§Georg.6.8Εἰ οὖν ἀνάγκη μέν, εἴπερ ἔστι τι, ἤτοι ἀγέννητον εἶναι ἢ γενόμενον, ταῦτα δὲ ἀδύνατόν τι καὶ εἶναι.
If, therefore, on the one hand, it is necessary, if indeed anything exists, that it is either ungenerated or generated, and these things are also impossible to exist.
Ἔτι εἴπερ ἔστιν, ἓν ἢ πλείω, φησίν, ἐστίν· εἴτε μήτε ἓν μήτε πολλά, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη.
Further, if indeed it exists, it is either one or many, he says; and if it is neither one nor many, it would be nothing.
Καὶ ἓν μὲν. . . καὶ ὅτι ἀσώματον ἂν εἴη τὸ ἕν η ἐνσχονμέν γε τῷ τοῦ Ζήνωνος λόγου.
And on the one hand, the one... and that the one would be incorporeal, at least if we adhere to the argument of Zeno.
Ἑνος δὲ ὄντος οὐδʼ ἂν. . . εἶναι οὐδὲ μὴ. . . μήτε πολλά.
But if it is one, neither would it... be, nor... nor many.
§Georg.6.9Εἰ γὰρ μήτε ἓν μήτε πολλά ἐστιν, οὐδʼ ἂν κινηθῆναί φησιν.
For if it is neither one nor many, he says it could not even be moved.
Οὐδενὶ γὰρ κινηθείη, ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι, ἢ ὡσαύτως ἔχον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη, τὸ δʼ οὐκ ὂν γεγονὸς εἴη, Ἔτι δὲ ἢ κινεῖ ἢ κινεῖται, καὶ εἰ μεταφέρεται οὐ συνεχὲς ὄν, διῄρηται τὸ ὄν, οὔτε τι ταύτῃ·
For it could be moved by nothing, or it would no longer be, or [be] in the same state, but the one would not exist, and the other would be generated from the non-existent. Furthermore, it either moves [something else] or is moved; and if it is transported while not being continuous, the existent is divided, and there is nothing in this respect.
ὥστε πάντῃ κινεῖται, πάντῃ διῄρηται.
Therefore, it is moved everywhere, and is divided everywhere.
§Georg.6.10Εἰ δ’ οὕτως, πάντα οὐκ ἔστιν.
But if so, all things do not exist.
Ἐκλιπὲς γὰρ ταύτῃ, φησίν, ᾗ διῄρηται, τοῦ ὄντος, ἀντὶ τοῦ κενοῦ τὸ διῃρῆσθαι λέγων, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Λευκίππου καλουμένοις λόγοις γέγραπται.
For in this respect, he says, where it is divided, it is deficient in being, speaking of "being divided" instead of "the void," just as is written in the so-called treatises of Leucippus.
Εἰ μὲν οὖν οὐδέν, τὰς ἀποδείξεις λέγειν ἅπαντα.
If, then, nothing is, all these demonstrations speak of nothing.
Δεῖ γὰρ τὰ φρονούμενα εἶναι, καὶ τὸ μὴ ὅν, εἴπερ μή ἐστι, μηδὲ φρονεῖσθαι.
For things thought must exist, and the non-existent, if indeed it does not exist, must not even be thought.
§Georg.6.11Εἰ δʼ οὕτως, οὐδὲν ἂν εἶναι ψεῦδος οὐδείς φησιν, οὐδʼ εἰ ἐν τῷ πελάγει φαίη ἁμιλλάσθαι ἅρματα.
But if so, no one would say that there is any falsehood, not even if someone were to say that chariots contend in the sea.
Πάντα γὰρ ἂν ταῦτα εἴη.
For all these things would exist.
Καὶ γὰρ τὰ ὀρώμένα καὶ ἀκουόμενα διὰ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὅτι φρονεῖται ἕκαστα αὐτῶν· εἰ δὲ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἃ ὁρῶμεν ἐστίν, οὕτω μᾶλλον ἃ ὁρῶμεν ἢ διανοούμεθα.
For indeed, things seen and heard exist because each of them is thought; but if it is not because of this, but just as the things we see are not more [existent than those we do not], so are the things we see more [existent] than those we think?
§Georg.6.12Καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ πολλοὶ ἂν ταῦτα ἴδοιεν, καὶ ἐνταῦθα πολλοὶ ἂν ταῦτα διανοηθείημεν.
For just as in the former case many might see these things, so in the latter case many of us might think these things.
Τὸ οὖν μᾶλλον δὴ τοιάδʼ ἐστί, ποῖα δὲ τἀληθῆ, ἄδηλον.
Which of them, then, is more [real], and which are the true ones, is unclear.
Ὥστε καὶ εἰ ἔστιν, ἡμῖν γε ἄγνωστα εἶναι τὰ πράγματα.
So that even if they exist, things are at least unknowable to us.
§Georg.6.13Εἰ δὲ καὶ γνωστά, πῶς ἄν τις, φησί, δηλώσειεν ἄλλῳ;
But even if they are knowable, how, he says, could anyone reveal them to another?
Ὃ γὰρ εἶδε, πῶς ἄν τις, φησί, τοῦτο εἴποι λόγῳ;
For how, he says, could anyone declare in speech what he saw?
Ἢ πῶς ἂν ἐκείνῳ δῆλον ἀκούσαντι γίγνοιτο, μὴ ἰδόντι;
Or how could it become clear to one who hears but has not seen?
Ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐδὲ ἡ ὄψις τοὺς φθόγγους γιγνώσκει, οὕτως οὐδὲ ἡ ἀκοὴ τὰ χρώματα ἀκούει, ἀλλὰ φθόγγους· καὶ λέγει ὁ λέγων, ἀλλʼ οὐ χρῶμα οὐδὲ πρᾶγμα.
For just as sight does not recognize sounds, so hearing does not hear colors, but sounds; and the speaker speaks, but does not speak a color or a thing.
§Georg.6.14Ὃ οὖν τις μὴ ἐννοεῖ, πῶς αἰτεῖ παρʼ ἄλλου λόγῳ ἢ σημείῳ τινὶ ἑτέρου πράγματος ἐννοήσειεν, ἀλλʼ ἢ ἐἀν μὲν χρῶμα ἰδών, ἐὰν δὲ μος.
How, then, can one who does not have something in mind receive it from another by speech or by some sign of another thing and keep it in mind, unless by seeing a color on the one hand, or [hearing a sound] on the other?
Ἀρχὴν γὰρ οὐ λέγε γοει δὲ χρῶμα, ἀλλὰ λόγον, ὥστ' οὐδὲ διανοεῖσθαι χρῶμα ἔστιν, ἀλλʼ ὁρᾶν, οὐδὲ ψόφον, ἀλλʼ ἀκούειν.
For in the first place, the speaker does not speak a color, but speech, so that it is not even possible to think a color, but only to see it, nor a sound, but only to hear it.
§Georg.6.15Εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐνδέχεται, γινώσκει τε καὶ ἀναγινώσκει λέγων.
But even if it is possible, the speaker knows and recalls by speaking.
Ἀλλὰ πῶς ὁ ἀκούων τὸ αὐτὸ ἐννοήσει;
But how will the hearer think the same thing?
Οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα ἐν πλείοσι καὶ χωρὶς οὖσιν εἶναι· δύο γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἕν.
For it is not possible for the same thing to be at the same time in several things that exist separately; for in that way, the one would be two.
§Georg.6.16Εἰ δὲ καὶ εἴη, φησίν, ἐν πλείοσι καὶ ταὐτόν, οὐδὲν κωλύει μὴ ὅμοιον φαίνεσθαι αὐτοῖς, μὴ πάντη ὁμοίοις ἐκείνοις οὖσιν καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, εἴ τι ἐν τοιούτου εἴησαν, ἀλλʼ οὐ δύο εἶεν.
And even if, he says, it were in several things and were the same, nothing prevents it from not appearing similar to them, since they are not entirely similar to those things and in the same state, if indeed they are in such a condition, yet are not two.
Φαίνεται δὲ οὐδʼ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ὅμοια αἰσθανόμενος ἐν τῷ αύτῷ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' ἕτερα τῇ ἀκοῇ καὶ τῇ ὄψει, καὶ νῦν τε καὶ πάλαι διαφόρως.
Indeed, not even a person himself appears to perceive things similar to himself at the same time, but different things by hearing and by sight, and differently now and in the past.
§Georg.6.17Ὥστε σχολῇ ἄλλῳ πᾶν ταὐτὸ αἴσθοιτό τις.
Therefore, someone could hardly perceive entirely the same thing as another.
Οὕτως οὐκ ἔστιν, ἕν ἐστι γνωστόν, οὐδεὶς ἂν αὐτὸ ἑτέρῳ δηλώσειεν, διά τε τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὰ πράγματα λεκτά, καὶ ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ ταὐτὸν ἐννοεῖ.
Thus, even if there exists something and it is one and is knowable, no one could reveal it to another, both because things are not expressible in speech, and because no one has in mind the same thing as another.
Ἅπαντες δὲ καὶ οὕτως ἑτέρων ἀρχαιοτέρων εἰσὶν ἀπορίαι, ὥστε ἐν τῇ περὶ ἐκείνων σκέψει καὶ ταῦτα ἐξεταστέον.
But all these are difficulties that belong to other, older thinkers, so that in the investigation concerning them, these too must be examined.