However many the methods and in how many ways knowing is, we must try to divide them. And the starting point for these very things and first is to define what knowing is.
χαλεπώτερον δ᾽ ἂν δόξειεν· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε καθόλου καὶ κοινόν τι λαβεῖν ἐν τοῖς πλεοναχῶς λεγομένοις.
But it would seem rather difficult; for it is not possible to grasp something universal and common in things said in many ways.
ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ᾽ἄπορον ἢ οὐ ῥᾴδιόν γε εἰπεῖν μέχρι πόσου καὶ τίνων ζητητέ᾽ον αἰτίας ὁμοίως ἔν τε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καὶ νοητοῖς· ἡ γὰρ εἰς τὸ ἄπειρον ὁδὸς ἐν ἀμφοῖν ἀλλοτρία καὶ ἀναιροῦσα τὸ φρονεῖν.
Since this also is puzzling, or at least not easy to say, up to what point and of what things we must seek causes equally in sensible and intelligible things; for the path to infinity in both is alien and destructive of thinking.
ἀρχὴ δὲ τρόπον τινὰ ἄμφω.
But in a way both are starting points.
τάχα δ᾽ ἡ μὲν ἡμῖν ἡ δ᾽ ἁπλῶς, ἢ τὸ μὲν τέλος ἡ δ᾽ ἡμετέρα τις ἀρχή. §25μέχρι μὲν οὖν τινὸς δυνάμεθα δι᾽ αἰτίου θεωρεῖν ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων λαμβάνοντες.
And perhaps one is for us, and the other absolutely, or one is the end and the other is some starting point of ours. Up to a certain point, then, we can contemplate through cause, taking starting points from sensations.
ὅταν δὲ ἐπ᾽ αὐτὰ τὰ ἄκρα καὶ πρῶτα μεταβαίνωμεν οὐκέτι δυνάμεθα, εἴτε διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν αἰτίαν εἴτε διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀσθένειαν ὥσπερ πρὸς τὰ φωτεινότατα βλέπειν.
But when we transition to the very extremes and first things, we can no longer do so, whether because they have no cause, or because of our weakness, just like looking towards the brightest things.
τάχα δ᾽ ἐκεῖνο ἀληθέστερον ὡς αὐτῷ τῷ νῷ ἡ θεωρία θιγόντι καὶ οἷον ἁψαμένῳ, διὸ καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπατὴ περὶ αὐτά. §26χαλεπὴ δὲ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦθ᾽ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ πίστις, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλως μέγα καὶ πρὸς τὰς καθ᾽ ἕκαστα πραγματείας ἀναγκαῖον καὶ μάλιστα τὰς μεγίστας, ἐν τίνι ποιητέον τὸν ὅρον, οἷον περί τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ περὶ τὰς ἔτι προτέρας.
But perhaps that is truer, namely that contemplation belongs to the intellect itself by touching and, as it were, grasping them, wherefore also there is no deception concerning them. And comprehension and belief in this very thing is also difficult, since in other respects too it is great and necessary for particular investigations and especially the greatest ones—namely, in what we must place the limit, as for example concerning nature and concerning those things that are even prior [to it].
οί γὰρ ἀπάντων ζητοῦντες λόγον ἀναιροῦσι λόγον ἅμα δὲ καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι.
For those who seek an explanation for everything destroy explanation, and at the same time knowing as well.
μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἀληθέστερον εἰπεῖν ὅτι ζητοῦσιν ὧν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ πέφυκεν ὅσοι τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀΐδιον ὑπολαμβάνουσιν.
But rather it is truer to say that they seek what does not exist and is not by nature, as many as assume that the heaven is eternal.