§6.12Εἰ δὲ τῆς διαφορᾶς τὸν ὅρον ἀποδέδωκε, σκοπεῖν εἰ καὶ ἄλλου τινὸς κοινὸς ὁ ἀποδοθεὶς ὅρος, οἷον ὅταν περιττὸν ἀριθμὸν ἀριθμὸν μέσον ἔχοντα εἴπῃ, ἐπιδιοριστέον τὸ πῶς μέσον ἔχοντα.
But if he has rendered the definition of the difference, one must examine whether the rendered definition is also common to something else, for example, when he says that an odd number is "a number having a middle", one must further determine how it has a middle.
Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμὸς κοινὸς ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς λόγοις ὑπάρχει, τοῦ δὲ περιττοῦ μετείληπται ὁ λόγος.
For "number" is common in both formulae, but the definition has been substituted for "odd".
Ἔχει δὲ καὶ γραμμὴ καὶ σῶμα μέσον, οὐ περιττὰ ὄντα.
But both a line and a body have a middle, though they are not odd.
Ὥστ᾿ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὁρισμὸς οὗτος τοῦ περιττοῦ.
So this would not be a definition of the odd.
Εἰ δὲ πολλαχῶς λέγεται τὸ μέσον ἔχον, διοριστέον τὸ πῶς μέσον ἔχον.
And if "having a middle" is said in many ways, one must determine how it has a middle.
Ὥστ᾿ ἢ ἐπιτίμησις ἔσται, ἢ συλλογισμὸς ὅτι οὐχ ὥρισται.
So there will be either an objection, or a deduction that he has not defined it.
Πάλιν εἰ οὗ μὲν τὸν λόγον ἀποδίδωσι τῶν ὄντων ἐστί, τὸ δ᾿ ὑπὸ τὸν λόγον μὴ τῶν ὄντων, οἷον εἰ τὸ λευκὸν ὡρίσατο χρῶμα πυρὶ μεμιγμένον·
Again, see whether that of which he renders the definition is among existing things, but that which falls under the definition is not among existing things; for example, if he defined white as "colour mixed with fire".
ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸ ἀσώματον μεμῖχθαι σώματι, ὥστ᾿ οὐκ ἂν εἴη χρῶμα πυρὶ μεμιγμένον· λευκὸν δ᾿ ἔστιν.
For it is impossible for what is incorporeal to be mixed with a body, so that there could not be "colour mixed with fire", yet white exists.
Ἔτι ὅσοι μὴ διαιροῦσιν ἐν τοῖς πρός τι πρὸς ὃ λέγεται, ἀλλ᾿ ἐν πλείοσι περιλαβόντες εἶπαν, ἢ ὅλως ἢ ἐπί τι ψεύδονται, οἷον εἴ τις τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἐπιστήμην ὄντος εἶπεν.
Moreover, all those who do not distinguish, in the case of relative terms, the object in relation to which they are said, but speak by grasping them within a wider range, speak falsely either wholly or in part; for example, if someone called medicine "the science of what exists".
Εἰ μὲν γὰρ μηδενὸς τῶν ὄντων ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἐπιστήμη, δῆλον ὅτι ὅλως ἔψευσται, εἰ δὲ τινὸς μὲν τινὸς δὲ μή, ἐπί τι ἔψευσται· δεῖ γὰρ παντός, εἴπερ καθ᾿ αὑτὸ καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὄντος εἶναι λέγεται, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει τῶν πρός τι· πᾶν γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν πρὸς ἐπιστήμην λέγεται.
For if medicine is the science of nothing that exists, it is clear that he has lied wholly, but if it is the science of some things but not of others, he has lied in part; for it ought to be the science of all, if indeed it is said to be of what exists essentially and not accidentally, just as is the case with other relative terms; for every object of science is said in relation to science.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐπειδὴ ἀντιστρέφει πάντα τὰ πρός τι.
And likewise with the others, since all relative terms are reciprocal.
Ἔτι εἴπερ ὁ μὴ καθ᾿ αὑτὸ ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὴν ἀπόδοσιν ποιούμενος ὀρθῶς ἀποδίδωσιν, οὐ πρὸς ἓν ἀλλὰ πρὸς πλείω ἕκαστον ἂν τῶν πρός τι λέγοιτο.
Moreover, if indeed he who makes the rendering not essentially but accidentally renders it correctly, each of the relative terms would be said in relation not to one thing but to more.
Οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὂν καὶ λευκὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ὥστε πρὸς ὁποιονοῦν τούτων ἀποδιδοὺς ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴη ἀποδιδούς, εἴπερ ὁ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀποδιδοὺς ὀρθῶς ἀποδίδωσιν.
For nothing prevents the same thing from being both existing, white, and good, so that in rendering it in relation to any one of these, he would be rendering it correctly, if indeed he who renders it accidentally renders it correctly.
Ἔτι δ᾿ ἀδύνατον τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον ἴδιον τοῦ ἀποδοθέντος εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν αἱ πολλαὶ πρὸς ὂν λέγονται, ὥσθ᾿ ἑκάστη ὄντος ἐπιστήμη ἔσται.
Moreover, it is impossible for such a definition to be peculiar to the term rendered; for not only medicine but also most of the other sciences are said in relation to what exists, so that each will be a "science of what exists".
Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ὁ τοιοῦτος οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμης ὁρισμός· ἴδιον γὰρ καὶ οὐ κοινὸν δεῖ τὸν ὁρισμὸν εἶναι.
It is clear, therefore, that such a definition is the definition of no science; for a definition ought to be peculiar and not common.
Ἐνίοτε δ᾿ ὁρίζονται οὐ τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα εὖ ἔχον ἢ τετελεσμένον.
Sometimes people define not the thing itself, but the thing in a good or completed state.
Τοιοῦτος δ᾿ ὁ τοῦ ῥήτορος καὶ ὁ τοῦ κλέπτου ὅρος, εἴπερ ἐστὶ ῥήτωρ μὲν ὁ δυνάμενος τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῳ πιθανὸν θεωρεῖν καὶ μηδὲν παραλείπειν, κλέπτης δ᾿ ὁ λάθρᾳ λαμβάνων· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τοιοῦτος ὢν ἑκάτερος ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς ῥήτωρ ὁ δ᾿ ἀγαθὸς κλέπτης ἔσται· οὐ γὰρ ὁ λάθρᾳ λαμβάνων ἀλλ᾿ ὁ βουλόμενος λάθρᾳ λαμβάνειν κλέπτης ἐστίν.
Such is the definition of the rhetorician and that of the thief, if indeed a rhetorician is "one who is able to discern the persuasive element in each case and omit nothing", and a thief is "one who takes in secret"; for it is clear that each, being of this kind, will be a good rhetorician and a good thief; for it is not he who takes in secret, but he who wishes to take in secret, who is a thief.
Πάλιν εἰ τὸ δι᾿ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν ὡς ποιητικὸν ἢ πρακτικὸν ἢ ὁπωσοῦν δι᾿ ἄλλο αἱρετὸν ἀποδέδωκεν, οἷον τὴν δικαιοσύνην νόμων σωστικὴν εἰπὼν ἢ τὴν σοφίαν ποιητικὴν εὐδαιμονίας· τὸ γὰρ ποιητικὸν ἢ σωστικὸν τῶν δι᾿ ἄλλο αἱρετῶν.
Again, see whether he has rendered what is desirable for its own sake as productive or practical or in any way desirable for the sake of something else; for example, if he called justice "preserving the laws" or wisdom "productive of happiness"; for what is productive or preservative belongs to those things that are desirable for the sake of something else.
Ἢ οὐδὲν μὲν κωλύει τὸ δι᾿ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν καὶ δι᾿ ἄλλο εἶναι αἱρετόν, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾿ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἡμάρτηκεν ὁ οὕτως ὁρισάμενος τὸ δι᾿ αὑτὸ αἱρετόν· ἑκάστου γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ μάλιστα, βέλτιον δὲ τὸ δι᾿ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν εἶναι τοῦ δι᾿ ἕτερον, ὥστε τοῦτο καὶ τὸν ὁρισμὸν ἔδει μᾶλλον σημαίνειν.
Or, though nothing prevents what is desirable for its own sake from being also desirable for the sake of something else, nevertheless he who has in this way defined what is desirable for its own sake has erred no less; for in each thing, what is best is especially in its essence, and to be desirable for its own sake is better than to be desirable for the sake of something else, so that the definition also ought rather to have signified this.