§8.2#2Οὐ μόνον δ᾿ ἐνισταμένου τοῦτο ποιητέον, ἀλλὰ κἂν ἄνευ ἐνστάσεως ἀρνῆται διὰ τὸ προορᾶν τι τῶν τοιούτων· ἀφαιρεθέντος γὰρ ἐν ᾧ ἡ ἔνστασις, ἀναγκασθήσεται τιθέναι διὰ τὸ μὴ προορᾶν ἐν τῷ λοιπῷ ἐπὶ τίνος οὐχ οὕτως· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ τιθῇ, ἀπαιτούμενος ἔνστασιν οὐ μὴ ἔχῃ ἀποδοῦναι.
And this must be done not only when the answerer objects, but also if without objecting he denies because he foresees some such thing; for when that in which the objection lies is taken away, he will be compelled to grant it, because he does not foresee in the remainder in what case it is not so; and if he does not grant it, when demanded an objection he will not be able to produce it.
Εἰσὶ δὲ τοιαῦται τῶν προτάσεων αἱ ἐπὶ τὶ μὲν ψευδεῖς ἐπὶ τὶ δ᾿ ἀληθεῖς· ἐπὶ τούτων γὰρ ἔστιν ἀφελόντα τὸ λοιπὸν ἀληθὲς καταλιπεῖν.
Such are the premises which are false in some respects but true in others; for in these it is possible, by taking away the false part, to leave the remainder as true.
Ἐὰν δ᾿ ἐπὶ πολλῶν προτείνοντος μὴ φέρῃ ἔνστασιν, ἀξιωτέον τιθέναι· διαλεκτικὴ γάρ ἐστι πρότασις πρὸς ἣν οὕτως ἐπὶ πολλῶν ἔχουσαν μὴ ἔστιν ἔνστασις.
If, when one proposes in many cases, the answerer does not bring an objection, one should demand that he grant it; for a dialectical premise is one against which, when it holds thus in many cases, there is no objection.
Ὅταν δ᾿ ἐνδέχηται τὸ αὐτὸ ἄνευ τε τοῦ ἀδυνάτου καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου συλλογίσασθαι, ἀποδεικνύντι μὲν καὶ μὴ διαλεγομένῳ οὐδὲν διαφέρει οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως συλλογίσασθαι, διαλεγομένῳ δὲ πρὸς ἄλλον οὐ χρηστέον τῷ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου συλλογισμῷ.
When it is possible to reason the same thing both without and through the impossible, for one who is demonstrating and not debating it makes no difference to reason in this or that way, but for one who is debating with another, he must not use the reasoning through the impossible.
Ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου συλλογισαμένῳ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀμφισβητεῖν· ὅταν δὲ τὸ ἀδύνατον συλλογίσηται, ἂν μὴ λίαν ᾖ περιφανὲς ψεῦδος ὄν, οὐκ ἀδύνατόν φασιν εἶναι, ὥστ᾿ οὐ γίνεται τοῖς ἐρωτῶσιν ὃ βούλονται.
For to one who has reasoned without the impossible there is no room for dispute; but when one reasons to the impossible, unless the falsity is extremely obvious, they say it is not impossible, so that the questioners do not get what they want.
Δεῖ δὲ προτείνειν ὅσα ἐπὶ πολλῶν μὲν οὕτως ἔχει, ἔνστασις δὲ ἢ ὅλως μὴ ἔστιν ἢ μὴ ἐπιπολῆς τὸ συνιδεῖν· μὴ δυνάμενοι γὰρ συνορᾶν ἐφ᾿ ὧν οὐχ οὕτως, ὡς ἀληθὲς ὂν τιθέασιν.
One must propose those things which hold thus in many cases, and where an objection either does not exist at all or is not easy to perceive; for when they cannot see in what cases it is not so, they grant it as being true.
Οὐ δεῖ δὲ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἐρώτημα ποιεῖν· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνανεύσαντος οὐ δοκεῖ γεγονέναι συλλογισμός.
And one must not make the conclusion a question; otherwise, if the answerer denies it, the reasoning does not seem to have taken place.
Πολλάκις γὰρ καὶ μὴ ἐρωτῶντος ἀλλ᾿ ὡς συμβαῖνον ἐπιφέροντος ἀρνοῦνται, καὶ τοῦτο ποιοῦντες οὐ δοκοῦσιν ἐλέγχεσθαι τοῖς μὴ συνορῶσιν ὅ τι συμβαίνει ἐκ τῶν τεθέντων.
For often, even when the questioner does not ask but brings it forward as a consequence, they deny it, and by so doing they do not seem to be refuted to those who do not see what follows from the premises.
Ὅταν οὖν μηδὲ φήσας συμβαίνειν ἐρωτήσῃ, ὁ δ᾿ ἀρνηθῇ, παντελῶς οὐ δοκεῖ γεγονέναι συλλογισμός.
When, therefore, without even saying that it follows, he asks a question and the other denies it, it does not seem at all that a reasoning has taken place.
Οὐ δοκεῖ δὲ πᾶν τὸ καθόλου διαλεκτικὴ πρότασις εἶναι οἷον τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἢ ποσαχῶς λέγεται τἀγαθόν; ἔστι γὰρ πρότασις διαλεκτικὴ πρὸς ἣν ἔστιν ἀποκρίνασθαι ναί ἢ οὔ· πρὸς δὲ τὰς εἰρημένας οὐκ ἔστιν.
And not every universal seems to be a dialectical premise, as for instance, "What is man?" or "In how many ways is the good said?"; for a dialectical premise is one to which it is possible to answer "yes" or "no", but to the aforementioned ones it is not possible.
Διὸ οὐ διαλεκτικά ἐστι τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἐρωτημάτων, ἂν μὴ αὐτὸς διορίσας ἢ διελόμενος εἴπῃ, οἷον ἆρά γε τἀγαθὸν οὕτως ἢ οὕτως λέγεται; πρὸς γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ῥᾳδία ἡ ἀπόκρισις ἢ καταφήσαντι ἢ ἀποφήσαντι.
Therefore, such questions are not dialectical, unless one says them after defining or dividing them oneself, as for instance, "Is the good said in this way or in that way?"; for to such questions the answer is easy, whether by affirming or by denying.
Διὸ πειρατέον οὕτω προτείνειν τὰς τοιαύτας τῶν προτάσεων.
Therefore, one must try to propose such premises in this way.
Ἅμα δὲ καὶ δίκαιον ἴσως παρ᾿ ἐκείνου ζητεῖν ποσαχῶς λέγεται τἀγαθόν, ὅταν αὐτοῦ διαιρουμένου καὶ προτείνοντος μηδαμῶς συγχωρῇ.
At the same time, it is perhaps also fair to demand from him in how many ways the good is said, when, although he himself divides and proposes it, the other by no means concedes.
Ὅστις δ᾿ ἕνα λόγον πολὺν χρόνον ἐρωτᾷ, κακῶς πυνθάνεται.
And whoever asks a single argument for a long time makes a bad inquiry.
Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀποκρινομένου τοῦ ἐρωτωμένου τὸ ἐρωτώμενον, δῆλον ὅτι πολλὰ ἐρωτήματα ἐρωτᾷ ἢ πολλάκις ταὐτά, ὥστε ἢ ἀδολεσχεῖ ἢ οὐκ ἔχει συλλογισμόν· ἐξ ὀλίγων γὰρ πᾶς συλλογισμός· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀποκρινομένου, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιτιμᾷ ἢ ἀφίσταται.
For if, when the person questioned answers what is asked, he continues, it is clear that he asks many questions or the same ones many times, so that he either babbles or has no reasoning (for every reasoning consists of few premises); but if he does not answer, it is because he does not rebuke him or does not withdraw.