§Xenoph.2.21Εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ὕδωρ ἅπαν ἢ πῦρ ἢ ὅ τι δὴ ἄλλο τοιοῦτον, οὐδὲν κωλύει πλείω εἰπεῖν τοῦ ὄντος ἑνός, εἰ δὴ δι' ἕκαστον ὅμοιον αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ.
For if all is water or fire or whatever other such thing, nothing prevents saying that the existing things are more than one, if indeed each is similar to itself.
Καὶ γὰρ μανόν, τὸ δὲ πυκνὸν εἶναι, μὴ ὄντος ἐν τῷ μανῷ κενοῦ, §Xenoph.2.22Οὐδὲν κωλύειν γάρ, τῷ μανῷ οὐκ ἔστιν ἔν τισι μέρεσι χωρὶς ἀποκεκριμένον τὸ κενόν, ὡς τὸ τοῦ ὅλου, τὸ μὲν εἶναι πυκνόν, καὶ τουτὶ δέ ἐστι μανὸν τὸ πᾶν οὕτως ἔχον· ἀλλʼ ὁμοίως ἅπαν πλῆρες ὅν, ὁμοίως ἧττον πλῆρές ἐστι τοῦ πυκνοῦ,
For there can be a rare and a dense, even if there is no void in the rare, for nothing prevents it; in the rare, void is not separated off in certain parts, so that, as for the whole, one part is dense, and this other is rare, the whole being thus; but, though the whole is similarly full, it is similarly less full than the dense.
§Xenoph.2.23Εἱ δὲ καὶ ἔστιν, ἀγέννητόν ἐστιν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δοθείη ἄπειρον εἶναι, καὶ μηδὲ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ἄπειρον εἶναι.
But if it also exists, is ungenerated, and for this reason were granted to be infinite, and it were not even possible for there to be one infinite and another infinite.
Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἤδη προσαγορευτέον καὶ ἀδύνατον· πῶς γὰρ ἂν τὸ ἄπειρον ὅσον ἧ τὸ κενὸν μὴ ὅλον ἂν οἶόν τε εἶναι;
For this reason, even in this, one must now address it as impossible; for how could the infinite, in so far as it is void, not be able to be the whole?
Ἀκίνητον δʼ εἶναι φησίν εἰ κενὸν μή ἐστιν· ἅπαντα γὰρ κινεῖσθαι τῷ ἀλλάττειν τόπον.
But he says it is motionless if there is no void; for all things move by changing place.
§Xenoph.2.24Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τοῦτο πολλοῖς οὐ συνδοκεῖ, ἀλλ’, εἶναί τι κενόν, οὐ μέντοι τοῦτό γέ τι σῶμα εἶναι, ἀλλʼ οἶον καὶ ὁ Ἡσίοδος ἐν τῇ γενέσει πρῶτον τὸ χάος φησὶ γενέσθαι, ὡς δὲ χώραν πρῶτον ὑπάρχειν τοῖς οὖσιν.
First of all, then, this does not seem right to many, but rather that there is some void, yet this is not any body, but such as Hesiod also says in the generation that chaos first came to be, as though space first existed for things that are.
Τοιοῦτον δέ τι καὶ τὸ κενὸν οἶον ἀγγεῖόν τι ἀνὰ μέσον εἶναι ζητοῦμεν.
And the void is something of this kind, like a vessel in the midst of things, which we seek.
§Xenoph.2.25Ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ εἰ μή ἐστι κενόν, μηδέ τι ἦσσον ἂν κινοῖτο, ἐπεὶ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸ πραγματευθείς, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀποχρῆσαν αὐτῷ ἀποφήνασθαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν, ὅμως κινεῖσθαί φησι τὰ ὄντα, οὐκ ὄντος κενοῦ, Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς κινεῖσθαι μὲν ἀεί φησι συγκινούμενα τὸν ἅπαντα ἐνδελεχῶς χρόνον, οὐδὲν εἶναι λέγων ὡς τοῦ παντός, οὐδὲ κενεόν.
But indeed, even if there is no void, it would move none the less; since Anaxagoras also, having busied himself with this very point, and not merely contenting himself with declaring that it does not exist, nevertheless says that existing things move, though there is no void. And similarly Empedocles also says that they always move, being moved together continuously for all time, though he says that there is nothing of the whole that is empty, nor is there a void.
§Xenoph.2.26Πόθεν οὖν τί κʼ ἐπέλθοι; Ὄταν δὲ εἰς μίαν μορφὴν συγκριθῇ, ὡς ἓν εἶναι, οὐδέν φησι τό γε κενεὸν πέλει οὐδὲ περισσόν. Τί γὰρ κωλύει εἰς ἄλληλα φέρεσθαι καὶ περιίστασθαι ἅμα ὁτουοῦν εἰς ἄλλο, καὶ τούτου εἰς ἕτερον, καὶ εἰς τὸ πρῶτον, ἄλλου μεταβάλλοντος ἀεί.
'Whence then could anything come?' But when it is combined into one form so as to be one, he says 'there is nothing empty, nor any surplus.' For what prevents things from moving into one another and changing places simultaneously, any whatever into another, and this into a third, and so into the first, while another is always changing?
§Xenoph.2.27Ἔτι καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μένοντος τοῦ πράγματος τόπῳ τοῦ εἴδους μεταβολήν, ἣν ἀλλοίωσιν οἵ τʼ ἄλλοι κἀκεῖνος λέγει, [οὐδὲν] ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων αὑτῷ κωλύει κινεῖσθαι τὰ πράγματα, ὅταν ἐκ λευκοῦ μέλαν ἢ ἐκ πικροῦ γένηται γλυκύ.
Furthermore, as for the change of form while the thing remains in the same place, which others and he call alteration, nothing from what he has said prevents things from moving, when from white it becomes black, or from bitter sweet.
§Xenoph.2.28Οὐδὲν γὰρ τὸ μὴ εἶναι κενὸν ἢ μὴ δέχεσθαι τὸ πλῆρες ἀλλοιοῦσθαι κωλύει.
For the non-existence of void, or the filled thing not receiving anything else, in no way prevents alteration.
Ὤστε οὔτε ἅπαντα ἀΐδια οὔθʼ ἓν οὔτʼ ἄπειρον ἀνάγκη εἶναι, ἀλλʼ ἄπειρα πολλά. Οὔτε ἕν θʼ ὅμοιον, οὔτʼ ἀκίνητον, οὔτʼ εἰ ἓν οὔτʼ εἰ πόλλ' ἄττα.
So that there is no necessity for all things to be eternal, nor one, nor infinite, but there can be many infinite things; nor is it necessary for it to be both one and similar, nor motionless, whether it be one or some many things.
§Xenoph.2.29Τούτων δὲ κειμένων καὶ μετακοσμεῖσθαι καὶ ἑτεροιοῦσθαι τὰ ὄντα οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐκ τῶν ὑπʼ ἐκείνῳ εἰρημένων, καὶ ἑνὸς ὄντος τοῦ παντὸς κινήσεως οὔσης, καὶ πλήθει καὶ ὀλιγότητι διαφέροντας, καὶ ἀλλοιουμένου προσγιγνομένου.
With these things established, nothing from what has been said by him prevents existing things from being rearranged and altered, even if the whole is one and motion exists, differing in multitude and fewness, and being altered as something is added.
Εἴ δʼ ἅρα τινός, οὐ τοῦ σώματος, καὶ εἰ πολλὰ συμμισγομένων καὶ συνδιακρινομένων ἀλλήλοις.
And if after all of something, not of body, and if they are many, by mixing and separating from one another.
Τὴν γὰρ μῖξιν οὔτʼ ἐπιπρόσθεσιν τοιαύτην εἶναι οὔτε σύνθεσιν εἰκὸς οἵαν λέγειν.
For it is not likely that mixture is such a superposition or composition as they say.
§Xenoph.2.30Ὥστε ἢ χωρὶς εὐθὺς εἶναι, ἢ καὶ ἀποστρεφθέντος ἐπίπροσθεν ἕτερα ἑτέρων φέρεσθαι χωρὶς ἀλλήλων ταῦτα, ἀλλʼ οὕτω συγκεῖσθαι ταχθέντα ὥστε ὁτιοῦν μιγνυμένου παρʼ ὁτιοῦν ᾧ μίγνυσθαι μέρος, οὕτως ὡς μὴ ἀναληφθῆναι συγκείμενα, ἀλλὰ μεμιγμένα, μηδʼ ὁποιαοῦν αὐτῷ μέρη.
So that they either are immediately separate, or, when what is in front is turned away, some of them move separately from others, but are so arranged and put together that any part whatever of what is being mixed is beside any part whatever of that with which it is being mixed, in such a way that they are not taken up as merely put together, but as mixed, not even any parts whatever of it remaining unmixed.
Ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι σῶμα τὸ ἐλάχιστον, ἅπαν ἅπαντι μέρος μέμικται ὁμοίως καὶ τὸ ὅλον.
For since there is no least body, every part is mixed with every part, just like the whole.