§7.3#2Ἀλλ᾿ οὖν τοῦτό γ᾿ ἀληθές, ὅτι τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ ἐναντίαι ἢ αἱ αὐταὶ διαφοραί εἰσιν.
At any rate, this much is true, that the differences of contraries are either contrary or the same.
Εἰ οὖν τοῦ ἐναντίου ἡ ἐναντία κατηγορεῖται, τούτου δὲ μή, δῆλον ὅτι ἡ εἰρημένη τούτου ἂν κατηγοροῖτο.
Therefore, if the contrary difference is predicated of the contrary, but not of this subject, it is clear that the stated difference would be predicated of this subject.
Καθόλου δ᾿ εἰπεῖν, ἐπεὶ ὁ ὁρισμός ἐστιν ἐκ γένους καὶ διαφορῶν, ἂν ὁ τοῦ ἐναντίου ὁρισμὸς φανερὸς ᾖ, καὶ ὁ τοῦ προκειμένου ὁρισμὸς φανερὸς ἔσται.
To speak generally, since definition consists of genus and differences, if the definition of the contrary is clear, the definition of the subject before us will also be clear.
Ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ διαφοραὶ ἢ ἐναντίαι τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ αἱ αὐταὶ κατηγοροῦνται, δῆλον ὅτι τοῦ προκειμένου ἤτοι τὸ αὐτὸ γένος ἂν κατηγοροῖτο ὅπερ καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου, αἱ δὲ διαφοραὶ ἐναντίαι, ἢ ἅπασαι ἢ τινές, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ αἱ αὐταί· ἢ ἀνάπαλιν αἱ μὲν διαφοραὶ αἱ αὐταὶ τὰ δὲ γένη ἐναντία· ἢ ἄμφω ἐναντία, καὶ τὰ γένη καὶ αἱ διαφοραί.
For since the contrary is in either the same genus or the contrary genus, and likewise the differences predicated of contraries are either contrary or the same, it is clear that of the subject before us there would be predicated either the same genus as that of the contrary, while the differences are contrary (either all or some of them, while the rest are the same); or conversely, the differences are the same while the genera are contrary; or both are contrary, namely both the genera and the differences.
Ἀμφότερα γὰρ ταὐτὰ εἶναι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται· εἰ δὲ μή, ὁ αὐτὸς ὁρισμὸς τῶν ἐναντίων ἔσται.
For it is not possible for both to be the same; otherwise, there would be the same definition for contraries.
Ἔτι ἐκ τῶν πτώσεων καὶ τῶν συστοίχων· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖν τὰ γένη τοῖς γένεσι καὶ τοὺς ὅρους τοῖς ὅροις.
Furthermore, we must establish a definition from inflections and cognates; for it is necessary that genera follow genera, and definitions follow definitions.
Οἷον εἰ ἡ λήθη ἐστὶν ἀποβολὴ ἐπιστήμης, καὶ τὸ ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι ἀποβάλλειν ἐπιστήμην ἔσται καὶ τὸ ἐπιλελῆσθαι ἀποβεβληκέναι ἐπιστήμην. Ἑνὸς οὖν ὁποιουοῦν τῶν εἰρημένων ὁμολογηθέντος ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ὁμολογεῖσθαι.
For example, if 'forgetfulness' is 'the loss of knowledge,' then 'to forget' will be 'to lose knowledge,' and 'to have forgotten' will be 'to have lost knowledge.' Therefore, if any single one of these stated things is agreed upon, the remaining ones must also be agreed upon.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ ἡ φθορὰ διάλυσις οὐσίας, καὶ τὸ φθείρεσθαι διαλύεσθαι οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ φθαρτικῶς διαλυτικῶς, εἴ τε τὸ φθαρτικὸν διαλυτικὸν οὐσίας, καὶ ἡ φθορὰ διάλυσις οὐσίας.
Likewise, if 'destruction' is 'the dissolution of essence,' then 'to be destroyed' is 'to have one's essence dissolved,' and 'destructively' is 'dissolutively'; and if 'what is destructive' is 'what is dissolutive of essence,' then 'destruction' is 'the dissolution of essence.' Likewise also in the other cases.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. Ὥσθ᾿ ἑνὸς ὁποιουοῦν ληφθέντος καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα ὁμολογεῖται.
So, if any single one is assumed, all the remaining ones are also agreed upon.
Καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίως δ᾿ ἐχόντων πρὸς ἄλληλα.
Also, we must establish it from things that stand in a similar relation to one another.
Εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν ποιητικὸν ὑγιείας, καὶ τὸ εὐεκτικὸν ποιητικὸν εὐεξίας ἔσται καὶ τὸ ὠφέλιμον ποιητικὸν ἀγαθοῦ. Ὀμοίως γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν εἰρημένων πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον τέλος ἔχει, ὥστ᾿ εἰ ἑνὸς αὐτῶν ὁ ὁρισμός ἐστι τὸ ποιητικὸν εἶναι τοῦ τέλους, καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἑκάστου οὗτος ἂν εἴη ὁρισμός.
For if 'the healthy' is 'productive of health,' then 'what produces a good habit of body' will be 'productive of a good habit of body,' and 'the useful' will be 'productive of good.' For each of the stated things stands in a similar relation to its own proper end, so that if the definition of one of them is 'being productive of the end,' this would also be the definition of each of the remaining ones.
Ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ τοῦ ὁμοίως, ὁσαχῶς ἐνδέχεται κατασκευάσαι δύο πρὸς δύο συγκρίνοντα, οἷον εἰ μᾶλλον ὅδε τοῦδε ἢ ὅδε τοῦδε ὁρισμός, ὁ δὲ ἧττον ὁρισμός, καὶ ὁ μᾶλλον.
Furthermore, we must establish it from the 'more' and the 'likewise,' in as many ways as it is possible to establish it by comparing two things with two. For example, if this is 'more' a definition of this than that is of that, and the 'less' is a definition, then the 'more' is also a definition.
Καὶ εἰ ὁμοίως ὅδε τοῦδε καὶ ὅδε τοῦδε, εἰ ὁ ἕτερος τοῦ ἑτέρου, καὶ ὁ λοιπὸς τοῦ λοιποῦ.
And if this is 'likewise' a definition of this as that is of that, if the one is a definition of the one, the remaining is also of the remaining.
Ἑνὸς δ᾿ ὁρισμοῦ πρὸς δύο συγκρινομένου, ἢ δύο ὁρισμῶν πρὸς ἕνα, οὐδὲν χρήσιμος ἡ ἐκ τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐπίσκεψις· οὔτε γὰρ ἕνα δυοῖν οὔτε δύο τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὅρους δυνατόν ἐστιν εἶναι.
But when one definition is compared with two things, or two definitions with one, the examination from the 'more' is of no use; for it is impossible for there to be either one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing.