§8.11#1Ἐπιτίμησις δὲ λόγου κατ᾿ αὐτόν τε τὸν λόγον, καὶ ὅταν ἐρωτᾶται, οὐχ ἡ αὐτή· πολλάκις γὰρ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς διειλέχθαι τὸν λόγον ὁ ἐρωτώμενος αἴτιος διὰ τὸ μὴ συγχωρεῖν ἐξ ὧν ἦν διαλεχθῆναι καλῶς πρὸς τὴν θέσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐπὶ θατέρῳ μόνον τὸ καλῶς ἐπιτελεσθῆναι τὸ κοινὸν ἔργον.
Criticism of an argument is not the same when it is of the argument itself, and when it is asked (as a question); for often the answerer is the cause of the argument not being conducted well, because of not conceding the points from which it was possible to discuss well against the thesis; for the successful completion of the common task does not depend on one party alone.
Ἀναγκαῖον οὖν ἐνίοτε πρὸς τὸν λέγοντα καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὴν θέσιν ἐπιχειρεῖν, ὅταν ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος τἀναντία τῷ ἐρωτῶντι παρατηρῇ προσεπηρεάζων.
Therefore it is necessary sometimes to argue against the speaker and not against the thesis, when the answerer maliciously watches for the opposites to the questioner.
Δυσκολαίνοντες οὖν ἀγωνιστικὰς καὶ οὐ διαλεκτικὰς ποιοῦνται τὰς διατριβάς.
Being ill-tempered, they thus make the discussions competitive and not dialectical.
Ἔτι δ᾿ ἐπεὶ γυμνασίας καὶ πείρας χάριν ἀλλ᾿ οὐ διδασκαλίας οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν λόγων, δῆλον ὡς οὐ μόνον τἀληθῆ συλλογιστέον ἀλλὰ καὶ ψεῦδος, οὐδὲ δι᾿ ἀληθῶν ἀεὶ ἀλλ᾿ ἐνίοτε καὶ ψευδῶν.
Furthermore, since such arguments are for the sake of training and trial, and not of instruction, it is clear that one must deduce not only the truth but also falsehood, and not always through true premises but sometimes also through false ones.
Πολλάκις γὰρ ἀληθοῦς τεθέντος ἀναιρεῖν ἀνάγκη τὸν διαλεγόμενον, ὥστε προτατέον τὰ ψευδῆ.
For often, when a true thesis is set down, the discussion partner must demolish it, so that one must propose false premises.
Ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ψεύδους τεθέντος ἀναιρετέον διὰ ψευδῶν· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τινὶ δοκεῖν τὰ μὴ ὄντα μᾶλλον τῶν ἀληθῶν, ὥστ᾿ ἐκ τῶν ἐκείνῳ δοκούντων τοῦ λόγου γινομένου μᾶλλον ἔσται πεπεισμένος ἢ ὠφελημένος.
And sometimes, when a false thesis is set down, it must be demolished through false premises; for nothing prevents things that are not from seeming to someone to be more the case than the truth, so that if the argument is constructed from what seems true to him, he will be more convinced than benefited.
Δεῖ δὲ τὸν καλῶς μεταβιβάζοντα διαλεκτικῶς καὶ μὴ ἐριστικῶς μεταβιβάζειν, καθάπερ τὸν γεωμέτρην γεωμετρικῶς, ἄν τε ψεῦδος ἄν τ᾿ ἀληθὲς ᾖ τὸ συμπεραινόμενον· ποῖοι δὲ διαλεκτικοὶ συλλογισμοί, πρότερον εἴρηται.
And he who leads the discussion to another point well must lead it dialectically and not eristically, just as a geometer does geometrically, whether the conclusion reached is false or true; what kind of deductions are dialectical has been said before.
Ἐπεὶ δὲ φαῦλος κοινωνὸς ὁ ἐμποδίζων τὸ κοινὸν ἔργον, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐν λόγῳ.
Since he who obstructs a common task is a bad partner, it is clear that this is so in argument too.
Κοινὸν γάρ τι καὶ ἐν τούτοις προκείμενόν ἐστι, πλὴν τῶν ἀγωνιζομένων.
For in these too there is a certain common purpose proposed, except for those who compete.
Τούτοις δ᾿ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀμφοτέροις τυχεῖν τοῦ αὐτοῦ τέλους· πλείους γὰρ ἑνὸς ἀδύνατον νικᾶν.
For these, it is not possible for both to attain the same end; for it is impossible for more than one to win.
Διαφέρει δ᾿ οὐδὲν ἄν τε διὰ τοῦ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἄν τε διὰ τοῦ ἐρωτᾶν ποιῇ τοῦτο· ὅ τε γὰρ ἐριστικῶς ἐρωτῶν φαύλως διαλέγεται, ὅ τ᾿ ἐν τῷ ἀποκρίνεσθαι μὴ διδοὺς τὸ φαινόμενον μηδ᾿ ἐκδεχόμενος ὅ τί ποτε βούλεται ὁ ἐρωτῶν πυθέσθαι.
And it makes no difference whether one does this through answering or through questioning; for he who questions eristically discusses badly, and so does he who in answering does not concede what is apparent nor accept whatever the questioner wishes to inquire.
Δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι οὑχ ὁμοίως ἐπιτιμητέον καθ᾿ αὑτόν τε τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τῷ ἐρωτῶντι· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τὸν μὲν λόγον φαῦλον εἶναι, τὸν δ᾿ ἐρωτῶντα ὡς ἐνδέχεται βέλτιστα πρὸς τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον διειλέχθαι.
It is clear, then, from what has been said, that one must not criticize the argument in itself and the questioner in the same way; for nothing prevents the argument itself from being bad, while the questioner has discussed with the answerer as well as possible.
Πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς δυσκολαίνοντας οὐ δυνατὸν ἴσως εὐθὺς οἵους τις βούλεται ἀλλ᾿ οἵους ἐνδέχεται ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς συλλογισμούς.
For against those who are ill-tempered, it is perhaps not possible to make immediately the kind of deductions one wishes, but only such as are possible.
Ἐπεὶ δ᾿ ἐστὶν ἀδιόριστον πότε τἀναντία καὶ πότε τὰ ἐν ἀρχῇ λαμβάνουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι (πολλάκις γὰρ καθ᾿ αὑτοὺς λέγοντες τὰ ἐναντία λέγουσι, καὶ ἀνανεύσαντες πρότερον διδόασιν ὕστερον· διόπερ ἐρωτώμενοι τἀναντία καὶ τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ πολλάκις ὑπακούουσιν), ἀνάγκη φαύλους γίνεσθαι τοὺς λόγους.
And since it is undetermined when people assume opposites and when they assume the point at issue (for often when speaking by themselves they say opposite things, and having denied beforehand they concede later; wherefore when questioned they often agree to opposites and to the point at issue), the arguments must necessarily become bad.
Αἴτιος δ᾿ ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος, τὰ μὲν οὐ διδούς, τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα διδούς.
And the answerer is the cause of this, by not conceding some points, and conceding others of such a kind.
Φανερὸν οὖν ὡς οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐπιτιμητέον τοῖς ἐρωτῶσι καὶ τοῖς λόγοις.
It is clear, then, that one must not criticize questioners and arguments in the same way.