§8.2#1Χρηστέον δ᾿ ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι τῷ μὲν συλλογισμῷ πρὸς τοὺς διαλεκτικοὺς μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς, τῇ δ᾿ ἐπαγωγῇ τοὐναντίον πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς μᾶλλον· εἴρηται δ᾿ ὑπὲρ τούτων καὶ πρότερον.
In debating, one must use reasoning rather against dialecticians than against the multitude, and induction, on the contrary, rather against the multitude; this has also been said before.
Ἔστι δὲ ἐπ᾿ ἐνίων μὲν ἐπάγοντα δυνατὸν ἐρωτῆσαι τὸ καθόλου, ἐπ᾿ ἐνίων δ᾿ οὐ ῥᾴδιον διὰ τὸ μὴ κεῖσθαι ταῖς ὁμοιότησιν ὄνομα πάσαις κοινόν· ἀλλ᾿ ὅταν δέῃ τὸ καθόλου λαβεῖν, οὕτως ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων φασίν·
In some cases, it is possible for one who is inducing to ask for the universal, but in others it is not easy because there is no common name established for all the similarities; but when it is necessary to assume the universal, they say "thus in all such cases".
τοῦτο δὲ διορίσαι τῶν χαλεπωτάτων, ὁποῖα τῶν προφερομένων τοιαῦτα καὶ ποῖα οὔ.
But to distinguish which of the cases brought forward are of this kind and which are not, is one of the hardest things.
Καὶ παρὰ τοῦτο πολλάκις ἀλλήλους παρακρούονται κατὰ τοὺς λόγους, οἱ μὲν φάσκοντες ὅμοια εἶναι τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὅμοια, οἱ δ᾿ ἀμφισβητοῦντες τὰ ὅμοια μὴ εἶναι ὅμοια.
And because of this, they often mislead each other in arguments, some asserting that things are similar which are not similar, and others disputing that similar things are similar.
Διὸ πειρατέον ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων ὀνοματοποιεῖν αὐτόν, ὅπως μήτε τῷ ἀποκρινομένῳ ἐξῇ ἀμφισβητεῖν ὡς οὐχ ὁμοίως τὸ ἐπιφερόμενον λέγεται, μήτε τῷ ἐρωτῶντι συκοφαντεῖν ὡς ὁμοίως λεγομένου, ἐπειδὴ πολλὰ τῶν οὐχ ὁμοίως λεγομένων ὁμοίως φαίνεται λέγεσθαι.
Therefore, in all such cases, one must try to coin a name oneself, so that it may neither be open to the answerer to dispute on the ground that the point brought forward is not said in a similar sense, nor to the questioner to make a false charge on the ground that it is said in a similar sense, since many things which are not said in a similar sense appear to be said in a similar sense.
Ὅταν δ᾿ ἐπάγοντος ἐπὶ πολλῶν μὴ διδῷ τὸ καθόλου, τότε δίκαιον ἀπαιτεῖν ἔνστασιν.
But when, though one is inducing in many cases, the answerer does not grant the universal, then it is fair to demand an objection.
Μὴ εἰπόντα δ᾿ αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τίνων οὕτως, οὐ δίκαιον ἀπαιτεῖν ἐπὶ τίνων οὐχ οὕτως· δεῖ γὰρ ἐπάγοντα πρότερον οὕτω τὴν ἔνστασιν ἀπαιτεῖν.
But if one has not himself stated in what cases it is so, it is not fair to demand in what cases it is not so; for one must first induce and only then demand the objection in this way.
Ἀξιωτέον τε τὰς ἐνστάσεις μὴ ἐπ᾿ αὐτοῦ τοῦ προτεινομένου φέρειν, ἐὰν μὴ ἓν μόνον ᾖ τὸ τοιοῦτον, καθάπερ ἡ δυὰς τῶν ἀρτίων μόνος ἀριθμὸς πρῶτος· δεῖ γὰρ τὸν ἐνιστάμενον ἐφ᾿ ἑτέρου τὴν ἔνστασιν φέρειν, ἢ λέγειν ὅτι τοῦτο μόνον τοιοῦτο.
And one should demand that they bring objections not against the proposed term itself, unless that is the only thing of its kind, as the number two is the only prime number among the even numbers; for the objector must bring his objection against something else, or else say that this alone is of such a kind.
Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἐνισταμένους τῷ καθόλου, μὴ ἐν αὐτῷ δὲ τὴν ἔνστασιν φέροντας ἀλλ᾿ ἐν τῷ ὁμωνύμῳ, οἷον ὅτι ἔχοι ἄν τις τὸ μὴ αὑτοῦ χρῶμα ἢ πόδα ἢ χεῖρα (ἔχοι γὰρ ἂν ὁ ζωγράφος χρῶμα καὶ ὁ μάγειρος πόδα τὸν μὴ αὑτοῦ) διελόμενον οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἐρωτητέον· λανθανούσης γὰρ τῆς ὁμωνυμίας εὖ δόξει ἐνστῆναι τῇ προτάσει.
But against those who object to the universal, yet bring their objection not in the thing itself but in its homonym—for instance, that someone might have a color, a foot, or a hand which is not his own (for a painter might have color, and a cook a foot, that is not his own)—one must therefore question them after making a division in such cases; for if the homonymy remains unnoticed, the objection to the premise will seem to be successful.
Ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἐν τῷ ὁμωνύμῳ ἀλλ᾿ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνιστάμενος κωλύῃ τὴν ἐρώτησιν, ἀφαιροῦντα δεῖ ἐν ᾧ ἡ ἔνστασις προτείνειν τὸ λοιπὸν καθόλου ποιοῦντα, ἕως ἂν λάβῃ τὸ χρήσιμον.
If, however, the objector prevents the question by objecting not in the homonym but in the thing itself, one must propose the remainder by taking away that in which the objection lies, making it universal, until one obtains what is useful.
Οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς λήθης καὶ τοῦ ἐπιλελῆσθαι· οὐ γὰρ συγχωροῦσι τὸν ἀποβεβληκότα ἐπιστήμην ἐπιλελῆσθαι, διότι μεταπεσόντος τοῦ πράγματος ἀποβέβληκε μὲν τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἐπιλέλησται δ᾿ οὔ.
For example, in the case of forgetting and having forgotten; for they do not grant that he who has lost knowledge has forgotten, because when the thing has changed, he has indeed lost the knowledge, but has not forgotten.
Ῥητέον οὖν ἀφελόντα ἐν ᾧ ἡ ἔνστασις τὸ λοιπόν, οἷον εἰ διαμένοντος τοῦ πράγματος ἀποβέβληκε τὴν ἐπιστήμην, διότι ἐπιλέλησται.
One must therefore state the remainder, taking away that in which the objection lies; for instance, if while the thing remains he has lost the knowledge, he has forgotten.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐνισταμένους διότι τῷ μείζονι ἀγαθῷ μεῖζον ἀντίκειται κακόν· προφέρουσι γὰρ ὅτι τῇ ὑγιείᾳ, ἐλάττονι ὄντι ἀγαθῷ τῆς εὐεξίας, μεῖζον κακὸν ἀντίκειται· τὴν γὰρ νόσον μεῖζον κακὸν εἶναι τῆς καχεξίας.
Likewise also against those who object that a greater evil is contrary to a greater good; for they bring forward the objection that to health, which is a lesser good than robust health, a greater evil is contrary; for disease is a greater evil than ill health.
Ἀφαιρετέον οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ τούτου ἐν ᾧ ἡ ἔνστασις· ἀφαιρεθέντος γὰρ μᾶλλον ἂν θείη, οἷον ὅτι τῷ μείζονι ἀγαθῷ μεῖζον κακὸν ἀντίκειται, ἐὰν μὴ συνεπιφέρῃ θάτερον θάτερον, καθάπερ ἡ εὐεξία τὴν ὑγίειαν.
Therefore, in this case also, we must take away that in which the objection lies; for when it is taken away, the answerer would more likely grant it, for instance, that a greater evil is contrary to a greater good, unless one of them entails the other, as robust health entails health.