§Xenoph.2.1Ἀλλ' ἄρα εἰ μὲν δυνατά ἐστιν ἢ ἀδύνατα ἃ λέγει, ἐατέον.
But whether what he says is possible or impossible must be let pass.
Τὸ δὲ πότερον συμπεραίνεται αὐτὸ ἐξ ὦν λαμβάνει, ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἱκανῶς σκέψασθαι· ἕτερον γὰρ ἄν τι τοῦτʼ ἴσως ἐκείνου εἴη.
But we must sufficiently examine whether this itself is concluded from what he assumes, or whether nothing prevents it from being otherwise; for this would perhaps be something different from that.
§Xenoph.2.2Καὶ πρῶτον τεθέντος, ὃ πρῶτον λαμβάνει, μηδὲν γενέσθαι ἂν ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, ἆρα ἀνάγκη ἀγέννητα πάντα εἶναι, ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύει γεγονέναι ἕτερα ἐξ ἑτέρων, καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ἄπειρον ἕναι;
And first, if that which he first assumes is posited, namely that nothing could come into being from non-being, is it necessary that all things are ungenerated, or does nothing prevent some things from having come into being from others, and this going on to infinity?
Ἣ καὶ ἀνακάμπτει κύκλῳ, ὥστε τὸ ἕτερον ἐκ τοῦ ἑτέρου γεγονέναι, ἀεί τε οὕτως ὄντος τινός, καὶ ἀπειράκις ἑκάστου γεγενημένου ἐξ ἀλλήλων.
Or that it even bends back in a circle, so that one thing has come into being from another, something always existing in this way, and each having come into being from one another infinitely many times?
§Xenoph.2.3Ὤστε οὐδὲν ἂν κωλύοιτο ἅπαντα γεγονέναι, κειμένου τοῦ μηδὲν γενέσθαι ἂν ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, καὶ ἄπειρα ὄντα πρὸς ἐκεῖνον προσαγορεῦσαι οὐδὲν κωλύει τῶν τῷ ἑνὶ ἑπομένων ὀνομάτων. Ἄπαντα γὰρ εἶναι καὶ λέγεσθαι καὶ ἐκεῖνος τῷ ἀπείρῳ προσάπτει.
So nothing would prevent all things from having come into being, even if it is posited that nothing could come into being from non-being, and nothing prevents us, even if they are infinite, from addressing them, in reply to him, by any of the names that follow from the "one." For he too attributes being all things and being so called to the infinite.
Οὐδέν τε κωλύει, καὶ μὴ ἀπείρων ὄντων, κύκλῳ αὐτῶν εἶναι τὴν γένεσιν.
And nothing prevents their generation from being in a circle, even if they are not infinite.
§Xenoph.2.4Ἔτι εἰ ἅπαντα γίγνεσθαι, ἔστι δὲ οὐδέν, ὥς τινες λέγουσιν, πῶς ἓν ἀδΰα εἴη;
Furthermore, if all things come into being, and nothing exists, as some say, how could they be eternal?
Ἄλλὰ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν εἶναι ἕν τι ὡς ὄντος καὶ κειμένου διαλέγεται.
But in fact he argues on the assumption that there is some one thing, as existing and posited.
Εἰ γάρ, φησί, μὴ ἐγένετο, ἔστω δὲ ἀΐδια, ὡς δέον ὑπάρχειν τὸ εἶναι τοῖς πράγμασιν.
For if, he says, it did not come into being, let them be eternal, as if being must belong to things.
§Xenoph.2.5Ἔτι εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα μήτε τὸ μὴ ὅν ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι μήτε ἀπολέσθαι τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὅμως τί κωλύει τὰ μὲν γενόμενα αὐτῶν εἶναι, τὰ δ' ἀΐδια, ὡς καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει;
Moreover, even if it is especially true that neither non-being can come into being, nor being can perish, nevertheless, what prevents some of them from being generated and others eternal, as Empedocles also says?
§Xenoph.2.6῎Απαντα γὰρ κἀκεῖνος ταὐτὰ ὁμολογήσας, ὅτι
"ἔκ τε μὴ ὄντος ἀμήχανόν ἐστι γενέσθαι, τό τε ὄν ἐξόλλυσθαι ἀνήνυστον καὶ ἄπρηκτον, ἀεὶ γὰρ θήσεσθαι ὅπῃ κέ τις αἰὲν ἐρείδῃ,"
ὅμως τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἀΐδια εἶναί φησι, πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα, τὰ δ' ἄλλα γίνεσθαί τε καὶ γεγονέναι ἐκ τούτων.
For he too, having agreed to all these same things, namely that "from non-being it is impossible to come into being, and for being to be utterly destroyed is unaccomplishable and impossible, for it will always be placed wherever one may ever thrust it," nevertheless says that some of the things that are are eternal—fire, water, earth, and air—while others come to be and have come to be from these.
§Xenoph.2.7Οὐδεμία γὰρ ἑτέρα, ὡς οἴεται, γένεσίς ἐστι τοῖς οὗσιν,
"ἀλλὰ μόνον μῖξίς τε διάλλαξίς τε μιγέντων yἐστί· φύσις δʼ ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνομάζεται ἀνθρώποισιν. "
Τὴν δὲ γένεσιν προσιοῦσαν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις καὶ τῷ ὅτι γίνεσθαι λέγει, ἐπεὶ τοῦτό γε ἀδύνατον ᾤετο.
For there is no other coming into being, as he thinks, for the things that are, "but only a mixing and interchange of what is mixed; and 'nature' is the name given to these by men." But he says that coming into being applies to eternal things and that they come to be, since he thought that this was impossible.
§Xenoph.2.8Πῶς γάρ, φήσει, καὶ ἔπαρξις ἴετο, παντί τε καὶ ποθὲν ἐλθόν; Ἀλλὰ μισγομένων τε καὶ συντιθεμένων πυρὸς καὶ τῶν μετὰ πυρὸς γίγνεσθαι τὰ πολλά, διαλλαττομένων τε καὶ διακρινομμένων φθείρεσθαι πάλιν, καὶ εἶναι τῇ μὲν μίξει πολλά τε καὶ τῇ διακρίσει, τῇ δὲ φύσει τέτταρʼ ἄνευ τῶν αἰτίων, ἢ ἕν· ἢ εἰ καὶ ἄπειρα εὐθὺς εἴη ταῦτα, ἐξ ὧν συντιθεμένων γίγνεται, διακρινομένων δὲ φθείρεται, ὡς καὶ τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν φασί τινες λέγειν ἐξ ἀεὶ ὄντων καὶ ἀπείρων τὰ γινόμενα γίνεσθαι.
"For how," he will say, "could being even be added to everything, and whence coming?" But by the mixing and compounding of fire and the things with fire, the many come into being, and by their interchange and separation, they perish again, and they are many by mixing and by separation, but in nature they are four (excluding the causes), or one; or even if these things, from which they are compounded when coming to be and separated when perishing, were immediately infinite, as some say Anaxagoras also says, that the things that come to be come to be from things that always exist and are infinite.
§Xenoph.2.9Κἂν οὕτως, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀΐδια πάντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ γιγνόμενα ἄττα καὶ γενόμενά τʼ ἐξ ὄντων καὶ φθειρόμενα εἰς οὐσίας τινὰς ἄλλας.
And even so, not all things would be eternal, but there would also be some things coming to be and having come to be from things that are, and perishing into certain other substances.
Ἔτι οὐδὲν κωλύει μίαν τινὰ οὐσίαν τὸ πᾶν μορφήν, ὡς καὶ ὁ Ἀναξίμανόρος καὶ ὁ Ἀναξιμένης λέγουσιν, ὁ μὲν ὕδωρ εἶναι φάμενος τὸ πᾶν, ὁ δέ, ὁ Ἀναξιμένης, ἀέρα, καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι οὕτως εἶναι τὸ πᾶν ἓν ἠξιώκασιν.
Furthermore, nothing prevents the whole from being some one substance in form, as Anaxander and Anaximenes say—the one saying that the whole is water, the other, Anaximenes, air, and as many others as have deemed the whole to be one in this way.
§Xenoph.2.10Τοῦτο ἤδη σχήμασί τε καὶ πλήθεσι καὶ ὀλιγότητι, καὶ τῷ μανὸν ἢ πυκνὸν γίνεσθαι, πολλὰ καὶ ἄπειρα ὄντα τε καὶ γιγνόμενα ἀπεργάζεται τὸ ὅλον, Φησὶ δὲ καὶ ὁ Δημόκριτος τὸ ὕδωρ τε καὶ τὸν ἀέρα ἕκαστόν τε τῶν πολλῶν, τοῦτο ὅν, ῥυθμῷ διαφέρειν.
This whole, then, by shapes and quantities and smallness, and by becoming rare or dense, produces the whole as things that are and come to be, as many and infinite. And Democritus also says that water and air, and each of the many things, being this, differ in shape.