§7.3#1Ἀναιρεῖν μὲν οὖν ὅρον οὕτως καὶ διὰ τούτων ἀεὶ πειρατέον· ἐὰν δὲ κατασκευάζειν βουλώμεθα, πρῶτον μὲν εἰδέναι δεῖ ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἢ ὀλίγοι τῶν διαλεγομένων ὅρον συλλογίζονται, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἀρχὴν τὸ τοιοῦτον λαμβάνουσιν, οἷον οἵ τε περὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ ἀριθμοὺς καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς τοιαύτας μαθήσεις·
We must, then, always attempt to destroy a definition in this way and by these means; but if we wish to establish one, we must first of all know that no one, or only a few of those who engage in discussion, reason to a definition, but all of them assume such a thing as a starting-point, as do those concerned with geometry, numbers, and other such branches of learning.
εἶθ᾿ ὅτι δι᾿ ἀκριβείας μὲν ἄλλης ἐστὶ πραγματείας ἀποδοῦναι καὶ τί ἐστιν ὅρος καὶ πῶς ὁρίζεσθαι δεῖ, νῦν δ᾿ ὅσον ἱκανὸν πρὸς τὴν παροῦσαν χρείαν, ὥστε τοσοῦτον μόνον λεκτέον ὅτι δυνατὸν γενέσθαι ὁρισμοῦ καὶ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι συλλογισμόν.
Next, we must know that while it belongs to another study to render with accuracy both what a definition is and how one ought to define, for now we need only say as much as is sufficient for our present need, so that we must only state this much, that a reasoned conclusion of a definition and of the essence is possible.
Εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ὅρος λόγος ὁ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ πράγματι δῆλων, καὶ δεῖ τὰ ἐν τῷ ὅρῳ κατηγορούμενα καὶ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι τοῦ πράγματος μόνα κατηγορεῖσθαι, κατηγορεῖται δ᾿ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι τὰ γένη καὶ αἱ διαφοραί, φανερὸν ὡς εἴ τις λάβοι ταῦτα μόνον ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι τοῦ πράγματος κατηγορεῖσθαι, ὅτι ὁ ταῦτα ἔχων λόγος ὅρος ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἂν εἴη· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ἕτερον εἶναι ὅρον, ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι τοῦ πράγματος κατηγορεῖται.
For if a definition is a formula that makes clear the essence of the thing, and the attributes predicated in the definition must be the only ones predicated in the 'what it is' of the thing, and the genera and the differences are predicated in the 'what it is,' then it is manifest that if one should assume that these alone are predicated in the 'what it is' of the thing, the formula containing these would of necessity be a definition; for it is not possible for there to be any other definition, since nothing else is predicated in the 'what it is' of the thing.
Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐγχωρεῖ συλλογισμὸν ὅρου γενέσθαι, φανερόν· ἐκ τίνων δὲ δεῖ κατασκευάζειν, διώρισται μὲν ἐν ἑτέροις ἀκριβέστερον, πρὸς δὲ τὴν προκειμένην μέθοδον οἱ αὐτοὶ τόποι χρήσιμοι.
It is clear, then, that it is possible for there to be a reasoning of a definition; but from what materials we ought to establish one has been defined more accurately in other places, though for the present method the same topics are useful.
Σκεπτέον γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἀντικειμένων, καὶ ὅλους τοὺς λόγους καὶ κατὰ μέρος ἐπισκοποῦντα· εἰ γὰρ ὁ ἀντικείμενος τοῦ ἀντικειμένου, καὶ τὸν εἰρημένον τοῦ προκειμένου ἀνάγκη εἶναι.
For we must examine the case of contraries and other opposites, looking at the formulas both as wholes and in part; for if the opposite is the definition of the opposite, it is necessary that the stated definition also be that of the subject before us.
Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων πλείους συμπλοκαί, ληπτέον τῶν ἐναντίων, ὁποίου ἂν μάλιστα φανῇ ὁ ἐναντίος ὁρισμός.
But since there are several combinations of contraries, we must take from the contraries that one in which the contrary definition most clearly appears.
Ὅλους μὲν οὖν τοὺς λόγους καθάπερ εἴρηται σκεπτέον, κατὰ μέρος δ᾿ ὧδε.
Now, the formulas as wholes must be examined as has been said, but in part as follows.
Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὅτι τὸ ἀποδοθὲν γένος ὀρθῶς ἀποδέδοται.
First, then, we must see whether the rendered genus has been rendered correctly.
Εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ, τὸ δὲ προκείμενον μή ἐστιν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, δῆλον ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ ἂν εἴη, ἐπειδὴ ἀνάγκη τὰ ἐναντία ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις γένεσιν εἶναι.
For if the contrary is in the contrary genus, and the subject before us is not in the same genus, it is clear that it would be in the contrary genus, since it is necessary for contraries to be either in the same genus or in contrary genera.
Καὶ τὰς διαφορὰς δὲ τὰς ἐναντίας τῶν ἐναντίων ἀξιοῦμεν κατηγορεῖσθαι, καθάπερ λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος· τὸ μὲν γὰρ διακριτικὸν τὸ δὲ συγκριτικὸν ὄψεως.
We also expect the contrary differences of contraries to be predicated, as in the case of white and black; for the one is dispersive, the other compressive of vision.
Ὥστ᾿ εἰ τοῦ ἐναντίου αἱ ἐναντίαι κατηγοροῦνται, τοῦ προκειμένου αἱ ἀποδοθεῖσαι κατηγοροῖντ᾿ ἄν.
Therefore, if the contrary differences are predicated of the contrary, the rendered differences would be predicated of the subject before us.
Ὥστ᾿ ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ γένος καὶ αἱ διαφοραὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποδέδονται, δῆλον ὅτι ὁρισμὸς ἂν εἴη ὁ ἀποδοθείς.
Thus, since both the genus and the differences are correctly rendered, it is clear that the rendered formula would be a definition.
Ἢ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τῶν ἐναντίων τὰς ἐναντίας διαφορὰς κατηγορεῖσθαι, ἂν μὴ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ᾖ τὰ ἐναντία·
Or is it not necessary that the contrary differences of contraries be predicated, unless the contraries are in the same genus?
ὧν δὲ τὰ γένη ἐναντία, οὐδὲν κωλύει τὴν αὐτὴν διαφορὰν κατ᾿ ἀμφοῖν λέγεσθαι, οἷον κατὰ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸ δὲ κακία ψυχῆς, ὥστε τὸ ψυχῆς διαφορὰ ἐν ἀμφοῖν λέγεται, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σώματός ἐστιν ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία.
But where the genera are contrary, nothing prevents the same difference from being said of both, as in the case of justice and injustice; for the one is a virtue, the other a vice of the soul, so that the difference 'of the soul' is said of both, since there is also a virtue and vice of the body.