§Georg.5.1Οὐκ εἶναί φησιν οὐδέν· εἰ δʼ ἔστιν, ἄγνωστον εἶναι· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔστι καὶ γνωστόν, ἀλλʼ οὐ δηλωτὸν ἄλλοις.
He says that nothing exists; and if it exists, it is unknowable; and if it both exists and is knowable, yet it cannot be shown to others.
Καὶ ὅτι μὲν οὐκ ἔστι, συνθεὶς τὰ ἑτέροις εἰρημένα, ὅσοι περὶ τῶν ὄντων λέγοντες τἀναντία, ὡς δοκοῦσιν, ἀποφαίνονται αὐτοῖς, οἱ μὲν ὅτι ἓν καὶ οὐ πολλά, οἱ δὲ αὗ ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ οὐχ ἕν, καὶ οἱ μὲν ὅτι ἀγένητα, οἱ δʼ ὡς γενόμενα ἐπιδεικνύντες ταῦτα, συλλογίζεται κατʼ ἀμφοτέρων.
And as for the fact that nothing exists, having synthesized what has been said by others—all those who, speaking about existents, declare opposites, as they seem, to themselves: some that it is one and not many, others again that it is many and not one, and some demonstrating these to be ungenerated, others as generated—he reasons against both.
§Georg.5.2Ἀνάγκη γάρ, φησίν, εἴ τί ἐστι, μήτε ἓν μήτε πολλὰ εἶναι, μήτε ἀγέννητα μήτε γενόμενα, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη.
For, he says, if anything exists, it must be neither one nor many, neither ungenerated nor generated, so that nothing would exist.
Εἰ γὰρ μὴ εἴη τι, τούτων ἂν θάτερα εἴη.
For if there were something, it would be either of these.
Ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε ἓν οὔτε πολλά, οὔτε ἀγέννητα οὔτε γενόμενα, τὰ μὲν ὡς Μέλισσος, τὰ δὲ ὡς Ζήνων ἐπιχειρεῖ δεικνύειν μετὰ τὴν πρώτην ἴδιον αὐτοῦ ἀπόδειξιν, ἐν ᾖ λέγει ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε εἶναι οὔτε μὴ εἶναι.
That it is neither one nor many, nor ungenerated nor generated, he attempts to show, partly in the manner of Melissus and partly in the manner of Zeno, after his own first proper proof, in which he says that there is neither being nor non-being.
§Georg.5.3Εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔστι μὴ εἶναι, οὐδὲν ἂν ἧττον, τὸ μὴ ὂν τοῦ ὄντος εἴη.
For if not-being is not-being, the non-existent would exist no less than the existent.
Τό τε γὰρ μὴ ὄν ἐστι μὴ ὅν, καὶ τὸ ὂν ὄν, ὥστε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἢ εἶναι ἢ οὐκ εἶναι τὰ πράγματα.
For the non-existent is non-existent, and the existent is existent, so that things no more are than are not.
§Georg.5.4Εἰ δʼ ὅμως τὸ μὴ εἶναί ἐστι, τὸ εἶναι, φησίν, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀντικείμενον.
But if, nevertheless, not-being is, being, he says, is not its opposite.
Εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ εἶναί ἐστι, τὸ εἶναι [ἢ] μὴ εἶναι προσήκει.
For if not-being is, then to being belongs not-being.
Ὥστε οὐκ ἂν οὕτως, φησίν, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη, εἰ μὴ ταὐτόν έστιν εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι, Εἰ δὲ ταὐτό, καὶ οὕτως οὐκ ἂν εἴη οὐδέν·
So that in this way, he says, nothing would exist, unless being and not-being are the same thing.
τό τε γὰρ μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἔστι καὶ τὸ ὅν, ἐπείπερ ταὐτὸ τῷ μὴ ὄντι.
And if they are the same, in this way too nothing would exist; for the non-existent is not, and the existent is not either, since it is the same as the non-existent.
Οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐκείνου.
This, then, is that same argument of his.