§8.1#1## Θ.
Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ τάξεως, καὶ πῶς δεῖ ἐρωτᾶν, λεκτέον.
Θ. After this, we must speak of arrangement, and how one must question.
Δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον μὲν ἐρωτηματίζειν μέλλοντα τὸν τόπον εὑρεῖν ὅθεν ἐπιχειρητέον, δεύτερον δὲ ἐρωτηματίσαι καὶ τάξαι καθ᾿ ἕκαστα πρὸς ἑαυτόν, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν καὶ τρίτον εἰπεῖν ταῦτα ἤδη πρὸς ἕτερον.
First, one who is about to question must find the topic from which he should argue; secondly, he must frame the questions and arrange them individually in his own mind; and thirdly and lastly, address these now to another person.
Μέχρι μὲν οὖν τοῦ εὑρεῖν τὸν τόπον ὁμοίως τοῦ φιλοσόφου καὶ τοῦ διαλεκτικοῦ ἡ σκέψις, τὸ δ᾿ ἤδη ταῦτα τάττειν καὶ ἐρωτηματίζειν ἴδιον τοῦ διαλεκτικοῦ· πρὸς ἕτερον γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον, τῷ δὲ φιλοσόφῳ καὶ ζητοῦντι καθ᾿ ἑαυτὸν οὐδὲν μέλει, ἐὰν ἀληθῆ μὲν ᾖ καὶ γνώριμα δι᾿ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμός, μὴ θῇ δ᾿ αὐτὰ ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς εἶναι τοῦ ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ προορᾶν τὸ συμβησόμενον· ἀλλ᾿ ἴσως κἂν σπουδάσειεν ὅτι μάλιστα γνώριμα καὶ σύνεγγυς εἶναι τὰ ἀξιώματα· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ οἱ ἐπιστημονικοὶ συλλογισμοί.
Up to finding the topic, then, the inquiry of the philosopher and of the dialectician is alike; but to arrange these and frame the questions belongs peculiarly to the dialectician, for all such processing is directed towards another, whereas the philosopher and private inquirer cares nothing if, though the premises through which the reasoning proceeds are true and familiar, the answerer does not admit them because they are close to the original point and he foresees what will follow; indeed, he would perhaps even be eager for his axioms to be as familiar and close as possible, for from these scientific reasonings are formed.
Τοὺς μὲν οὖν τόπου ὅθεν δεῖ λαμβάνειν, εἴρηται πρότερον· περὶ τάξεως δὲ καὶ τοῦ ἐρωτηματίσαι λεκτέον διελόμενον τὰς προτάσεις, ὅσαι ληπτέαι παρὰ τὰς ἀναγκαίας.
The topics, then, from which we must obtain our points, have been discussed before; but we must speak of arrangement and of framing questions, dividing the premises, which are to be assumed in addition to the necessary ones.
Ἀναγκαῖαι δὲ λέγονται δι᾿ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμὸς γένεται.
Now those are called necessary through which the reasoning is produced.
Αἱ δὲ παρὰ ταύτας λαμβανόμεναι τέτταρές εἰσιν· ἢ γὰρ ἐπαγωγῆς χάριν τοῦ δοθῆναι τὸ καθόλου, ἢ εἰς ὄγκον τοῦ λόγου, ἢ πρὸς κρύψιν τοῦ συμπεράσματος, ἢ πρὸς τὸ σαφέστερον εἶναι τὸν λόγον.
But those assumed in addition to these are fourfold: either for the sake of induction in order that the universal may be granted, or to give weight to the argument, or to conceal the conclusion, or to make the argument clearer.
Παρὰ δὲ ταύτας οὐδεμίαν ληπτέον πρότασιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τούτων αὔξειν καὶ ἐρωτηματίζειν πειρατέον.
Apart from these, no premise is to be assumed, but we must try to expand and frame questions by means of these.
Εἰσὶ δ᾿ αἱ πρὸς κρύψειν ἀγῶνος χάριν· ἀλλ᾿ ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη πραγματεία πρὸς ἕτερόν ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ταύταις χρῆσθαι.
Those used for concealment are for the sake of contest; but since all such activity is directed towards another, it is necessary to use these too.
Τὰς μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαίας, δι᾿ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμός, οὐκ εὐθὺς προτατέον, ἀλλ᾿ ἀποστατέον ὅτι ἀνωτάτω, οἷον μὴ τῶν ἐναντίων ἀξιοῦντα τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἂν τοῦτο βούληται λαβεῖν, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀντικειμένων· τεθέντος γὰρ τούτου, καὶ ὅτι τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ συλλογιεῖται, ἐπειδὴ ἀντικείμενα τὰ ἐναντία.
The necessary premises, therefore, through which the reasoning is formed, must not be proposed straightaway, but one must keep as far aloof from them as possible; for instance, not claiming that there is the same science of contraries, if one wishes to assume this, but of opposites; for if this is granted, one will reason that there is the same science of contraries too, since contraries are opposites.
Ἃν δὲ μὴ τιθῇ, δι᾿ ἐπαγωγῆς ληπτέον, προτείνοντα ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐναντίων.
But if he does not grant it, it must be assumed through induction, proposing it in the case of particular contraries.
Ἣ γὰρ διὰ συλλογισμοῦ ἢ δι᾿ ἐπαγωγῆς τὰς ἀναγκαίας ληπτέον, ἢ τὰς μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ τὰς δὲ συλλογισμῷ, ὅσαι δὲ λίαν προφανεῖς εἰσί, καὶ αὐτὰς προτείνοντα· ἀδηλότερόν τε γὰρ ἀεὶ ἐν τῇ ἀποστάσει καὶ τῇ ἐπαγωγῇ τὸ συμβησόμενον, καὶ ἅμα τὸ αὐτὰς τὰς χρησίμους προτεῖναι καὶ μὴ δυνάμενον ἐκείνως λαβεῖν ἕτοιμον.
For we must assume the necessary premises either through reasoning or through induction, or some by induction and others by reasoning, while those that are too obvious we should propose directly; for what will follow is always less clear in keeping aloof and in induction, and at the same time, proposing the useful premises themselves is ready at hand if we cannot obtain them in the other way.
Τὰς δὲ παρὰ ταύτας εἰρημένας ληπτέον μὲν τούτων χάριν, ἑκάστῃ δ᾿ ὧδε χρηστέον, ἐπάγοντα μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν καθ᾿ ἕκαστον ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου καὶ τῶν γνωρίμων ἐπὶ τὰ ἄγνωστα· γνώριμα δὲ μᾶλλον τὰ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ τοῖς πολλοῖς.
The premises mentioned as additional to these must be assumed for the sake of these purposes, and each must be used as follows: in induction, by proceeding from particulars to the universal and from the familiar to the unfamiliar; and those things perceived by sense are more familiar, either absolutely or to the majority.
Κρύπτοντα δὲ προσυλλογίζεσθαι δι᾿ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμὸς τοῦ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μέλλει γίνεσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα ὡς πλεῖστα.
For concealment, one should pre-syllogize the premises through which the reasoning of the original point is to be made, and these as many as possible.
Εἴη δ᾿ ἂν τοῦτο, εἴ τις μὴ μόνον τὰς ἀναγκαίας ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πρὸς ταύτας χρησίμων τινὰ συλλογίζοιτο.
And this would be done if one should reason out not only the necessary premises but also some of those useful for them.
Ἔτι τὰ συμπεράσματα μὴ λέγειν, ἀλλ᾿ ὕστερον ἀθρόα συλλογίζεσθαι· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πορρωτάτω ἀποστήσειε τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς θέσεως.
Furthermore, one should not state the conclusions, but reason them out all together later; for in this way one would keep farthest aloof from the original thesis.
Καθόλου δ᾿ εἰπεῖν, οὕτω δεῖ ἐρωτᾶν τὸν κρυπτικῶς πυνθανόμενον, ὥστ᾿ ἠρωτημένου τοῦ παντὸς λόγου καὶ εἰπόντος τὸ συμπέρασμα ζητεῖσθαι τὸ διὰ τί.
To speak generally, he who inquires by way of concealment must question in such a way that, when the whole argument has been questioned and he has stated the conclusion, the reason "why" is still sought.
Τοῦτο δ᾿ ἔσται μάλιστα διὰ τοῦ λεχθέντος ἔμπροσθεν τρόπου· μόνου γὰρ τοῦ ἐσχάτου ῥηθέντος συμπεράσματος ἄδηλον πῶς συμβαίνει, διὰ τὸ μὴ προορᾶν τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἐκ τίνων συμβαίνει, μὴ διαρθρωθέντων τῶν πρότερον συλλογισμῶν.
And this will be most of all through the method mentioned before; for if only the final conclusion is stated, it is unclear how it follows, because the answerer does not foresee from what premises it follows, since the prior reasonings have not been clearly articulated.
Ἥκιστα δ᾿ ἂν διαρθροῖτο ὁ συλλογισμὸς τοῦ συμπεράσματος μὴ τὰ τούτου λήμματα ἡμῶν τιθέντων, ἀλλ᾿ ἐκεῖνα ὑφ᾿ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμὸς γίνεται.
The reasoning to the conclusion would be least of all articulated if we do not lay down its premises, but rather those through which the reasoning is produced.
Χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ συνεχῆ τὰ ἀξιώματα λαμβάνειν ἐξ ὧν οἱ συλλογισμοί, ἀλλ᾿ ἐναλλὰξ τὸ πρὸς ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον συμπέρασμα· τιθεμένων γὰρ τῶν οἰκείων παρ᾿ ἄλληλα μᾶλλον τὸ συμβησόμενον ἐξ αὐτῶν προφανές.
It is also useful not to assume continuously the axioms from which the reasonings proceed, but alternately those leading to one conclusion and to another; for if closely related premises are placed next to each other, what will follow from them is more obvious.