§6.11Ἐὰν δὲ τῶν συμπεπλεγμένων τινὸς ἀποδοθῇ ὅρος, σκοπεῖν ἀφαιροῦντα τὸν θατέρου τῶν συμπεπλεγμένων λόγον, εἰ καὶ ὁ λοιπὸς τοῦ λοιποῦ· εἰ γὰρ μή, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδ᾿ ὁ ὅλος τοῦ ὅλου.
If a definition is rendered for any of the composite terms, one must examine, by removing the definition of one of the composite terms, whether the remaining definition is also the definition of the remaining term; for if not, it is clear that neither is the whole definition the definition of the whole.
Οἷον εἰ ὡρίσατο γραμμὴν πεπερασμένην εὐθεῖαν πέρας ἐπιπέδου ἔχοντος πέρατα, οὗ τὸ μέσον ἐπιπροσθεῖ τοῖς πέρασιν, εἰ τῆς πεπερασμένης γραμμῆς ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ πέρας ἐπιπέδου ἔχοντος πέρατα, τοῦ εὐθέος δεῖ εἶναι τὸ λοιπόν, οὗ τὸ μέσον ἐπιπροσθεῖ τοῖς πέρασιν.
For example, if someone defined a "finite straight line" as "the limit of a plane having limits, whose middle obstructs its extremities"; if the definition of the "finite line" is "the limit of a plane having limits", the remainder, "whose middle obstructs its extremities", must be the definition of "straight".
Ἀλλ᾿ ἡ ἄπειρος οὔτε μέσον οὔτε πέρατα ἔχει, εὐθεῖα δ᾿ ἐστίν, ὥστ᾿ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ λοιπὸς τοῦ λοιποῦ λόγος.
But the infinite line has neither middle nor extremities, yet it is straight, so that the remaining definition is not the definition of the remaining term.
Ἔτι εἰ συνθέτου ὄντος τοῦ ὁριζομένου ἰσόκωλος ὁ λόγος ἀπεδόθη τῷ ὁριζομένῳ.
Moreover, see whether, when the term to be defined is composite, a definition of equal clauses is rendered for the term to be defined.
Ἰσόκωλος δὲ λέγεται ὁ λόγος εἶναι, ὅταν ὅσαπερ ἂν ᾖ τὰ συγκείμενα, τοσαῦτα καὶ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὀνόματα καὶ ῥήματα ᾖ.
A definition is said to be of equal clauses when there are just as many nouns and verbs in the definition as there are constituent elements.
Ἀνάγκη γὰρ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις μεταλλαγὴν γίνεσθαι, ἢ πάντων ἢ τινῶν, ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν πλείω νῦν ἢ πρότερον ὀνόματα εἴρηται· δεῖ δὲ τὸν ὁριζόμενον λόγον ἀντὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀποδοῦναι, μάλιστα μὲν πάντων, εἰ δὲ μή, τῶν πλείστων.
For in such cases there must be a substitution of the words, either of all or of some, since no more words are spoken now than before; but one must render the defining formula instead of the words, preferably for all, or if not, for the most part.
Οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἁπλῶν ὁ τοὔνομα μεταλαβὼν ὡρισμένος ἂν εἴη, οἷον ἀντὶ λωπίου ἱμάτιον.
For in this way, even in the case of simple terms, he who merely substitutes a word would have defined it, for example, "cloak" instead of "mantle".
Ἔτι δὲ μείζων ἁμαρτία, εἰ καὶ ἀγνωστοτέρων ὀνομάτων τὴν μετάληψιν ἐποιήσατο, οἷον ἀντὶ ἀνθρώπου λευκοῦ βροτὸν ἀργόν· οὔτε γὰρ ὥρισται ἧττόν τε σαφὲς οὕτω ῥηθέν.
Moreover, it is a greater error if he has made the substitution using even less well-known words, for example, "glistening mortal" instead of "white man"; for it is not defined, and it is less clear when spoken in this way.
Σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ μεταλλαγῇ τῶν ὀνομάτων εἰ οὐ ταὐτὸν ἔτι σημαίνει, οἷον ὁ τὴν θεωρητικὴν ἐπιστήμην ὑπόληψιν θεωρητικὴν εἰπών.
One must also examine, in the substitution of words, whether it no longer signifies the same thing, as for example, he who calls "theoretical science" "theoretical conception".
Ἡ γὰρ ὑπόληψις τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ οὐ ταὐτόν, δεῖ δέ γε, εἴπερ μέλλει καὶ τὸ ὅλον ταὐτὸν εἶναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ θεωρητικὸν κοινὸν ἐν ἀμφοτέροιν τοῖν λόγοιν ἐστί, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν διάφορον.
For "conception" is not the same as "science", yet it ought to be, if indeed the whole is also to be the same; for "theoretical" is common to both formulae, but the remainder is different.
Ἔτι εἰ θατέρου τῶν ὀνομάτων τὴν μετάληψιν ποιούμενος μὴ τῆς διαφορᾶς ἀλλὰ τοῦ γένους τὴν μεταλλαγὴν ἐποιήσατο, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀρτίως ῥηθέντος.
Moreover, see whether, in making the substitution for one of the words, he made the substitution not of the difference but of the genus, as in the case just mentioned.
Ἀγνωστότερον γὰρ ἡ θεωρητικὴ τῆς ἐπιστήμης· τὸ μὲν γὰρ γένος, τὸ δὲ διαφορά, πάντων δὲ γνωριμώτατον τὸ γένος· ὥστ᾿ οὐ τοῦ γένους ἀλλὰ τῆς διαφορᾶς ἔδει τὴν μετάληψιν ποιήσασθαι, ἐπειδὴ ἀγνωστότερόν ἐστιν.
For "theoretical" is less well-known than "science"; for the one is the genus and the other is the difference, and the genus is the most well-known of all; so that he ought to have made the substitution not of the genus but of the difference, since it is less well-known.
Ἢ τοῦτο μὲν γελοῖον τὸ ἐπιτίμημα·
Or is this objection ridiculous?
οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τὴν μὲν διαφορὰν τῷ γνωριμωτάτῳ ὀνόματι εἰρῆσθαι, τὸ δὲ γένος μή· οὕτω δ᾿ ἐχόντων δῆλον ὅτι τοῦ γένους καὶ οὐ τῆς διαφορᾶς κατὰ τοὔνομα καὶ τὴν μετάληψιν ποιητέον.
For nothing prevents the difference from being expressed by the most well-known word, and the genus not; and if this is the case, it is clear that one must make the substitution for the genus and not for the difference, in accordance with the term.
Εἰ δὲ μὴ ὄνομα ἀντ᾿ ὀνόματος ἀλλὰ λόγον ἀντ᾿ ὀνόματος μεταλαμβάνει, δῆλον ὅτι τῆς διαφορᾶς μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ γένους ὁρισμὸν ἀποδοτέον, ἐπειδὴ τοῦ γνωρίσαι χάριν ὁ ὁρισμὸς ἀποδίδοται· ἧττον γὰρ ἡ διαφορὰ τοῦ γένους γνώριμον.
If, however, he substitutes not a word for a word but a definition for a word, it is clear that one must render the definition of the difference rather than that of the genus, since the definition is rendered for the sake of making known; for the difference is less well-known than the genus.