§8.9Ὑπέχειν δὲ καὶ θέσιν καὶ ὁρισμὸν αὐτὸν αὑτῷ δεῖ προεγχειρήσαντα· ἐξ ὧν γὰρ ἀναιροῦσιν οἱ πυνθανόμενοι τὸ κείμενον, δῆλον ὅτι τούτοις ἐναντιωτέον.
One must defend both thesis and definition after having himself beforehand attacked them; for it is clear that one must oppose those premises from which the questioners demolish the position.
Ἄδοξον δ᾿ ὑπόθεσιν εὐλαβητέον ὑπέχειν.
And one must beware of defending an unreputable hypothesis.
Εἴη δ᾿ ἂν ἄδοξος διχως· καὶ γὰρ ἐξ ἧς ἄτοπα συμβαίνει λέγειν, οἷον εἰ πάντα φαίη τις κινεῖσθαι ἢ μηδέν, καὶ ὅσα χείρονος ἤθους ἑλέσθαι καὶ ὑπεναντία ταῖς βουλήσεσιν, οἷον ὅτι ἡδονὴ τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν βέλτιον τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι.
A hypothesis would be unreputable in two ways: both when it results in saying absurd things, for instance, if someone were to say that all things are in motion or nothing is; and when the premises are such as belong to a worse character to choose and are contrary to people's wishes, for instance, that pleasure is the good, and that doing injustice is better than suffering it.
Οὐ γὰρ ὡς λόγου χάριν ὑπέχοντα ἀλλ᾿ ὡς τὰ δοκοῦντα λέγοντα μισοῦσιν.
For people hate the defender of such views, not as one defending them for the sake of argument, but as one who speaks what he really believes.
§8.10Ὅσοι δὲ τῶν λόγων ψεῦδος συλλογίζονται, λυτέον ἀναιροῦντα παρ᾿ ὃ γίνεται τὸ ψεῦδος.
As for those arguments which deduce a falsehood, one must solve them by demolishing that on account of which the falsehood arises.
Οὐ γὰρ ὁτιοῦν ἀνελὼν λέλυκεν, οὐδ᾿ εἰ ψεῦδός ἐστι τὸ ἀναιρούμενον. Ἔχοι γὰρ ἂν πλείω ψεύδη ὁ λόγος, οἷον ἐάν τις λάβῃ τὸν καθήμενον γράφειν, Σωκράτη δὲ καθῆσθαι· συμβαίνει γὰρ ἐκ τούτων Σωκράτη γράφειν.
For he has not solved the argument by demolishing just anything, not even if the demolished premise is false; for the argument might contain several falsehoods. For example, if someone assumes that the sitting person writes, and that Socrates is sitting; for from these it follows that Socrates writes.
Ἀναιρεθέντος οὖν τοῦ Σωκράτη καθῆσθαι οὐδὲν μᾶλλον λέλυται ὁ λόγος· καίτοι ψεῦδος τὸ ἀξίωμα.
Therefore, when "Socrates is sitting" is demolished, the argument is solved no more, and yet the premise is false.
Ἀλλ᾿ οὐ παρὰ τοῦτο ὁ λόγος ψευδής· ἂν γάρ τις τύχῃ καθήμενος μὲν μὴ γράφων δέ, οὐκέτι ἐπὶ τοῦ τοιούτου ἡ αὐτὴ λύσις ἁρμόσει.
But it is not because of this premise that the argument is false; for if someone happens to be sitting but not writing, the same solution will no longer apply to such a case.
Ὥστε οὐ τοῦτο ἀναιρετέον, ἀλλὰ τὸ τὸν καθήμενον γράφειν· οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ὁ καθήμενος γράφει.
So one must not demolish this premise, but rather "the sitting person writes"; for not everyone who sits is writing.
Λέλυκε μὲν οὖν πάντως ὁ ἀνελὼν παρ᾿ ὃ γίνεται τὸ ψεῦδος, οἶδε δὲ τὴν λύσιν ὁ εἰδὼς ὅτι παρὰ τοῦτο ὁ λόγος, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ψευδογραφουμένων·
Therefore, he who demolishes that on account of which the falsehood arises has solved the argument in any case, but he knows the solution who knows that the argument depends on account of this, just as in the case of false geometrical proofs.
οὐ γὰρ ἀπόχρη τὸ ἐνστῆναι, οὐδ᾿ ἂν ψεῦδος ᾖ τὸ ἀναιρούμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διότι ψεῦδος ἀποδεικτέον· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν εἴη φανερὸν πότερον προορῶν τι ἢ οὔ ποιεῖται τὴν ἔνστασιν.
For it is not sufficient to object, not even if the demolished premise is false, but one must also demonstrate why it is false; for in this way it would be clear whether he makes the objection with some foresight or not.
Ἔστι δὲ λόγον κωλῦσαι συμπεράνασθαι τετραχῶς. Ἢ γὰρ ἀνελόντα παρ᾿ ὃ γίνεται τὸ ψεῦδος, ἢ πρὸς τὸν ἐρωτῶντα ἔνστασιν εἰπόντα· πολλάκις γὰρ οὐδὲ λέλυκεν, ὁ μέντοι πυνθανόμενος οὐ δύναται πορρωτέρω προαγαγεῖν.
And it is possible to prevent an argument from reaching its conclusion in four ways: either by demolishing that because of which the falsehood arises, or by making an objection against the questioner; for often the answerer has not even solved the argument, but the questioner is nevertheless unable to lead it any further.
Τρίτον δὲ πρὸς τὰ ἠρωτημένα· συμβαίη γὰρ ἂν ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἠρωτημένων μὴ γίνεσθαι ὃ βούλεται διὰ τὸ κακῶς ἠρωτῆσθαι, προστεθέντος δέ τινος γίνεσθαι τὸ συμπέρασμα.
Thirdly, against the questions asked; for it might happen that from the questions asked what the questioner wishes to conclude does not follow because they were badly asked, but if something is added, the conclusion follows.
Εἰ μὲν οὖν μηκέτι δύναται προάγειν ὁ ἐρωτῶν, πρὸς τὸν ἐρωτῶντα εἴη ἂν ἔνστασις, εἰ δὲ δύναται, πρὸς τὰ ἠρωτημένα.
If, then, the questioner is no longer able to lead the argument forward, the objection would be against the questioner; but if he is able, against the questions asked.
Τετάρτη δὲ καὶ χειρίστη τῶν ἐνστάσεων ἡ πρὸς τὸν χρόνον· ἔνιοι γὰρ τοιαῦτα ἐνίστανται πρὸς ἃ διαλεχθῆναι πλείονός ἐστι χρόνου ἢ τῆς παρούσης διατριβῆς.
Fourth and worst of the objections is that against time; for some people object to such things that to discuss them requires more time than the present discussion permits.
Αἱ μὲν οὖν ἐνστάσεις, καθάπερ εἴπαμεν, τετραχῶς γίνονται· λύσις δ᾿ ἐστὶ τῶν εἰρημένων ἡ πρώτη μόνον, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ κωλύσεις τινὲς καὶ ἐμποδισμοὶ τῶν συμπερασμάτων.
So, objections, as we said, occur in four ways; but of those mentioned, only the first is a solution, while the remaining ones are certain preventions and obstructions of conclusions.