§8.6Φανερὸν οὖν τίνων στοχαστέον τῷ ἀποκρινομένῳ, εἴτε ἁπλῶς ἔνδοξον εἴτε τινὶ τὸ κείμενόν ἐστιν.
It is clear, then, what the answerer should aim at, whether the thesis laid down is simply reputable or so to someone.
Ἐπεὶ δ᾿ ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἢ ἔνδοξον εἶναι ἢ ἄδοξον ἢ μηδέτερον, καὶ ἢ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἢ μὴ πρὸς τὸν λόγον εἶναι τὸ ἐρωτώμενον, ἐὰν μὲν ᾖ δοκοῦν καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸν λόγον, δοτέον φήσαντα δοκεῖν, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ δοκοῦν καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸν λόγον, δοτέον μέν, ἐπισημαντέον δὲ τὸ μὴ δοκοῦν πρὸς εὐλάβειαν εὐηθείας.
Since every question asked must necessarily be either reputable, unreputable, or neither, and must also be either relevant or irrelevant to the argument, if it is reputable and irrelevant to the argument, one must grant it, saying that it seems to be so; but if it does not seem to be so and is irrelevant, one must grant it but point out that it does not seem so, as a precaution against looking foolish.
Ὄντος δὲ πρὸς τὸν λόγον καὶ δοκοῦντος λεκτέον ὅτι δοκεῖ μέν, ἀλλὰ λίαν σύνεγγυς τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀναιρεῖται τούτου τεθέντος τὸ κείμενον.
But if it is relevant to the argument and seems to be so, one must say that it does indeed seem so, but that it is too close to the starting-point and that, if this is laid down, the thesis is demolished.
Εἰ δὲ πρὸς τὸν λόγον, λίαν δ᾿ ἄδοξον τὸ ἀξίωμα, συμβαίνειν μὲν φατέον τούτου τεθέντος, ἀλλὰ λίαν εὔηθες εἶναι τὸ προτεινόμενον.
But if it is relevant to the argument, but the premise requested is highly unreputable, one must say that while this follows if the premise is laid down, what is proposed is too foolish.
Εἰ δὲ μήτ᾿ ἄδοξον μήτ᾿ ἔνδοξον, εἰ μὲν μηδὲν πρὸς τὸν λόγον, δοτέον μηδὲν διορίσαντι, εἰ δὲ πρὸς τὸν λόγον, ἐπισημαντέον ὅτι ἀναιρεῖται τεθέντος τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ.
And if it is neither unreputable nor reputable, if indeed it is not at all relevant to the argument, it must be granted without making any distinction; but if it is relevant, one must point out that, if this is laid down, the starting-point is demolished.
Οὕτω γὰρ ὅ τ᾿ ἀποκρινόμενος οὐδὲν δόξει δι᾿ αὑτὸν πάσχειν, ἐὰν προορῶν ἕκαστα τιθῇ, ὅ τ᾿ ἐρωτῶν τεύξεται συλλογισμοῦ τιθεμένων αὐτῷ πάντων τῶν ἐνδοξοτέρων τοῦ συμπεράσματος.
For in this way, the answerer will not seem to suffer any defeat through his own fault, if he lays things down with foresight in each case; and the questioner will obtain his deduction, provided that all things more reputable than the conclusion are granted to him.
Ὅσοι δ᾿ ἐξ ἀδοξοτέρων τοῦ συμπεράσματος ἐπιχειροῦσι συλλογίζεσθαι, δῆλον ὡς οὐ καλῶς συλλογίζονται· διὸ τοῖς ἐρωτῶσιν οὐ θετέον.
And as for those who attempt to reason from premises less reputable than the conclusion, it is clear that they do not reason well; therefore, one must not grant these to them when they ask.
§8.7Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσαφῶς καὶ πλεοναχῶς λεγομένων ἀπαντητέον.
In the same way, one must also deal with things that are expressed obscurely and in multiple senses.
Ἐπεὶ γὰρ δέδοται τῷ ἀποκρινομένῳ μὴ μανθάνοντι εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὐ μανθάνω, καὶ πλεοναχῶς λεγομένου μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὁμολογῆσαι ἢ ἀρνήσασθαι, δῆλον ὡς πρῶτον μέν, ἂν μὴ σαφὲς ᾖ τὸ ῥηθέν, οὐκ ἀποκνητέον τὸ φάναι μὴ συνιέναι· πολλάκις γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ σαφῶς ἐρωτηθέντας διδόναι ἀπαντᾷ τι δυσχερές.
For since it is granted to the answerer, if he does not understand, to say "I do not understand," and if a thing is said in multiple senses, he is not of necessity bound to agree or deny, it is clear that, first of all, if what is said is not clear, one must not shrink from saying that one does not comprehend; for often, some difficulty arises from granting things when asked unclearly.
Ἂν δὲ γνώριμον μὲν ᾖ πλεοναχῶς δὲ λεγόμενον, ἐὰν μὲν ἐπὶ πάντων ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος ᾖ τὸ λεγόμενον, δοτέον ἁπλῶς ἢ ἀρνητέον, ἐὰν δ᾿ ἐπὶ τὶ μὲν ψεῦδος ᾖ ἐπὶ τὶ δ᾿ ἀληθές, ἐπισημαντέον ὅτι πλεοναχῶς λέγεται καὶ διότι τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος τὸ δ᾿ ἀληθές· ὕστερον γὰρ διαιρουμένου ἄδηλον εἰ καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ συνεώρα τὸ ἀμφίβολον.
If, however, it is familiar but said in multiple senses, then if what is said is true or false in all senses, one must grant or deny it simply; but if it is false in one sense and true in another, one must point out both that it is said in multiple senses and that one is false and the other true; for if the distinction is made later, it is unclear whether he also saw the ambiguity at the beginning.
Ἐὰν δὲ μὴ προΐδῃ τὸ ἀμφίβολον ἀλλ᾿ εἰς θάτερον βλέψας θῇ, ῥητέον πρὸς τὸν ἐπὶ θάτερον ἄγοντα ὅτι οὐκ εἰς τοῦτο βλέπων ἔδωκα ἀλλ᾿ εἰς θάτερον αὐτῶν. Πλειόνων γὰρ ὄντων τῶν ὑπὸ ταὐτὸν ὄνομα ἢ λόγον ῥᾳδία ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις.
If he did not foresee the ambiguity but laid down the premise by looking to one of the senses, he must say to the one who is leading the argument to the other sense: "I granted it looking not to this, but to the other of them." For when there are several things under the same name or definition, dispute is easy.
Ἐὰν δὲ καὶ σαφὲς ᾖ καὶ ἁπλοῦν τὸ ἐρωτώμενον, ἢ ναί ἢ οὔ ἀποκριτέον.
If, on the other hand, the question asked is both clear and simple, one must answer either "yes" or "no".
§8.8Ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα πρότασις συλλογιστικὴ ἢ τούτων τίς ἐστιν ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμὸς ἤ τινος τούτων ἕνεκα, δῆλον δ᾿ ὅταν ἑτέρου χάριν λαμβάνηται τῷ πλείω τὰ ὅμοια ἐρωτᾶν (ἢ γὰρ δι᾿ ἐπαγωγῆς ἢ δι᾿ ὁμοιότητος ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὸ καθόλου λαμβάνουσιν), τὰ μὲν οὖν καθ᾿ ἕκαστα πάντα θετέον, ἂν ᾖ ἀληθῆ καὶ ἔνδοξα, πρὸς δὲ τὸ καθόλου πειρατέον ἔνστασιν φέρειν·
Since every reasoning premise is either one of those from which the deduction is made, or for the sake of one of them, and it is clear when it is taken for the sake of another by his asking several similar questions (for they usually obtain the universal either through induction or through similarity), therefore, all the particular instances must be granted, if they are true and reputable; but against the universal, one must try to bring an objection.
τὸ γὰρ ἄνευ ἐνστάσεως, ἢ οὔσης ἢ δοκούσης, κωλύειν τὸν λόγον δυσκολαίνειν ἐστίν.
For to block the argument without an objection, whether real or apparent, is to be contentious.
Εἰ οὖν ἐπὶ πολλῶν φαινομένων μὴ δίδωσι τὸ καθόλου μὴ ἔχων ἔνστασιν, φανερὸν ὅτι δυσκολαίνει.
If, then, when many instances are apparent, he does not grant the universal though he has no objection, it is clear that he is being contentious.
Ἔτι εἰ μηδ᾿ ἀντεπιχειρεῖν ἔχει ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθές, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἂν δόξειε δυσκολαίνειν.
Furthermore, if he cannot even argue to the contrary that it is not true, he would seem much more to be contentious.
Καίτοι οὐδὲ τοῦθ᾿ ἱκανόν· πολλοὺς γὰρ λόγους ἔχομεν ἐναντίους ταῖς δόξαις, οὓς χαλεπὸν λύειν, καθάπερ Ζήνωνος ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται κινεῖσθαι οὐδὲ τὸ στάδιον διελθεῖν·
Yet even this is not enough; for we have many arguments contrary to common opinions, which are difficult to solve, such as that of Zeno, that it is not possible to move, nor to cross the stadium.
ἀλλ᾿ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο τἀντικείμενα τούτοις οὐ θετέον.
But it is not because of this that we must not lay down the things opposite to these.
Εἰ οὖν μήτ᾿ ἐνίστασθαι μήτ᾿ ἀντεπιχειρεῖν ἔχων μὴ τίθησι, δῆλον ὅτι δυσκολαίνει· ἔστι γὰρ ἡ ἐν λόγοις δυσκολία ἀπόκρισις παρὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους τρόπους, συλλογισμοῦ φθαρτική.
If, then, though having neither an objection nor a counter-argument, he does not lay it down, it is clear that he is being contentious; for contentiousness in arguments is an answer of a kind contrary to the methods mentioned, which is destructive of deduction.