§8.4Πῶς μὲν οὖν ἐρωτηματίζειν καὶ τάττειν δεῖ, σχεδὸν ἱκανὰ τὰ εἰρημένα· περὶ δ᾿ ἀποκρίσεως πρῶτον μὲν διοριστέον τί ἐστιν ἔργον τοῦ καλῶς ἀποκρινομένου, καθάπερ τοῦ καλῶς ἐρωτῶντος.
Now, as to how one should question and arrange, what has been said is pretty much sufficient; but concerning answering, we must first define what is the job of the one who answers well, just as of the one who questions well.
Ἔστι δὲ τοῦ μὲν ἐρωτῶντος τὸ οὕτως ἐπαγαγεῖν τὸν λόγον ὥστε ποιῆσαι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον τὰ ἀδοξότατα λέγειν τῶν διὰ τὴν θέσιν ἀναγκαίων, τοῦ δ᾿ ἀποκρινομένου τὸ μὴ δι᾿ αὐτὸν φαίνεσθαι συμβαίνειν τὸ ἀδύνατον ἢ τὸ παράδοξον, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν θέσιν· ἑτέρα γὰρ ἴσως ἁμαρτία τὸ θέσθαι πρῶτον ὃ μὴ δεῖ καὶ τὸ θέμενον μὴ φυλάξαι κατὰ τρόπον.
The job of the questioner is to lead the argument in such a way as to make the answerer say the most unreputable of the things that follow necessarily from the thesis, whereas that of the answerer is to make it appear that the impossible or the paradoxical occurs not through himself, but through the thesis; for to lay down in the first place what one should not, and not to maintain what has been laid down in a proper way, are perhaps different errors.
§8.5Ἐπεὶ δ᾿ ἐστὶν ἀδιόριστα τοῖς γυμνασίας καὶ πείρας ἕνεκα τοὺς λόγους ποιουμένοις· οὐ γὰρ οἱ αὐτοὶ σκοποὶ τοῖς διδάσκουσιν ἢ μανθάνουσι καὶ τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις, οὐδὲ τούτοις τε καὶ τοῖς διατρίβουσι μετ᾿ ἀλλήλων σκέψεως χάριν.
Now, for those who conduct their arguments for the sake of practice and trial, these things are undefined; for the goals are not the same for those who teach or learn and those who compete, nor are they the same for these and those who spend time with one another for the sake of inquiry.
Τῷ μὲν γὰρ μανθάνοντι θετέον ἀεὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα· καὶ γὰρ οὐδ᾿ ἐπιχειρεῖ ψεῦδος οὐδεὶς διδάσκειν· τῶν δ᾿ ἀγνωνιζομένων τὸν μὲν ἐρωτῶντα φαίνεσθαί τι δεῖ ποιεῖν πάντως, τὸν δ᾿ ἀποκρινόμενον μηδὲν φαίνεσθαι πάσχειν.
For the learner must always lay down what seems to be the case; for indeed no one attempts to teach what is false; but of those who compete, the questioner must always appear to achieve something, while the answerer must appear to suffer nothing.
Ἐν δὲ ταῖς διαλεκτικαῖς συνόδοις τοῖς μὴ ἀγῶνος χάριν ἀλλὰ πείρας καὶ σκέψεως τοὺς λόγους ποιουμένοις οὐ διήρθρωταί πω τίνος δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον καὶ ὁποῖα διδόναι καὶ ποῖα μὴ πρὸς τὸ καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς φυλάττειν τὴν θέσιν.
But in dialectical meetings, for those who conduct their arguments not for the sake of competition but for trial and inquiry, it has not yet been clearly defined what the answerer should aim at, and what sort of things they should grant and what sort they should not, in order to maintain the thesis well or not well.
Ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐδὲν ἔχομεν παραδεδομένον ὑπ᾿ ἄλλων, αὐτοί τι πειραθῶμεν εἰπεῖν.
Since, then, we have nothing handed down by others, let us try to say something ourselves.
Ἀνάγκη δὴ τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ὑπέχειν λόγον θέμενον ἤτοι ἔνδοξον ἢ ἄδοξον θέσιν ἢ μηδέτερον, καὶ ἤτοι ἁπλῶς ἔνδοξον ἢ ἄδοξον ἢ ὡρισμένως, οἷον τῷδί τινι ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ.
It is necessary, then, that the one who answers and sustains an argument does so having laid down a thesis that is either reputable, unreputable, or neither, and either simply reputable or unreputable, or relatively so, as for instance to some particular person, whether himself or someone else.
Διαφέρει δ᾿ οὐδὲν ὁπωσοῦν ἐνδόξου ἢ ἀδόξου οὔσης· ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς τρόπος ἔσται τοῦ καλῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι, καὶ δοῦναι ἢ μὴ δοῦναι τὸ ἐρωτηθέν.
And it makes no difference howsoever reputable or unreputable it is; for the way of answering well, and of granting or not granting what is questioned, will be the same.
Ἀδόξου μὲν οὖν οὔσης τῆς θέσεως ἔνδοξον ἀνάγκη τὸ συμπέρασμα γίνεσθαι, ἐνδόξου δ᾿ ἄδοξον· τὸ γὰρ ἀντικείμενον ἀεὶ τῇ θέσει ὁ ἐρωτῶν συμπεραίνεται.
Now, if the thesis is unreputable, the conclusion must necessarily be reputable, and if it is reputable, the conclusion must be unreputable; for the questioner always concludes the opposite of the thesis.
Εἰ δὲ μήτ᾿ ἄδοξον μήτ᾿ ἔνδοξον τὸ κείμενον, καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἔσται τοιοῦτον.
But if what is laid down is neither unreputable nor reputable, the conclusion will also be of this kind.
Ἐπεὶ δ᾿ ὁ καλῶς συλλογιζόμενος ἐξ ἐνδοξοτέρων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων τὸ προβληθὲν ἀποδείκνυσι, φανερὸν ὡς ἀδόξου μὲν ὄντος ἁπλῶς τοῦ κειμένου οὐ δοτέον τῷ ἀποκρινομένῳ οὔθ᾿ ὃ μὴ δοκεῖ ἁπλῶς, οὔθ᾿ ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν ἧττον δὲ τοῦ συμπεράσματος δοκεῖ.
And since the one who reasons well demonstrates the proposed problem from things more reputable and more familiar, it is clear that when what is laid down is simply unreputable, the answerer must not grant either what does not seem to be the case simply, or what seems to be so but is less reputable than the conclusion.
Ἀδόξου γὰρ οὔσης τῆς θέσεως ἔνδοξον τὸ συμπέρασμα, ὥστε δεῖ τὰ λαμβανόμενα ἔνδοξα πάντ᾿ εἶναι καὶ μᾶλλον ἔνδοξα τοῦ προκειμένου, εἰ μέλλει διὰ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων τὸ ἧττον γνώριμον περαίνεσθαι.
For if the thesis is unreputable, the conclusion is reputable, so that the premises taken must all be reputable and more reputable than what is proposed, if the less familiar is to be concluded through the more familiar.
Ὥστ᾿ εἴ τι μὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τῶν ἐρωτωμένων, οὐ θετέον τῷ ἀποκρινομένῳ.
Consequently, if any of the things questioned is not of this kind, the answerer must not grant it.
Εἰ δ᾿ ἔνδοξος ἁπλῶς ἡ θέσις, δῆλον ὅτι τὸ συμπέρασμα ἁπλῶς ἄδοξον.
But if the thesis is simply reputable, it is clear that the conclusion is simply unreputable.
Θετέον οὖν τά τε δοκοῦντα πάντα, καὶ τῶν μὴ δοκούντων ὅσα ἧττόν ἐστιν ἄδοξα τοῦ συμπεράσματος· ἱκανῶς γὰρ ἂν δόξειε διειλέχθαι.
Therefore, one must grant all that seems to be the case, and of those things that do not seem to be so, all that are less unreputable than the conclusion; for then the debate would seem to have been carried out sufficiently.
Ὁμοίως δὲ εἰ μήτ᾿ ἄδοξος μήτ᾿ ἔνδοξός ἐστιν ἡ θέσις· καὶ γὰρ οὕτως τά τε φαινόμενα ἅπαντα δοτέον, καὶ τῶν μὴ δοκούντων ὅσα μᾶλλον ἔνδοξα τοῦ συμπεράσματος· οὕτω γὰρ ἐνδοξοτέρους συμβήσεται τοὺς λόγους γίνεσθαι.
Likewise also if the thesis is neither unreputable nor reputable; for in this way too, all that appears to be the case must be granted, and of those things that do not seem so, all that are more reputable than the conclusion; for in this way it will turn out that the arguments become more reputable.
Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἁπλῶς ἔνδοξον ἢ ἄδοξον τὸ κείμενον, πρὸς τὰ δοκοῦντα ἁπλῶς τὴν σύγκρισιν ποιητέον· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἁπλῶς ἔνδοξον ἢ ἄδοξον τὸ κείμενον ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀποκρινομένῳ, πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸ δοκοῦν καὶ μὴ δοκοῦν κρίνοντα θετέον ἢ οὐ θετέον.
If, then, what is laid down is simply reputable or unreputable, the comparison must be made with what simply seems to be the case; but if what is laid down is not simply reputable or unreputable but is so to the answerer, he must grant or not grant by judging what seems and does not seem to be the case to himself.
Ἂν δ᾿ ἑτέρου δόξαν διαφυλάττῃ ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος, δῆλον ὅτι πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνου διάνοιαν ἀποβλέποντα θετέον ἕκαστα καὶ ἀρνητέον.
And if the answerer is maintaining the opinion of another, it is clear that he must grant and deny each thing by looking to that person's mind.
Διὸ καὶ οἱ κομίζοντες ἀλλοτρίας δόξας, οἷον ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν εἶναι ταὐτόν, καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτός φησιν, οὐ διδόασι μὴ παρεῖναι ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ τἀναντία, οὐχ ὡς οὐ δοκοῦν αὐτοῖς τοῦτο, ἀλλ᾿ ὅτι καθ᾿ Ἡράκλειτον οὕτω λεκτέον.
This is why those who introduce the opinions of others, as for instance that good and bad are the same, as Heraclitus says, do not grant that contraries cannot belong to the same thing at the same time, not because this does not seem so to themselves, but because according to Heraclitus one must speak in this way.
Ποιοῦσι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ οἱ παρ᾿ ἀλλήλων δεχόμενοι τὰς θέσεις· στοχάζονται γὰρ ὡς ἂν εἴπειεν ὁ θέμενος.
Those who receive theses from one another also do this; for they aim at how the one who laid down the thesis would speak.