§Georg.6.1Οὐδαμόθεν δὲ συμβαίνει ἐξ ὦν εἴρηκεν, μηδὲν εἶναι.
But it does not follow from anything he has said that nothing exists.
Ἃ γὰρ καὶ ἀποδείκνυσιν, οὕτως διαλέγεται. Εἰ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐστιν ἢ ἔστιν, ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν εἴη, καὶ ἔστιν ὅμοιον μὴ ὄν.
For concerning what he actually demonstrates, he argues in this way: if the non-existent exists, or if, to put it simply, "to exist" is [to exist], then [the non-existent] would exist, and the non-existent is similar to the existent.
Τοῦτο δὲ οὔτε φαίνεται οὕτως οὔτε ἀνάγκη, ἀλλ' ὡσπερεὶ δυοῖν, ὄντος, τοῦ δʼ οὐκ ὄντος, τὸ μὲν ἔστι, τὸ δʼ οὐκ ἀληθές, ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν μὴ ὄν.
But this neither appears to be so nor is it necessary; rather, it is as if there are two things, one existent and the other non-existent, and the one exists, but for the other, it is not true that the non-existent exists.
§Georg.6.2Διότι οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν, οὔτε εἶναι οὔτε μὴ εἶναι τὰ ἄμφω οὔθʼ ἕτερον οὐκ ἔστιν.
Therefore, because [the non-existent] is not, it does not follow that neither both exist nor that the other does not exist.
Οὐδὲν γάρ, φησίν, εἴη ἂν τὸ μὴ εἶναι τοῦ εἶναι, εἴπερ εἴη τι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι. Οὐδείς φησιν εἶναι τὸ μὴ εἶναι οὐδαμῶς.
For, he says, the non-existent would be nothing [different] from the existent, if indeed the non-existent also were something. [But] no one says that the non-existent exists in any way.
Εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὂν μὴ ὄν, οὐδʼ οὕτως ὁμοίως ἂν εἴη τὸ μὴ ὂν τῷ ὄντι· τὸ μὲν γάρ ἐστι μὴ ὅν, τὸ δὲ καὶ ἔστιν ἔτι.
And even if the non-existent exists as non-existent, not even so would the non-existent be similarly to the existent; for the one is non-existent, while the other additionally exists.
§Georg.6.3Εἰ δὲ καὶ ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἀληθές, ὡς δὴ θαυμάσιόν τʼ ἂν εἴη τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐστιν.
But even if, to put it simply, it is true that the non-existent exists, how very wonderful that would be!
Ἀλλ' εἰ δὴ οὕτω, πότερον μᾶλλον ξυμβαίνει τὰ πάντα εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι;
But if this is indeed so, does it follow more that all things exist, or that they do not exist?
Αὐτὸ γὰρ οὕτῳ γε τοὐναντίον ἔοικε γίνεσθαι.
For in this way, the very opposite seems to happen.
Εἰ γὰρ τό τε μὴ ὅν ἐστι καὶ τὸ ὂν ὅν ἐστιν, ἅπαντά ἐστιν. Καὶ γὰρ τὰ ὅντα καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα ἐστίν.
For if both the non-existent exists and the existent exists, all things exist; for both existents and non-existents exist.
Οὐκ ἀνάγκη γάρ, εἰ τὸ μὴ ὅν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ὄν μὴ εἶναι.
For it is not necessary, if the non-existent exists, that the existent also does not exist.
§Georg.6.4Εἰ δὴ καὶ οὕτω τις ξυγχωρεῖ, καὶ τὸ μὲν μὴ ὄν εἴη, τὸ δὲ ὂν μὴ εἴη, ὅμως οὐδὲν ἧττον εἴη ἄν· τὰ γὰρ μὴ ὄντα εἴη κατὰ τὸν ἐκίνου λόγον.
Even if someone concedes this, and the non-existent exists while the existent does not exist, nevertheless something would exist; for non-existents would exist according to his argument.
Εἰ δὲ ταὐτόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι, οὐδʼ οὕτως μᾶλλον οὐκ [εἴη] ἄν τι εἴη.
But if both existing and not existing are the same, not even so would it be more the case that nothing exists.
Ὡς γὰρ κἀκεῖνος λέγει, ὅτι εἰ ταὐτὸν μὴ ὂν καὶ ὅν, τό τε ὂν οὐκ ἔστι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὅν. §Georg.6.5Ὥστε οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἀντιστρέψαντι ἔστιν ὁμοίως φάναι ὅτι πάντα ἐστίν.
Or as he says, that if the non-existent and the existent are the same, the existent does not exist, and neither does the non-existent, so that nothing exists, yet by reversing the argument, one can equally say that all things exist.
Τό τε γὰρ μὴ ὅν ἐστι καὶ τὸ ὄν, ὥστε πάντα ἐστίν.
For both the non-existent exists and the existent exists, so that all things exist.
Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον φησίν· εἰ δὲ ἔστιν, ἤτοι ἀγέννητον ἢ γενόμενον εἶναι. Καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀγένητον, ἄπειρον αὐτὸ τοῖς τοῦ Μελίσσου ἀξιώμασι λαμβάνει· τὸ δʼ ἄπειρον οὐκ ἂν εἶναί ποτε.
After this argument he says: "If it exists, it must be either ungenerated or generated." And if it is ungenerated, he assumes it to be infinite according to the premises of Melissus; but the infinite could never exist.
§Georg.6.6Οὔτε γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ οὔτʼ ἂν ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶναι· δύο γὰρ ἄν οὕτως ἢ πλείω εἶναι, τό τε ἐνὸν καὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ, μηδαμοῦ δὲ ὂν οὐδὲ εἶναι κατὰ τὸν Ζήνωνος λόγον περὶ τῆς χώρας.
For it could exist neither in itself nor in another; for in this way there would be two or more things, both that which is in something and that in which it is, and what is nowhere does not even exist, according to Zeno's argument concerning place.
Ἀγέννητον μὲν οὖν διὰ ταῦτʼ οὐκ εἶναι, οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ γενόμενον.
Thus, the ungenerated does not exist for these reasons, but neither does the generated.
Γενέσθαι γοῦν οὐδὲν ἂν οὔτʼ ἐξ ὄντος οὔτʼ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος.
At any rate, nothing could be generated either from the existent or from the non-existent.
§Georg.6.7Εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὂν μεταπέσοι, οὐκ ἂν ἔτʼ εἶναι τὸ ὄν, ὥσπερ γʼ εἰ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν γένοιτο, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι εἴη μὴ ὄν.
For if the existent should change, the existent would no longer be [existent], just as indeed if the non-existent should be generated, it would no longer be non-existent.
Οὐδὲ μὴν οὐθʼ ἐξ ὄντος ἂν γενέσθαι.
Nor indeed could it be generated from the existent.
Εἰ μὲν γὰρ μή ἐστι τὸ μὴ ὄν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἐκ μηδενὸς ἂν γενέσθαι· εἰ δʼ ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὄν, διʼ ἅπερ οὐδʼ ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος, διὰ ταῦτα οὐδʼ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γενέσθαι.
For if the non-existent does not exist, nothing could be generated from nothing; but if the non-existent exists, for the very same reasons that it could not be generated from the existent, neither could it be generated from the non-existent.