§8.1#2Χρὴ δὲ καὶ ὁρισμῷ λαμβάνειν, ἐφ᾿ ὧν ἐνδέχεται, τὴν καθόλου πρότασιν, μὴ ἐπ᾿ αὐτῶν ἀλλ᾿ ἐπὶ τῶν συστοίχων·
One must also, where it is possible, assume the universal premise by definition, not in the cases themselves but in their coordinate terms; for people deceive themselves when the definition is assumed in a coordinate term, thinking that they are not granting the universal.
παραλογίζονται γὰρ ἑαυτούς, ὅταν ἐπὶ συστοίχου ληφθῇ ὁ ὁρισμός, ὡς οὐ τὸ καθόλου συγχωροῦντες, οἷον εἰ δέοι λαβεῖν ὅτι ὁ ὀργιζόμενος ὀρέγεται τιμωρίας διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν, ληφθείη δ᾿ ἡ ὀργὴ ὄρεξις εἶναι τιμωρίας διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τούτου ληφθέντος ἔχοιμεν ἂν καθόλου ὃ προαιρούμεθα.
For example, if it were necessary to assume that the angry man desires revenge because of an apparent slight, and anger should be assumed to be a desire for revenge because of an apparent slight; for it is clear that if this is assumed, we should have the universal that we purpose.
Τοῖς δ᾿ ἐπ᾿ αὐτῶν προτείνουσι πολλάκις ἀνανεύειν συμβαίνει τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἔχειν ἐπ᾿ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἔνστασιν, οἷον ὅτι ὁ ὀργιζόμενος οὐκ ὀρέγεται τιμωρίας· τοῖς γὰρ γονεῦσιν ὀργιζόμεθα μέν, οὐκ ὀρεγόμεθα δὲ τιμωρίας.
But for those who propose it in the cases themselves, it often happens that the answerer refuses, because he has the objection more ready in the case itself, for instance, that the angry man does not desire revenge; for we are angry with our parents, but we do not desire revenge.
Ἴσως μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀληθὴς ἡ ἔνστασις· παρ᾿ ἐνίων γὰρ ἱκανὴ τιμωρία τὸ λυπῆσαι μόνον καὶ ποιῆσαι μεταμέλεσθαι· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾿ ἔχει τι πιθανὸν πρὸς τὸ μὴ δοκεῖν ἀλόγως ἀρνεῖσθαι τὸ προτεινόμενον.
Perhaps, indeed, this objection is not true; for with some people it is a sufficient revenge merely to cause pain and make them repent; nevertheless, it has some plausibility so as not to seem to deny the proposal unreasonably.
Ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ τῆς ὀργῆς ὁρισμοῦ οὐχ ὁμοίως ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν εὑρεῖν ἔνστασιν.
But on the definition of anger itself, it is not so easy to find an objection.
Ἔτι τὸ προτείνειν μὴ ὡς δι᾿ αὐτὸ ἀλλ᾿ ἄλλου χάριν προτείνοντα· εὐλαβοῦνται γὰρ τὰ πρὸς τὴν θέσιν χρήσιμα.
Furthermore, one should propose not as though for its own sake, but for the sake of something else; for they are on their guard against what is useful for the thesis.
Ἁπλῶς δ᾿ εἰπεῖν, ὅτι μάλιστα ποιεῖν ἄδηλον πότερον τὸ προτεινόμενον ἢ τὸ ἀντικείμενον βούλεται λαβεῖν· ἀδήλου γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ πρὸς τὸν λόγον χρησίμου μᾶλλον τὸ δοκοῦν αὑτοῖς τιθέασιν.
To speak simply, one must make it as unclear as possible whether one wishes to assume the proposal or its opposite; for when what is useful to the argument is unclear, they rather lay down what seems good to themselves.
Ἔτι διὰ τῆς ὁμοιότητος πυνθάνεσθαι· καὶ γὰρ πιθανὸν καὶ λανθάνει μᾶλλον τὸ καθόλου.
Further, one should inquire by means of similarity; for it is both plausible and the universal is more easily concealed.
Οἷον ὅτι ὥσπερ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἄγνοια τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτή, οὕτω καὶ αἴσθησις τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτή, ἢ ἀνάπαλιν, ἐπειδὴ αἴσθησις ἡ αὐτή, καὶ ἐπιστήμη.
For example, just as the science and ignorance of contraries is the same, so also the perception of contraries is the same, or conversely, since perception is the same, science is too.
Τοῦτο δ᾿ ἐστὶν ὅμοιον ἐπαγωγῇ, οὐ μὴν ταὐτόν γε· ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν καθ᾿ ἕκαστα τὸ καθόλου λαμβάνεται, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ὁμοίων οὐκ ἔστι τὸ λαμβανόμενον τὸ καθόλου, ὑφ᾿ ὃ πάντα τὰ ὅμοιά ἐστιν.
This is similar to induction, yet not the same; for there the universal is assumed from particulars, whereas in the case of similar things, that which is assumed is not the universal under which all the similar things fall.
Δεῖ δὲ καὶ αὐτόν ποτε αὑτῷ ἔνστασιν φέρειν· ἀνυπόπτως γὰρ ἔχουσιν οἱ ἀποκρινόμενοι πρὸς τοὺς δοκοῦντας δικαίως ἐπιχειρεῖν.
One must also sometimes bring an objection against oneself; for answerers are off their guard against those who seem to argue justly.
Χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐπιλέγειν ὅτι σύνηθες καὶ λεγόμενον τὸ τοιοῦτον· ὀκνοῦσι γὰρ κινεῖν τὸ εἰωθὸς ἔνστασιν μὴ ἔχοντες.
It is also useful to add that such a thing is usual and commonly said; for people hesitate to change what is customary when they have no objection.
Ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῷ χρῆσθαι καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις φυλάττονται κινεῖν αὐτά.
At the same time, because they themselves use such things, they are careful not to change them.
Ἔτι τὸ μὴ σπουδάζειν, κἂν ὅλως χρήσιμον ᾖ· πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς σπουδάζοντας μᾶλλον ἀντιτείνουσιν.
Further, one should not show eagerness, even if it is entirely useful; for they resist more those who are eager.
Καὶ τὸ ὡς ἐν παραβολῇ προτείνειν· τὸ γὰρ δι᾿ ἄλλο προτεινόμενον καὶ μὴ δι᾿ αὑτὸ χρήσιμον τιθέασι μᾶλλον.
And one should propose as if in a comparison; for they rather lay down what is proposed for the sake of something else and not for itself.
Ἔτι μὴ αὐτὸ προτείνειν ὃ δεῖ ληφθῆναι, ἀλλ᾿ ᾧ τοῦτο ἕπεται ἐξ ἀνάγκης· μᾶλλόν τε γὰρ συγχωροῦσι διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁμοίως ἐκ τούτου φανερὸν εἶναι τὸ συμβησόμενον, καὶ ληφθέντος τούτου εἴληπται κἀκεῖνο.
Further, one should not propose the very thing that must be assumed, but that from which this follows of necessity; for they grant it more because the consequence is not equally obvious from this, and when this is assumed, that too has been assumed.
Καὶ τὸ ἐπ᾿ ἐσχάτῳ ἐρωτᾶν ὃ μάλιστα βούλεται λαβεῖν· μάλιστα γὰρ τὰ πρῶτα ἀνανεύουσι διὰ τὸ τοὺς πλείστους τῶν ἐρωτώντων πρῶτα λέγειν περὶ ἃ μάλιστα σπουδάζουσιν.
Also, one should ask last the thing one most wishes to assume; for they refuse most of all the first things because most questioners state first those things about which they are most eager.
Πρὸς ἐνίους δὲ πρῶτα τὰ τοιαῦτα προτείνειν· οἱ γὰρ δύσκολοι τὰ πρῶτα μάλιστα συγχωροῦσιν, ἂν μὴ παντελῶς φανερὸν ᾖ τὸ συμβησόμενον, ἐπὶ τελευτῆς δὲ δυσκολαίνουσιν.
But to some people, one should propose such things first; for stubborn people grant the first things most of all, unless the consequence is completely obvious, but at the end they become difficult.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅσοι οἴονται δριμεῖς εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἀποκρίνεσθαι· θέντες γὰρ τὰ πλεῖστα ἐπὶ τέλους τερθρεύονται ὡς οὐ συμβαίνοντος ἐκ τῶν κειμένων· τιθέασι δὲ προχείρως, πιστεύοντες τῇ ἕξει καὶ ὑπολαμβάνοντες οὐδὲν πείσεσθαι.
Likewise also those who think they are sharp in answering; for having granted most things, at the end they quibble that the conclusion does not follow from what has been laid down; but they lay down readily, trusting in their habit and supposing they will suffer no harm.
Ἔτι τὸ μηκύνειν καὶ παρεμβάλλειν τὰ μηδὲν χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸν λόγον, καθάπερ οἱ ψευδογραφοῦντες· πολλῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἄδηλον ἐν ὁποίῳ τὸ ψεῦδος.
Further, one should lengthen the argument and insert things of no use to it, just as those who draw false figures; for when there are many things, it is unclear in which of them the falsehood lies.
Διὸ καὶ λανθάνουσιν ἐνίοτε οἱ ἐρωτῶντες ἐν παραβύστῳ προστιθέντες ἃ καθ᾿ αὑτὰ προτεινόμενα οὐκ ἂν τεθείη.
Therefore, questioners sometimes deceive in secret, adding things which, if proposed by themselves, would not be laid down.
Εἰς μὲν οὖν κρύψιν τοῖς εἰρημένοις χρηστέον, εἰς δὲ κόσμον ἐπαγωγῇ καὶ διαιρέσει τῶν συγγενῶν.
For concealment, then, one must use the things mentioned, but for ornament, induction and the division of related things.
Ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπαγωγὴ ὁποῖον τί ἐστι δῆλον, τὸ δὲ διαιρεῖσθαι τοιοῦτον οἷον ὅτι ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης βελτίων ἢ τῷ ἀκριβεστέρα εἶναι ἢ τῷ βελτιόνων, καὶ ὅτι τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αἱ μὲν θεωρητικαὶ αἱ δὲ πρακτικαὶ αἱ δὲ ποιητικαί.
Now what induction is is clear; but division is such as that one science is better than another either by being more precise or by being of better objects, and that of sciences some are theoretical, others practical, and others productive.
Τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων ἕκαστον συνεπικοσμεῖ μὲν τὸν λόγον, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα δὲ ῥηθῆναι πρὸς τὸ συμπέρασμα.
For each of such things embellishes the argument, but they are not necessary to be stated for the conclusion.
Εἰς δὲ σαφήνειαν παραδείγματα καὶ παραβολὰς οἰστέον, παραδείγματα δὲ οἰκεῖα καὶ ἐξ ὧν ἴσμεν, οἷα Ὅμηρος, μὴ οἷα Χοιρίλος· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν σαφέστερον εἴη τὸ προτεινόμενον.
For clarity, examples and comparisons must be brought, and examples that are familiar and from what we know, such as Homer, not such as Choerilus; for in this way the proposal would be clearer.