§Zenon.4.11Ὤστε καὶ τὸ ὃν ἢ ἄπειρον ἢ πέρας ἔχον ἐστίν.
Consequently, the existent is also either infinite or limited.
Ἴσως δὲ ἄτοπον καὶ τὸ προσάπτειν τῷ μὴ ὄντι ἀπειρίαν.
But it is perhaps also absurd to attribute infinity to the non-existent.
Οὐ γὰρ πᾶν, εἰ μὴ ἔχει πέρας, ἄπειρον λέγομεν, ὥσπερ οὐδʼ ἄνισον οὐκ ἂν φαῖμεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν.
For we do not call everything "infinite" if it does not have a limit, just as we would not say that the non-existent is unequal either.
Ἔτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι ὁ θεὸς πέρας εἶς ὤν, ἀλλʼ οὐ πρὸς θεόν.
Furthermore, God, being one, would not have a limit, but not in relation to God.
Εἰ δὲ ἓν μόνον ἐστίν, ὁ θεὸς ἂν εἴη μόνον καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ μέρη.
But if there is only one, God alone and the parts of God would exist.
§Zenon.4.12Ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτʼ ἄτοπον, εἰ τοῖς πολλοῖς συμβέβηκε πεπεράνθαι πρὸς ἄλληλα, διὰ τοῦτο τὸ ἓν μὴ ἔχειν πέρας.
For it is also absurd if, because it happens to the many to be limited in relation to one another, on this account the one does not have a limit.
Πολλὰ γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ ὑπάρχει ταὐτά, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ εἶναι κοινὸν αὐτοῖς ἐστίν.
For many of the same things belong both to the many and to the one, since existence itself is also common to them.
Ἄτοπον οὖν ἴσως ἂν εἴη, εἰ διὰ τοῦτο μὴ φαῖμεν εἶναι τὸν θεόν, εἰ τὰ πολλά ἐστιν, ὅπως μὴ ὅμοιον ἔσται αὐτοῖς ταύτῃ,
It would therefore perhaps be absurd if, because the many exist, we were to say on this account that God does not exist, in order that He might not be similar to them in this respect.
§Zenon.4.13Ἔτι τί κωλύει πεπεράνθαι καὶ ἔχειν πέρατα ἓν ὄντα τὸν θεόν;
Furthermore, what prevents God, being one, from being limited and having limits?
Ὡς καὶ ὁ Παρμενίδης λέγει ἓν ὄν εἶναι αὐτὸν
"πάντοθεν εὐκύκλου σφαίρας ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ, μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλές,"
Τὸ γὰρ πέρας τινὸς μὲν ἀνάγκη ἴσως εἶναι, οὐ μέντοι πρός τί γε, οὐδὲ ἀνάγκη τὸ ἔχον πέρας πρός τι ἔχειν πέρας, ὡς πεπερασμένον πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἐφεξῆς ἀπείρου, ἀλλʼ ἐστὶ τὸ πεπεράνθαι ἔσχατα ἔχειν, ἔσχατα δʼ ἔχον οὐκ ἀνάγκη πρός τι ἔχειν.
As Parmenides also says that He, being one, is: "like the mass of a well-rounded sphere from every side, equally balanced from the center," For a limit is perhaps necessarily a limit of something, but not indeed in relation to something; nor is it necessary that what has a limit has a limit in relation to something, as if it were limited in relation to what is not adjacent to the infinite. Rather, to be limited is to have extremities, and what has extremities does not necessarily have them in relation to something.
§Zenon.4.14Ἐνίοις μὲν οὐ συμβαίνει πᾶν καὶ πεπεράνθαι.
For some things it does not happen that everything is also limited.
Πάλιν περὶ τοῦ ἀκίνητον εἶναι τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ὅν, ὅτι καὶ τὸ ὂν κινεῖται, ἴσως ὁμοίως τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἄτοπον.
Again, concerning the one and the existent being motionless, that the existent also moves is perhaps similarly absurd as the previous arguments.
§Zenon.4.15Καὶ ἔτι ἆρά γε οὐ ταὐτὸ ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι τὸ μὴ κινεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀκίνητον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀπόφασιν τοῦ κινεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ τὸ μὴ ἴσον, ὅπερ καὶ κατὰ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, εἴπερ ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ ἀκίνητον τῷ ἔχειν πως ἤδη λέγεσθαι, ὥσπερ τὸ ἄνισον, καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι τῷ ἠρεμεῖν, ὡς καὶ σχεδὸν οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ α ἀποφάσεις ἐπὶ ἐναντίοις λέγονται.
And furthermore, would one not suppose that not-moving and being motionless are not the same thing? Rather, the former is a negation of moving (just like "not-equal," which can also be said of the non-existent, if indeed it is true), whereas being motionless is already said by having a certain state (just like "unequal," and it is applied to the opposite of moving, which is resting, just as almost all negations starting with alpha are said of opposites).
§Zenon.4.16Τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ κινεῖσθαι ἀληθὲς ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, τὸ δὲ ἠρεμεῖν οὐχ ὑπάρχει τῷ μὴ ὄντι.
Therefore, not-moving is true of the non-existent, but resting does not belong to the non-existent.
Ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ ἀκίνητον εἶναι σημαίνει ταὐτόν.
Similarly, being motionless does not signify the same thing either.
Ἀλλ' οὗτος ἐπὶ τῷ ἠρεμεῖν αὐτῷ χρῆται, καὶ φησὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ρεμεῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει μετάβασιν.
But this man uses it in the sense of resting, and says that the non-existent rests, because it has no transition.
§Zenon.4.17Ὄπερ τε καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄνω εἴπομεν, ἄτοπον ἴσως, εἴ τι τῷ μὴ ὄντι προσάπτομεν, τοῦτο μὴ ἀληθὲς εἶναι κατὰ τοῦ ὄντος εἰπεῖν, ἄλλως τε κἂν ἀπόφασις ᾖ τὸ λεχθέν, τῶν καὶ τὸ μὴ κινεῖσθαι μηδὲ μεταλαμβάνειν ἐστίν.
And as we also said in the above, it is perhaps absurd if, when we attribute something to the non-existent, it is not true to say this of the existent, especially if what is said is a negation, among which are also not-moving and not-participating.
Πολλὰ γὰρ ἄν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐλέχθη, ἀφαιροῖτο τῶν ὄντων κατηγορεῖ.
For indeed, as was also said, many things would be taken away from being predicated of the existent.
§Zenon.4.18Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν πολλὰ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν εἴη μὴ ἕν, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἐστὶ μὴ ἕν, εἴτε ἐπʼ ἐνίων τἀναντία ξυμβαίνειν δοκεῖ κατὰ τοσαύτας ἀποφάσεις· ὦν ἀνάγκη ἢ ἴσον ἢ ἄνισον, ἄν τι πλῆθος ᾖ, καὶ μὴ ὡς ἢ καὶ ἄρτιον ἢ περιττόν, ἂν ἀριθμὸς ᾖ.
For it would not be true to say that many things are not one, if indeed the non-existent is also not one; or if in some cases the opposites seem to happen according to such negations, of which it is necessary to be either equal or unequal, if there is any plurality, and not as either even or odd, if there is a number.
Ὁμοίως δὲ ὡς καὶ τὸ ἠρεμεῖν ἢ κινεῖσθαι ἀνάγκη, ἂν σῶμα ᾖ.
And similarly, it is necessary to be either resting or moving, if there is a body.
§Zenon.4.19Ἔτι εἰ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μὴ κινεῖται ὁ θεός τε καὶ τὸ ἔν, ὅτι τὰ πολλὰ κινεῖται τῷ εἰς ἄλληλα ἰέναι, τί κωλύει καὶ τὸν θεὸν κινεῖσθαι εἰς ἄλλο;
Furthermore, even if on this account God and the One do not move, namely because the many move by going into one another, what prevents God also from moving into something else?
Οὐδα τι μόνον, ἀλλʼ ὅτι εἶς μόνος θεός.
No other thing indeed, but only that God is the sole One.
Εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτός, τί κωλύει εἰς ἄλληλα κινουμένων τῶν μερῶν τοῦ. . . κύκλῳ φε. . . θεόν;
But if He Himself also is, what prevents God from [being carried in a circle...], while His parts move into one another?
Οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἕν, ὥσπερ ὁ Ζήνων πολλὰ εἶναι φύσει.
For surely such a thing is not one in the way Zeno says many things exist by nature.
§Zenon.4.20Αὐτὸς γὰρ σῶμα λέγει εἶναι τὸν θεόν, εἴτε τόδε τὸ πᾶν, εἴτε ὅ τι δήποτε αὐτὸ λέγων.
For he himself says that God is a body, whether this all, or whatever else he calls Him.
Ἀσώματος γὰρ ὢν πῶς ἂν σφαιροειδὴς εἴη ἐπιμόνως, ὅταν οὕτως οὔτʼ ἂν κινοῖτο οὔτʼ ἂν ἠρεμοῖ μηδαμοῦ γε ὤν;
For if He were incorporeal, how could He be spherical persistently, since in that way He would neither move nor rest, being nowhere?
Ἐπεὶ δὲ σῶμά ἐστι, τί ἂν αὐτὸ κωλύοι κινεῖσθαι ὡς ἐλέχθη;
But since He is a body, what would prevent Him from moving, as was said?