§Zenon.4.1Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν λαμβάνει καὶ ουτος τὸ γιγνόμενον γίγνεσθαι ἐξ ὄντος, ὥσπερ ὁ Μέλισσος.
First of all, then, he too assumes, like Melissus, that what comes to be comes to be from what is.
Καίτοι τί κωλύει μήτʼ ἐξ ὁμοίου τὸ γιγνόμενον γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος;
And yet, what prevents that which comes to be from coming to be not from a like, but rather from what is not?
Ἔτι οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὁ θεὸς ἀγέννητος ἢ καὶ τἄλλα πάντα, εἴπερ ἅπαντα ἐξ ὁμοίου ἢ ἀνομοίου γέγονεν· ὅπερ ἀδύνατον.
Furthermore, God is no more unbegotten than all other things, if indeed all things have come to be from a like or from an unlike—which is impossible.
§Zenon.4.2Ὤστε ἢ οὐδέν ἐστι παρὰ τὸν θεόν, ἢ καὶ τἆλλα ἀΐδια πάντα, Ἔτι κράτιστον τὸν θεὸν λαμβάνει, τοῦτο δυνατώτατον καὶ βέλτιστον λέγων.
Consequently, either there is nothing besides God, or all other things are also eternal. Furthermore, he assumes that God is the most powerful, meaning by this the mightiest and best.
Οὐ δοκεῖ δὲ τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν νόμον, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ κρείττους εἶναι ἀλλήλων οἱ θεοί, Οὐκ οὖν ἐκ τοῦ δοκοῦντος εἴληφε ταύτην κατὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν ὁμολογίαν.
But this does not seem to be according to common opinion, but rather that many gods are better than one another. Therefore he has not taken this agreement concerning God from common opinion.
§Zenon.4.3Τό τε κράτιστον εἶναι τὸν θεὸν οὐχ οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνων λέγεται ὡς πρὸς ἄλλο τι τοιαύτη ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ φύσις, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ διάθεσιν, ἐπεὶ τοί γε πρὸς ἕτερον οὐδὲν ἂν κωλύοι μὴ τῇ αὐτοῦ ἐπιεικείᾳ καὶ ῥώμῃ ὑπερέχειν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀσθένειαν.
And he is said to say that God is the most powerful, understanding this not in the sense that the nature of God is such in relation to something else, but in relation to His own state. For indeed, in relation to another, nothing would prevent Him from excelling not by His own virtue and strength, but because of the weakness of others.
§Zenon.4.4Θέλοι δʼ ἂν οὐδεὶς οὔτω τὸν θεὸν φάναι κράτιστον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅτι αὐτὸς ἔχει ὡς οἶόν τε ἄριστα, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐκλείπει καὶ εὖ καὶ καλῶς ἔχειν αὐτῷ· ἅμα γὰρ ἴσως ἔχοντι κάκεῖνο ἂν συμβαίη.
But no one would want to say that God is the most powerful in this way, but rather because He himself is in the best possible state, and nothing is lacking for things to be well and beautifully for Him; for at the same time, if He is in this state, that other thing would also probably happen.
Οὕτω δὲ διακεῖσθαι καὶ πλείους αὐτοὺς ὄντας οὐδὲν κωλύει, ἅπαντας ὡς οἶόν τε ἄριστα διακειμένους, καὶ κρατίστους τῶν ἄλλων, οὐχ αὐτῶν ὄντας.
And nothing prevents them from being disposed in this way even if they are many, all of them being disposed in the best possible way, and being the most powerful compared to other things, but not compared to themselves.
§Zenon.4.5Ἒστι δ', ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ἄλλα.
And there are, as it seems, also other difficulties.
Κράτιστον γὰρ εἶναι τὸν θεόν φησι, τοῦτο δέ τινι εἶναι ἀνάγκη, ἕνα τὰ πάντα ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν οὐδὲν προσήκει·
For he says that God is the most powerful, but this must be in relation to someone.
οὐ γὰρ εἰ μὴ καὶ τῇδ’ ὁρᾷ. χεῖρον ὁρᾷ ταύτῃ, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὁρᾷ.
Also, it is not at all fitting for Him, being one, to see and hear all things; for if He does not see in this part too, He does not see worse in this part, but rather He does not see.
Ἀλλ' ἴσως τοῦτο βούλεται τὸ πάντῃ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὅτι οὕτως ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχοι, ὅμοιος ὢν πάντη.
But perhaps he wants this "perceiving in every way", because in this way He would be in the best state, being similar in every way.
§Zenon.4.6Ἔτι τοιοῦτος ὢν διὰ τί σφαιροειδὴς ἂν εἴη, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτι ἑτέραν τινὰ μᾶλλον ἔχων ἰδέαν, ὅτι πάντῃ ἀκούει καὶ πάντῃ κρατεῖ;
Furthermore, being of such a kind, why should He be spherical, rather than having some other form, just because He hears in every way and rules in every way?
Ὤσπερ γὰρ ὅταν λέγωμεν τὸ ψιμμύθιον ὅτι πάντα ἐστὶ λευκόν, οὐδὲν ἄλλο τι σημαίνομεν ἢ ὅτι ἐν ἅπασιν αὐτοῦ τοῖς μέρεσιν ἐγκέχρωσται ἡ λευκότης· τί δὴ κωλύει οὕτω κἀκεῖ τὸ πάντῃ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ κρατεῖν λέγεσθαι, ὅτι ἅπαν ὃ ἄν τις αὐτοῦ λαμβάνῃ μέρος, τοῦτʼ ἔσται πεπονθός;
For just as when we say of white lead that it is all white, we mean nothing other than that whiteness is colored in all of its parts; what then prevents the "seeing, hearing, and ruling in every way" from being said of Him in this way, namely that whatever part of Him one takes, this part will be affected in that way?
Ὤσπερ δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ ψιμμύθιον, οὐδὲ τὸν θεὸν ἀνάγκη διὰ τοῦτο εἶναι σφαιροειδῆ,
But just as white lead is not, so too God is not necessarily spherical on this account.
§Zenon.4.7Ἔτι μήτε ἄπειρον μήτε πεπεράνθαι σῶμά γε ὂν καὶ ἔχον μέγεθος πῶς οἶόν τε, εἴπερ τοῦτʼ ἐστὶν ἄπειρον ὃ ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ πέρας δεκτικὸν ὂν πέρατος.
Furthermore, how is it possible for something that is a body and has magnitude to be neither infinite nor limited, if indeed the infinite is that which does not have a limit though it is receptive of a limit?
Πέρας δ' ἐν μεγέθει καὶ πλήθει ἐγγίνεται, καὶ ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ ποσῷ, ὥστε ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ πέρας μέγεθος ὄν, ἄπειρόν ἐστιν.
But limit arises in magnitude and plurality, and in every quantity, so that if it is a magnitude and does not have a limit, it is infinite.
Ἔτι δὲ σφαιροειδῆ ὄντα ἀνάγκη πέρας ἔχειν.
Furthermore, being spherical, it must have a limit.
§Zenon.4.8Ἔσχατα γὰρ ἔχει, εἴπερ μέσον ἔχει αὐτοῦ τοῦ πλεῖστον ἀπέχειν.
For it has extremities, if indeed it has a center of that which is furthest apart.
Μέσον δʼ ἔχει, σφαιροειδὲς ὄν, τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι σφαιροειδὲς ὃ ἐκ τοῦ μέσου ὁμοίως πρὸς τὰ ἔσχατα.
And being spherical, it has a center, for that is spherical which is equidistant from the center to the extremities.
Σῶμα ἔσχατα ἢ πέρατα ἔχειν, οἶον διαφορεῖ.
That a body has extremities or limits, differs.
Εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀπλοῦν, οὐκ ἂν καὶ τὸ ὂν ἄπειρον.
For even if the non-existent is simple, the existent would not therefore be infinite.
§Zenon.4.9Τί γὰρ κωλύει ἔνια ταὐτὰ λεχθῆναι κατὰ τοῦ ὄντος καὶ μὴ ὄντος;
For what prevents some of the same things from being said of the existent and the non-existent?
Τό τε γὰρ ὂν οὐκ ὂν οὐδεὶς νῦν αἰσθάνεται, καὶ ὂν δέ τις οὐκ ἂν αἰσθάνοιτο νῦν· ἄμφω δὲ λεκτά, ὅπως διανοητά.
For no one now perceives that which is not, and someone might also not perceive now that which is; but both are speakable, inasmuch as they are thinkable.
§Zenon.4.10Οὐ λευκὸν δὲ τὸ μὴ ὄν·
And the non-existent is not white.
εἰ οὖν διὰ τοῦτο τὰ ὄντα πάντα λευκά, ὅπως μή τι ταὐτὸ κατὰ τοῦ ὄντος σημαίνωμεν καὶ μὴ ὄντος, ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ τῶν ὄντων τι μὴ εἶναι λευκόν;
If, then, for this reason all existents are white, so that we may not signify any of the same things of the existent and the non-existent, or does nothing prevent some of the existents from not being white?
Οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἄλλην ἄν ἀπόφασιν δέξαιτο τὸ ἄπειρον;
And in this way, might the infinite also admit of another negation?
εἰ μὴ τὸ πάλαι λεχθέντι μᾶλλον, παρὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ἢ μὴ ἔχειν ἐστὶν ἅπαν.
Unless indeed, according to what was said long ago, everything is either in the state of having or not having.