Aristotle · On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias §Xenoph.1.8-Xenoph.1.15
Critique of the Eleatic Premise on Generation
Summary
The author argues that the premise 'nothing comes from nothing' might itself be based on erroneous sensory opinion, asserting that the sensory reality of multiplicity and motion is more secure. He critiques the Eleatic premise by citing Hesiod and other thinkers who accepted generation from non-being.
§Xenoph.1.8Ὤστʼ εἰ μὲν ἅπαντα τὰ δοκοῦντα μὴ ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνεται, οὐθὲν ἴσως προσήκει οὐδὲ τούτῳ προχρῆσθαι τῷ δόγματι, οὐκ ἄν ποτε οὐδὲν γένοιτο ἐκ μηδενός, Μία γάρ τίς ἐστι δόξα καὶ αὕτη τῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶν, ἢν ἐκ τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαί πως ἐπὶ πολλῶν ὄντες ὑπειλήφαμεν.
Therefore, if all that seems to be is incorrectly assumed, it is perhaps not at all fitting to make use even of this opinion, that "nothing could ever come into being from nothing." For this too is one of those incorrect opinions which we have assumed from somehow perceiving in the case of many things.
§Xenoph.1.9Εἰ δὲ μὴ πάντα ἡμῖν ψευδῆ τὰ φαινόμενα, ἀλλὰ τινές εἰσι καὶ τούτων ὀρθαὶ ὑπολήψεις ἢ ἐπιδεῖξαι τὰς τοιαύτας ποιότητας μάλιστα δοκούσας ὀρθάς, ταύτας ληπτέον, ἂς ἀεὶ βεβαιοτέρας εἶναι δεῖ ἢ αἳ μέλλουσιν ἐξ ἐκείνων τῶν λόγων δειχθήσεσθαι.
But if not all appearing things are false for us, but there are some correct assumptions even among these, or if we must point out such qualities as seem most correct, we must grasp these, which must always be more secure than those which are going to be demonstrated from those arguments.
Εἰ γὰρ καὶ εἶεν δύο δόξαι ὑπεναντίαι ἀλλήλαις, ὥσπερ οἴεται, εἰ μὴ πολλὰ γενέσθαι φησίν, ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἐκ μὴ ὄντων.
For even if there were two opinions contrary to one another, as he thinks—namely, if he says that many things do not come into being, they must of necessity come from non-being.
§Xenoph.1.10Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ οἶόν τε, οὐκ εἶναι τὰ ὄντα πολλά.
And if this is impossible, the things that are are not many.
Γένοιτο γὰρ ἂν ὅν, ὅτι ἔστιν ἄπειρον εἶναι.
For what is would come into being as being infinite.
Εἰ δ' οὕτως, καὶ ἔν.
And if so, it is also one.
Ὁμοίως μὲν δὴ ἡμῖν ὁ ἀμφοτέρων π οὐδὲν μᾶλλόν τι ἕν, ἢ ὅτι πολλὰ δείκνυται.
In like manner, for us, in the argument of both, that it is one is demonstrated no more than that it is many.
§Xenoph.1.11Εἰ δὲ βέβαιος μᾶλλον ἡ ἑτέρα, ἀπὸ ταύτης ξυμπερανθέντα μᾶλλον δέδεικται.
But if the one opinion is more secure, that which is concluded from this has been demonstrated more.
Τυγχανόμενα δέ, ἔχοντος ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὑπολήψεις ταύτας, καὶ κινούμενα μέν ἐστι τὰ ὄντα.
And as it happens, even if one holds both of these assumptions, the things that are do move and exist.
Ἀμφοῖν δὲ πιστὴ μᾶλλον αὕτη, καὶ θᾶττον ἂν προεῖντο πάντες ταύτην ἐκείνης τὴν δόξαν.
And of the two, this one is more credible, and everyone would sooner abandon that opinion than this one.
§Xenoph.1.12Ὤσηʼ εἰ καὶ συμβαίνει ἐναντίας εἶναι τὰς φάσεις, καὶ ἀδύνατον γίνεσθαί τε ἐκ μὴ ὄντος καὶ μὴ πολλὰ εἶναι τὰ πράγματα, ἐλέγχοιτο μὲν ἂν ὑπʼ ἀλλήλων ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ τί μᾶλλον οὕτως ἂν ἔχοι;
Therefore, even if it happens that these assertions are contrary to each other, and it is impossible both to come into being from non-being and for things not to be many, these would indeed be refuted by each other, but why should it be more in this way?
Ἴσως τε κἂν φαίη τις τούτοις τἀναντία.
And perhaps someone might say the contrary to these.
Οὔτε γὰρ δείξας ὅτι ὀρθὴ δόξα ἀφʼ ἦς ἄρχεται, οὔτε μᾶλλον βέβαιον ἢ περὶ ἦς δείκνυσι λαβών, διελέχθη.
For he argued without having shown either that the opinion from which he starts is correct, or having taken what is more secure than that about which he demonstrates.
§Xenoph.1.13Μᾶλλον γὰρ λαμβάνεται εἰκὸς εἶναι γίνεσθαι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος ἢ μὴ πολλὰ εἶναι.
For it is assumed that coming into being from non-being is more likely than that things are not many.
Λέγεταί τε καὶ σφόδρα ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν γίγνεσθαί τε τὰ μὴ ὄντα, καὶ μὴ γεγονέναι πολλὰ ἐκ μὴ ὄντων, καὶ οὐχ ὅτι οἱ τυγχάνοντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν δοξάντων εἶναι σοφῶν τινὲς εἰρήκασιν.
And it is strongly said, on behalf of these views, both that non-being comes into being, and that many things have not come into being from non-being, and not only ordinary people but also some of those thought to be wise have said so.
§Xenoph.1.14Αὐτίκα δ' Ἡσίοδος
"πρῶτον μὲν πάντων (φησὶ) χάος ἐγένετʼ, αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα γαῖ εὐρύστερνος, πάντων ἕδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεί, ἠδʼ ἔρος, ὃς πάντεσσι μεταπρέπει ἀθανάτοισιν. " §Xenoph.1.15Τὰ δʼ ἄλλα φησὶ γενέσθαι, ταῦτα δʼ ἐξ οὐδενός.
For example, Hesiod says: "First of all indeed Chaos came into being, but then broad-bosomed Earth, the ever-secure seat of all, and Eros, who is outstanding among all the immortals." He says that other things came into being, but these from nothing.
Πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ ἕτεροι εἶναι μὲν οὐδέν φασι, γίγνεσθαι δὲ πάντα, λέγοντες ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων γίνεσθαι τὰ γινόμενα.
And many others also say that nothing exists, but all things come to be, saying that the things that come to be come from non-being.
Ὤστε τοῦτο μὲν δῆλον, ὅτι ἐνίοις γε δοκεῖ καὶ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἂν γενέσθαι.
So it is clear that to some at least it seems possible to come into being even from non-being.
Notes
- Xenoph.1.8οὐκ ἄν ποτε οὐδὲν γένοιτο ἐκ μηδενός — This clause functions as an appositive clause (or a noun clause with the conjunction `ὅti` omitted) explaining the concrete content of the preceding `τούτῳ ... τῷ δόγματι` ('this opinion'). It refers to the fundamental Eleatic premise, namely, 'that nothing could ever come into being from nothing.'
- Xenoph.1.9ἢ ἐπιδεῖξαι τὰς τοιαύτας ποιότητας μάλιστα δοκούσας ὀρθάς, ταύτας ληπτέον — A difficult passage due to textual corruption (especially the presence of `ἤ`). In this translation, it is interpreted as expressing an alternative or additional obligation through the infinitive and the verbal adjective `ληπτέον`: either to demonstrate the qualities of assumptions that seem most correct, or to accept those assumptions.
- Xenoph.1.11θᾶττον ἂν προεῖντο πάντες ταύτην ἐκείνης τὴν δόξαν — The comparative adverb `θᾶττον` ('sooner') takes `ἐκείνης` ('that opinion,' i.e., the Eleatic view that nothing comes from nothing) as the genitive of comparison. Combined with `προεῖντο` ('would abandon,' optative aorist middle), it conveys a strong rhetorical nuance: 'everyone would abandon that opinion sooner than this one (i.e., they would cling to this one to the end).'
- Xenoph.1.13μὴ γεγονέναι πολλά ἐκ μὴ ὄντων — This clause belongs to the context of criticizing the Eleatic proposition that multiplicity does not come from non-being. While the combination of negations is complex, since the subsequent quotation of Hesiod defends generation from non-being, it represents a critique of the Eleatic view, suggesting that it is not universally held that many things could not come from non-being.
Cite this passage
Aristotle, On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias §Xenoph.1.8-Xenoph.1.15. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg047.humanitext-grc1:Xenoph.1.8-Xenoph.1.15
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