§Xenoph.1.1Ἀιδιον εἶναι φησιν εἴ τί ἐστιν, εἴπερ μὴ ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι μηδὲν ἐκ μηδενός.
He says that if anything is, it is eternal, since it is not possible for anything to come into being from nothing.
Εἴτε γὰρ ἅπαντα γέγονεν εἴτε μὴ πάντα ἀΐδιʼ ἀμφοτέρως.
For whether all things have come into being or not all are eternal, they are eternal either way.
Ἐξ οὐδενὸς γὰρ αὐτῶν ἂν γινόμενα.
For they would otherwise come into being from nothing.
Ἀπάντων τε γὰρ γινομένων οὐδὲν προϋπάρχειν· εἴτ' ὄντων τινῶν ἀεὶ ἕτερα προσγίνοιτο, πλέον ἂν καὶ μεῖζον τὸ·
For if all things came into being, nothing would pre-exist; or if, while some things always existed, other things were added, that which is would have become more and bigger.
ἓν γεγονέναι. §Xenoph.1.2Ὦι δὴ πλέον καὶ μεῖζον, τοῦτο γενέσθαι ἂν ἐξ οὐδενός· τῷ γὰρ ἐλάττονι τὸ πλέον, ἢ δ’ ἐν τῷ μικροτέρῳ τὸ μεῖζον οὐχ ὑπάρχειν.
And that which has become more and bigger would have come into being from nothing; for the more is not present in the less, nor is the bigger in the smaller.
Αΐδιον δὲ ὂν ἄπειρον εἶναι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει ἀρχὴν ὅθεν ἐγένετο, οὐδὲ τελευτὴν εἰς ὃ γινόμενον ἐτελεύτησέ ποτε· πᾶν δὲ καὶ ἄπειρον ὂν εἶναι.
And being eternal, it is infinite, because it has no beginning from which it came to be, nor an end at which, in coming to be, it ever finished; and being all and infinite, it must be one.
Εἰ γὰρ πλέον ἢ δύο εἴη, πέρατʼ ἂν εἶναι ταῦτα πρὸς ἄλληλα.
For if there were two or more, they would limit one another.
§Xenoph.1.3Ἔν δὲ ὅμοιον εἶναι πάντα· εἰ γὰρ ἀνόμοια πλείω ὄντα, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ἓν θεῖναι ἀλλὰ πολλά.
And being one, it is similar in all respects; for if it were dissimilar, being many, it could no longer be posited as one, but as many.
Ἀΐδιον δὲ ὂν μέτριόν τε καὶ ὅμοιον πάντῃ ἀκίνητον εἶναι τὸ ἕν.
And the One, being eternal, moderate, and similar in every way, is motionless.
Οὐ γὰρ ἂν κινηθῆναι μὴ ἔς τι ὑποχωρῆσαν.
For it could not move unless it withdrew into something.
Ὑποχωρῆσαι δὲ ἀνάγκην εἶναι ἤτοι εἰς πλῆρες ἰὸν ἢ κενόν.
And it must withdraw either by going into what is full or into what is empty.
Τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν οὐκ ἂν δέξασθαι τὸ πλῆρες, τὸ δὲ οὐκ εἶναι οὐδὲν [ἢ] τὸ κενόν.
And of these, the full could not receive it, and the empty is nothing.
§Xenoph.1.4rΤοιοῦτο δὲ ὂν τὸ ἓν ἀνώδυνόν τε καὶ ἀνάλγητον ὑγιές τε καὶ ἄνοσον εἶναι, οὔτε μετακοσμούμενον θέσει, οὔτε ἑτεροιούμενον εἴδει, οὔτε μιγνύμενον ἄλλῳ.
And the One being such, it is without pain and without suffering, healthy and without disease, neither changing by rearrangement of position, nor altering in form, nor mixing with anything else.
Κατὰ πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα πολλά τε τὸ ἓν γίνεσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν τεκνοῦσθαι καὶ τὸ ὂν φθείρεσθαι ἀναγκάζεσθαι.
For in all these ways, the One would be forced to become many, non-being would be generated, and being would be destroyed.
§Xenoph.1.5Ταῦτα δὲ ἀδύνατα εἶναι.
But these things are impossible.
Καὶ γὰρ εἰ τὸ μεμῖχθαί τι ἓν ἐκ πλειόνων λέγοιτο, καὶ εἴη πολλὰ κινούμενα εἰς ἄλληλα τὰ πράγματα, καὶ ἡ μῖξις ἡ ὡς ἐν ἑνὶ σύνθεσις εἴη τῶν πλειόνων, ἢ τῇ ἀπαλλάξει οἶον ἐπιπρόσθησις γίνοιτο τῶν μιχθέντων, ἐκείνους μὲν ἂν δι' ἀλλήλων χωριζόντων εἶναι τὰ μιχθέντα, ἐπιπροσθήσεως δʼ οὔσης ἐν τῇ τρίψει γίνεσθαι ἂν ἕκαστον φανερόν, ἀφαιρουμένων τῶν πρώτων τὰ ὑπʼ ἄλληλα τεθέντα τῶν μιχθέντων· ὧν οὐδέτερον συμβαίνειν.
For even if some one thing were said to be mixed out of many, and things were many and moving into one another, and the mixture were a composition of many as in a single thing, or if by their juxtaposition there were a sort of overlapping of the mixed things, in the former case the mixed things would be separated through one another, and in the case of overlapping, each would become visible in the rubbing, as the first layers are removed from the mixed things placed under one another; but neither of these occurs.
§Xenoph.1.6Διὰ τοῦτον δὲ τὸν τρόπον κἂν εἶναι πολλὰ κἂν ἡμῖν, ὡς τὸ φαίνεσθαι μόνως.
And in this way there might be many things even for us, as appearing only.
Ὤστʼ ἐπειδὴ οὐχ οἶόν θʼ οὕτως, οὐδὲ πολλὰ δυνατὸν εἶναι τὰ ὄντα, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα δοκεῖν οὐκ ὀρθῶς.
Since, therefore, this is not possible, it is not possible either for the things that are to be many, but these seem so incorrectly.
Πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἄλλα κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν φαντάζεσθαι ἅπασαν.
For many other things also appear according to our entire sensation.
§Xenoph.1.7Λόγον δ' οὔτʼ ἀναιρεῖ τὰ αὐτὰ γίνεσθαι, οὔτε πολλὰ εἶναι τὸ ὄν, ἀλλʼ ἀΐδιόν τε καὶ ἅπειρον καὶ πάντῃ ὅμοιον αὐτὸ αὐτῷ.
But argument neither does away with the view that these same things come to be, nor that what is is many, but rather that it is eternal and infinite and in every way similar to itself.
Ἆρʼ οὖν δεῖ πρῶτον μὲν μὴ πᾶσαν λαβόντα δόξαν ἄρχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ μάλιστα ὂν βέβαιον.
Should we then not rather start, not by taking every opinion, but always starting from what is most secure?