§8.11#2Καθ᾿ αὑτὸν δὲ τῷ λόγῳ πέντ᾿ εἰσὶν ἐπιτιμήσεις, πρώτη μὲν ὅταν ἐκ τῶν ἐρωτωμένων μὴ συμπεραίνηται μήτε τὸ προτεθὲν μήτε ὅλως μηδὲν ὄντων ψευδῶν ἢ ἀδόξων, ἢ ἁπάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων, ἐν οἷς τὸ συμπέρασμα, καὶ μήτ᾿ ἀφαιρεθέντων τινῶν μήτε προστεθέντων μηδὲ τῶν μὲν ἀφαιρεθέντων τῶν δὲ προστεθέντων γίνηται τὸ συμπέρασμα.
For there are five criticisms of an argument in itself: first, when from the asked premises neither the proposed conclusion nor anything at all is concluded, when all or most of the premises on which the conclusion depends are false or contrary to accepted opinion, and when the conclusion does not result even if some premises are removed or added, or some removed and others added.
Δευτέρα δὲ εἰ πρὸς τὴν θέσιν μὴ γίνοιτο ὁ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τοιούτων τε καὶ οὕτως ὡς εἴρηται πρότερον.
Second, if the deduction is not made against the thesis from such premises and in such a way as was said before.
Τρίτη δ᾿ εἰ προστεθέντων τινῶν γίνοιτο συλλογισμός, ταῦτα δ᾿ εἴη χείρω τῶν ἐρωτηθέντων καὶ ἧττον ἔνδοξα τοῦ συμπεράσματος.
Third, if a deduction results from some premises being added, but these are worse than those asked and less accepted than the conclusion.
Πάλιν εἰ ἀφαιρεθέντων τινῶν· ἐνίοτε γὰρ πλείω λαμβάνουσι τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ὥστε οὐ τῷ ταῦτ᾿ εἶναι γίνεται ὁ συλλογισμός.
Again, if some premises are removed; for sometimes they assume more than what is necessary, so that the deduction does not result because of those being there.
Ἔτι εἰ ἐξ ἀδοξοτέρων καὶ ἧττον πιστῶν τοῦ συμπεράσματος, ἢ εἰ ἐξ ἀληθῶν ἀλλὰ πλείονος ἔργου δεομένων ἀποδεῖξαι τοῦ προβλήματος.
Furthermore, if the deduction is from premises that are more contrary to accepted opinion and less credible than the conclusion, or if from true premises but requiring more labor to prove the problem.
Οὐ δεῖ δὲ πάντων τῶν προβλημάτων ὁμοίως ἀξιοῦν τοὺς συλλογισμοὺς ἐνδόξους εἶναι καὶ πιθανούς· φύσει γὰρ εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει τὰ μὲν ῥᾴω τὰ δὲ χαλεπώτερα τῶν ζητουμένων, ὥστε ἂν ἐξ ὧν ἐνδέχεται μάλιστα ἐνδόξων συμβιβάσῃ, διείλεκται καλῶς.
And one should not demand that deductions for all problems should be equally accepted and persuasive; for by nature some of the objects of inquiry are immediately easier and others harder, so that if one reaches a conclusion from the most accepted premises possible, he has discussed well.
Φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι οὐδὲ λόγῳ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιτίμησις πρός τε τὸ προβληθὲν καὶ καθ᾿ αὑτόν.
It is clear, then, that there is not the same criticism of an argument in relation to the problem proposed and in itself.
Οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει καθ᾿ αὑτὸν μὲν εἶναι τὸν λόγον ψεκτόν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ πρόβλημα ἐπαινετόν, καὶ πάλιν ἀντεστραμμένως καθ᾿ αὑτὸν μὲν ἐπαινετόν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ πρόβλημα ψεκτόν, ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν ᾖ ῥᾴδιον ἐνδόξων συμπεράνασθαι καὶ ἀληθῶν.
For nothing prevents the argument in itself from being blameworthy, but praiseworthy in relation to the problem, and conversely, praiseworthy in itself, but blameworthy in relation to the problem, when it is easy to conclude from many accepted and true premises.
Εἴη δ᾿ ἄν ποτε λόγος καὶ συμπεπερασμένος μὴ συμπεπερασμένου χείρων, ὅταν ὁ μὲν ἐξ εὐηθῶν συμπεραίνηται μὴ τοιούτου τοῦ προβλήματος ὄντος, ὁ δὲ προσδέηται τοιούτων ἅ ἐστιν ἔνδοξα καὶ ἀληθῆ, καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς προσλαμβανομένοις ᾖ ὁ λόγος.
And sometimes a concluded argument might be worse than an unconcluded one, when the former concludes from foolish premises when the problem is not of that kind, while the latter requires additionally such premises as are accepted and true, and the fault of the argument does not lie in the additional premises.
Τοῖς δὲ διὰ ψευδῶν ἀληθὲς συμπεραινομένοις οὐ δίκαιον ἐπιτιμᾶν· ψεῦδος μὲν γὰρ ἀεὶ ἀνάγκη διὰ ψεύδους συλλογίζεσθαι, τὸ δ᾿ ἀληθὲς ἔστι καὶ διὰ ψευδῶν ποτὲ συλλογίζεσθαι.
And it is not just to criticize those who conclude a truth through false premises; for a falsehood must always be deduced through false premises, but a truth can sometimes be deduced also through false premises.
Φανερὸν δ᾿ ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν.
This is clear from the Analytics.
Ὅταν δ᾿ ἀπόδειξις ᾖ τινὸς ὁ εἰρημένος λόγος, εἰ τί ἐστιν ἄλλο πρὸς τὸ συμπέρασμα μηδαμῶς ἔχον, οὐκ ἔσται παρὰ ἐκείνου συλλογισμός· ἂν δὲ φαίνηται, σόφισμα ἔσται, οὐκ ἀπόδειξις.
And when the said argument is a proof of something, if there is something else that has nothing to do with the conclusion, there will be no deduction from it; and if it appears to be so, it will be a sophism, not a proof.
Ἔστι δὲ φιλοσόφημα μὲν συλλογισμὸς ἀποδεικτικός, ἐπιχείρημα δὲ συλλογισμὸς διαλεκτικός, σόφισμα δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐριστικός, ἀπόρημα δὲ συλλογισμὸς διαλεκτικὸς ἀντιφάσεως.
A philosophical demonstration is a demonstrative deduction, a dialectical argument is a dialectical deduction, a sophism is an eristic deduction, and an aporetic argument is a dialectical deduction of a contradiction.
Εἰ δ᾿ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τι δοκούντων δειχθείη, μὴ ὁμοίως δὲ δοκούντων, οὐδὲν κωλύει τὸ δειχθὲν μᾶλλον ἑκατέρου δοκεῖν.
And if something is proved from two premises that both seem true, but not equally so, nothing prevents the proved conclusion from seeming truer than either.
Ἀλλ᾿ εἰ τὸ μὲν δοκοίη τὸ δὲ μηδετέρως, ἢ εἰ τὸ μὲν δοκοίη τὸ δὲ μὴ δοκοίη, εἰ μὲν ὁμοίως, ὁμοίως ἂν εἴη καὶ μή, εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον θάτερον, ἀκολουθήσει τῷ μᾶλλον.
But if one seems true and the other neither way, or if one seems true and the other not, if they are so in equal degree, the conclusion will be so in equal degree, but if one is more so, the conclusion will follow the one that is more so.
Ἔστι δέ τις ἁμαρτία καὶ αὕτη περὶ τοὺς συλλογισμούς, ὅταν δείξῃ διὰ μακροτέρων, ἐνὸν δι᾿ ἐλαττόνων καὶ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὑπαρχόντων, οἷον ὅτι ἐστὶ δόξα μᾶλλον ἑτέρα ἑτέρας, εἴ τις αἰτήσαιτο αὐτοέκαστον μάλιστ᾿ εἶναι, εἶναι δὲ δοξαστὸν ἀληθῶς αὐτό, ὥστε τῶν τινῶν μᾶλλον εἶναι αὐτό· πρὸς δὲ τὸ μᾶλλον μᾶλλον τὸ λεγόμενον εἶναι· εἶναι δὲ καὶ αὐτοδόξαν ἀληθῆ, ἣ ἔσται μᾶλλον ἀκριβὴς τῶν τινῶν· ᾔτηται δὲ καὶ αὐτοδόξαν ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ αὐτοέκαστον μάλιστ᾿ εἶναι· ὥστε αὕτη ἡ δόξα ἡ μάλιστα ἀληθὴς ἀκριβεστέρα ἐστίν.
And this is also a certain error concerning deductions, when one proves through longer steps when it is possible through fewer and those already present in the argument; as, for example, to prove that one opinion is more of an opinion than another, if someone should assume that each thing-in-itself exists in the highest degree, and that the thing-in-itself is truly an object of opinion, so that it exists more than particular objects of opinion; and that to what is more, that which is spoken of in relation to it is also more; and that there is also an opinion-in-itself which is true, and which will be more accurate than particular opinions; and it has been assumed both that there is a true opinion-in-itself and that each thing-in-itself exists in the highest degree; so that this opinion, which is most true, is more accurate.
Τίς δὲ ἡ μοχθηρία;
What is the badness here?
ἢ ὅτι ποιεῖ, παρ᾿ ὃ ὁ λόγος, λανθάνειν τὸ αἴτιον.
Is it not that it causes the cause, for the sake of which the argument is made, to be hidden?