§Xenoph.2.11Τί δὴ κωλύει καὶ οὕτως τὰ πολλὰ γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι, ἐξ ὄντος ἀεὶ ἐς ὂν μεταβάλλοντος ταῖς εἰρημέναις διαφοραῖς τοῦ ἑνός, καὶ οὐδὲν οὔτε πλέονος οὕτε ἐλάττονος γιγνομένον τοῦ ὅλου;
What then prevents many things from coming into being and perishing even in this way, with what exists always changing into what exists by the aforementioned differences of the one, and the whole becoming neither more nor less?
Ἔτι τί κωλύει ποτὲ μὲν ἐξ ἄλλων τὰ σώματα γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι πάλιν;
Furthermore, what prevents bodies from coming into being at one time from other things, and perishing again?
§Xenoph.2.12Εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτά τις συγχωροίη, καὶ εἴη τι καὶ ἀγένητον, τί μᾶλλον ἄπειρον δείκνυται;
But even if someone should grant these things, and there should be something ungenerated, why is it any more shown to be infinite?
Ἄπειρον γὰρ εἶναί φησιν, εἰ ἔστι μέν, μὴ γεγονέναι. Πέρατα γὰρ εἶναι τὴν τῆς γενέσεως ἀρχήν τε καὶ τελευτήν.
For he says that if it exists, it is infinite because it has not come into being, on the ground that the beginning and end of coming into being are limits.
§Xenoph.2.13Καίτοι τί κωλύει ἀγένητον ὂν ἔχειν πέρας ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων;
And yet, what prevents that which is ungenerated from having a limit, based on what has been said?
Εἰ γὰρ ἐγένετο, ἀρχὴν ἔχειν ἄξιοι ταύτην ὅθεν γίγνοιτο, εἰ γιγνόμενα.
For if it came into being, they think it has this as a beginning from which it came into being, if it is something that comes into being.
Τί δὴ κωλύει, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐγένετο, ἔχειν ἀρχήν;
What then prevents it, even if it did not come into being, from having a beginning?
Οὐ μέντοι γε ἐξ ἧς γε ἐγένετο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑτέραν, καὶ εἶναι περαίνοντα πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀΐδια ὄντα.
Not indeed a beginning from which it came into being, but another kind, and from being things that limit one another while being eternal?
§Xenoph.2.14Ἔτι τί κωλύει τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἀγέννητον ὂν ἄπειρον εἶναι, τὰ δʼ ἐν αὐτῷ γιγνόμενα πεπεράνθαι, ἔχοντʼ ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν γενέσεως;
Furthermore, what prevents the whole, being ungenerated, from being infinite, while the things coming to be within it are limited, having a beginning and end of coming into being?
Ἔτι καὶ ὡς ὁ Παρμενίδης φησί, τί κωλύει καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἓν ὂν καὶ ἀγένητον ὅμως πεπεράνθαι, καὶ εἶναι
"πάντοθεν ἐγκύκλου σφαίρας ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ, μέσσοθεν ἰσοπαλὲς πάντη· "
τὸ γὰρ οὔτε τι μεῖζον οὔτε τι βαιότερον εἶναι μέχρι ὅν ἐστι τῇ ἢ τῇ.
Furthermore, as Parmenides also says, what prevents even the whole, being one and ungenerated, from nevertheless being limited, and being 'like the mass of a well-rounded sphere from every side, equally balanced from the center in every direction'; for there is nothing either greater or smaller in any direction where it exists.
§Xenoph.2.15Ἔχον δὲ μέσον καὶ ἔσχατα, πέρας ἔχει ἀγέννητον ὅν, ἐπεὶ εἰ καί, ὡς αὐτὸς λέγει, ἕν ἐστι, καὶ τοῦτο σῶμα, ἔχει ἄλλα ἑαυτοῦ μέρη, εἰ τάδε ὅμοια πάντα.
And that which has a center and extremes has a limit, even though it is ungenerated; since if, as he himself says, it is one, and this is a body, it has other parts of itself, if these are all similar.
Καὶ γὰρ ὅμοιον οὕτω λέγει τὸ πᾶν εἶναι οὐ. . . ἄλλῳ τινὶ ὃ περανθῆναι ὁρᾷς, ἐλέγχει εἴ τι ὅμοιον τὸ ἄπειρον.
For he also says that the whole is similar in this way, not... some other thing which you see to be limited; if the infinite is something similar, he refutes it.
§Xenoph.2.16Τό γε ὅμοιον ἑτέρῳ ὅμοιον, ὥστε δύο ἢ πλείω ὄντα οὐκ ἂν ἓν οὐδʼ ἅπειρον εἶναι.
At any rate, what is similar is similar to another, so that if there are two or more, it could not be one nor infinite.
Ἀλλ’ ἴσως τὸ ὅμοιον πρὸς αὐτὸ λέγει, καὶ φησὶν αὐτὸ ὅμοιον εἶναι πᾶν, ὅτι ὁμοιομερὲς ὕδωρ ὂν ἅπαν ἢ γῆ ἢ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο.
But perhaps he speaks of it being similar to itself, and says that the whole is similar because it is of like parts, being all water or earth or some other such thing.
§Xenoph.2.17Δῆλος γὰρ οὖτος ἀξιῶν εἶναι ἓν τῶν διμερῶν ἕκαστον σῶμα ὅν, οὐκ ἄπειρόν ἐστιν.
For he is clearly maintaining that each of the two-part things, being a body, is one, and is not infinite.
Τὸ γὰρ ὅλον ἅπειρον, ὥστε ταῦτα περαίνει πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀγέννητα ὄντα.
For the whole is infinite, so that these, being ungenerated, limit one another.
Ἔτι εἰ ἀΐδιόν τε καὶ ἅπειρόν ἐστι, πῶς ἂν εἴη ἓν σῶμα ὅν;
Furthermore, if it is eternal and infinite, how could that which exists be one body?
Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀνομοίων ἀμερῶν εἴη, πολλά, καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτω γʼ εἶναι ἄξιοῖ.
For if it should consist of dissimilar partless things, it would be many, and he himself indeed deems it to be so.
§Xenoph.2.18Εἰ δὲ ἅπαν ὕδωρ ἢ ἅπαν γῆ ἢ ὅ τι δὴ τὸ ὅν τοῦτʼ ἐστί, πολλὰ ἂν ἔχοι μέρη, ὡς καὶ Ζήνων ἐπιχειρεῖ ὂν δεικνύναι τὸ οὕτως ὂν ἔν.
But if the existing thing is all water or all earth or whatever else it may be, it would have many parts, as Zeno also attempts to show that that which is one in this way is [many].
Εἴη οὖν ἂν καὶ πλείονα αὐτοῦ μέρη ἐλαττόνων τε καὶ μικροτέρων, ἀλλά τε πάντῃ ἂν ταύτῃ ἀλλοῖον εἴη οὐδενὸς προσγιγνομένου σώματος οὐδʼ ἀπογιγνομένου.
There would therefore be more parts of it, consisting of fewer and smaller parts, and yet in every way it would be altered in this respect, without any body being added or perishing.
§Xenoph.2.19Εἰ δὲ μήτε σῶμα μήτε πλάτος μήτε μῆκος ἔχον μηδέν, πῶς ἂν ἄπειρον ἂν εἴη;
But if it has neither body nor width nor any length, how could it be infinite?
Τί κωλύει πολλὰ καὶ ἐνάριθμα τοιαῦτα εἶναι;
What prevents there being many and countable things of this kind?
Τί κωλύει καὶ πλείω ὄντα ἑνὸς μεγέθει ἄπειρα εἶναι;
What prevents them, even being more than one, from being infinite in magnitude?
Ὡς καὶ Ξενοφάνης ἄπειρον τό τε βάθος τῆς γῆς καὶ τοῦ ἀέρος φησὶν εἶναι.
Just as Xenophanes also says that the depth of the earth and of the air is infinite.
§Xenoph.2.20Δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ Εμπεδοκλῆς· ἐπιτιμᾷ γὰρ ὡς λεγόντων τινῶν τοιαῦτα ἀδύνατα εἶναι, οὕτως ἐχόντων ξυμβαίνειν αὐτά,
"εἴπερ ἀπείρονα γῆς τε βάθη καὶ δαψιλὸς αἰθήρ, ὃς διὰ πολλῶν δὴ βροτέων ῥηθέντα ματαίως ἐκκέχυται στομάτων, ὀλίγον τοῦ παντὸς ἰδόντων. "
Ἕτι ὂν ἓν οὐδὲν ἄτοπον εἰ μὴ πάντη ὅμοιόν ἐστιν.
And Empedocles also makes this clear; for he censures some for saying that such things are impossible, and that these things result if they are so: 'If the depths of the earth and the abundant upper air are infinite, which have been poured out in vain through the mouths of many mortals, who have seen only a little of the whole.' Furthermore, even if that which exists is one, there is nothing strange if it is not similar in every way.