§6.13#1Σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἴ τινος ὁρισμὸν ἀποδιδοὺς τάδε ἢ τὸ ἐκ τούτων ἢ τόδε μετὰ τοῦδε ὡρίσατο.
One must also examine whether, in rendering the definition of something, he has defined it as "these things", or "what is composed of these", or "this with that".
Εἰ μὲν γὰρ τάδε, συμβήσεται ἀμφοῖν καὶ μηδετέρῳ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον εἰ τὴν δικαιοσύνην σωφροσύνην καὶ ἀνδρίαν ὡρίσατο·
For if he defined it as "these things", it will result that it belongs to both and to neither; for example, if he defined justice as "temperance and courage".
δύο γὰρ ὄντων ἐὰν ἑκάτερος θάτερον ἔχῃ, ἀμφότεροι δίκαιοι ἔσονται καὶ οὐδέτερος, ἐπειδὴ ἀμφότεροι μὲν ἔχουσι δικαιοσύνην, ἑκάτερος δ᾿ οὐκ ἔχει.
For if there are two people, and each has one of them, both will be just and neither will be, since both together have justice, but each individually does not.
Εἰ δὲ μήπω τὸ εἰρημένον σφόδρα ἄτοπον διὰ τὸ καὶ ἐπ᾿ ἄλλων συμβαίνειν τὸ τοιοῦτον (οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει ἀμφοτέρους ἔχειν μνᾶν μηδετέρου ἔχοντος), ἀλλ᾿ οὖν τό γε τἀναντία ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῖς παντελῶς ἄτοπον ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι.
If what has been said is not yet extremely absurd because such a thing happens also in other cases (for nothing prevents both together from having a mina although neither of them has it), yet at least that contrary qualities should belong to them would seem utterly absurd.
Συμβήσεται δὲ τοῦτο, ἐὰν ὁ μὲν αὐτῶν σωφροσύνην καὶ δειλίαν ἔχῃ, ὁ δὲ ἀνδρίαν καὶ ἀκολασίαν·
And this will happen if one of them has temperance and cowardice, and the other has courage and licentiousness; for both together will have both justice and injustice.
ἄμφω γὰρ δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀδικίαν ἕξουσιν. Εἰ γὰρ ἡ δικαιοσύνη σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρία ἐστίν, ἡ ἀδικία δειλία καὶ ἀκολασία ἔσται.
For if justice is temperance and courage, injustice will be cowardice and licentiousness.
Ὅλως τε ὅσα ἔστιν ἐπιχειρεῖν ὅτι οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστι τὰ μέρη καὶ τὸ ὅλον, πάντα χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον· ἔοικε γὰρ ὁ οὕτως ὁριζόμενος τὰ μέρη τῷ ὅλῳ ταὐτὰ φάσκειν εἶναι.
In general, all the arguments that can be urged to show that the parts and the whole are not the same are useful for what has just been said; for he who defines in this way seems to assert that the parts are the same as the whole.
Μάλιστα δ᾿ οἰκεῖοι γίνονται οἱ λόγοι, ἐφ᾿ ὅσων κατάδηλός ἐστιν ἡ τῶν μερῶν σύνθεσις, καθάπερ ἐπ᾿ οἰκίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῶν μερῶν ὄντων οὐδὲν κωλύει τὸ ὅλον μὴ εἶναι, ὥστ᾿ οὐ ταὐτὸν τὰ μέρη τῷ ὅλῳ.
And these arguments are especially appropriate in cases where the composition of the parts is manifest, as in the case of a house and other such things; for it is clear that while the parts exist, nothing prevents the whole from not existing, so that the parts are not the same as the whole.
Εἰ δὲ μὴ ταῦτα ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκ τούτων ἔφησεν εἶναι τὸ ὁριζόμενον, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπισκοπεῖν εἰ μὴ πέφυκεν ἓν γίνεσθαι εκ τῶν εἰρημένων· ἔνια γὰρ οὕτως ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα ὥστε μηδὲν ἐξ αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι, οἷον γραμμὴ καὶ ἀριθμός.
But if he said that the term defined is not "these things" but "what is composed of these", one must first examine whether one thing is not naturally of a kind to be formed from the things mentioned; for some things are so related to one another that nothing is formed from them, for example, a line and a number.
Ἔτι εἰ τὸ μὲν ὡρισμένον ἐν ἑνί τινι πέφυκε τῷ πρώτῳ γίνεσθαι, ἐξ ὧν δ᾿ ἔφησεν αὐτὸ εἶναι, μὴ ἐν ἑνὶ τῷ πρώτῳ, ἀλλ᾿ ἑκάτερον ἐν ἑκατέρῳ· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐκ τούτων ἐκεῖνο· ἐν οἷς γὰρ τὰ μέρη, καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν, ὥστ᾿ οὐκ ἐν ἑνὶ τὸ ὅλον πρώτῳ, ἀλλ᾿ ἐν πλείοσιν.
Moreover, see whether the defined term is naturally of a kind to come to be primarily in some one thing, whereas the elements from which he said it is composed do not come to be in some one primary thing, but each in each; for it is clear that the former would not be composed of these; for where the parts are, there the whole must also belong, so that the whole would belong not in one primary thing, but in more.
Εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ μέρη καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐν ἑνί τινι πρώτῳ, σκοπεῖν εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀλλ᾿ ἐν ἑτέρῳ τὸ ὅλον καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ τὰ μέρη.
And if both the parts and the whole are in some one primary thing, see whether they are not in the same, but the whole in one and the parts in another.
Πάλιν εἰ τῷ ὅλῳ συμφθείρεται τὰ μέρη· ἀνάπαλιν γὰρ δεῖ συμβαίνειν, τῶν μερῶν φθαρέντων φθείρεσθαι τὸ ὅλον· τοῦ δ᾿ ὅλου φθαρέντος οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐφθάρθαι.
Again, see whether the parts are destroyed with the whole; for the reverse ought to happen, that when the parts are destroyed, the whole is destroyed, but when the whole is destroyed, it is not necessary that the parts also be destroyed.
Ἢ εἰ τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, τὰ δὲ μηδέτερα, ἢ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακά, τὸ δ᾿ ὅλον μηδέτερον· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ μηδετέρου δυνατὸν ἢ ἀγαθόν τι ἢ κακὸν γενέσθαι, οὔτ᾿ ἐκ κακῶν ἢ ἀγαθῶν μηδέτερον.
Or see whether the whole is good or bad, but the parts are neither, or conversely, the parts are good or bad, but the whole is neither; for it is impossible either for anything good or bad to come to be from what is neither, or for what is neither to come to be from bad or good things.
Ἣ εἰ μᾶλλον μὲν θάτερον ἀγαθὸν ἢ θάτερον κακόν, τὸ δ᾿ ἐκ τούτων μὴ μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, οἷον εἰ ἡ ἀναίδεια ἐξ ἀνδρίας καὶ ψευδοῦς δόξης.
Or see whether one is more good than the other is bad, but what is composed of them is not more good than bad; for example, if shamelessness is composed of courage and false opinion.
Μᾶλλον γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἡ ἀνδρία ἢ κακὸν ἡ ψευδὴς δόξα· ἔδει οὖν καὶ τὸ ἐκ τούτων ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ μᾶλλον, καὶ εἶναι ἢ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν ἢ μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν.
For courage is more good than false opinion is bad; therefore, what is composed of them ought also to follow the "more", and be either simply good or more good than bad.
Ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἐὰν μὴ ἑκάτερον ᾖ καθ᾿ αὑτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν·
Or is this not necessary, unless each is in itself good or bad?
πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν ποιητικῶν καθ᾿ αὑτὰ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθά, μιχθέντα δέ, ἢ ἀνάπαλιν, ἑκάτερον μὲν ἀγαθόν, μιχθέντα δὲ κακὸν ἢ οὐδέτερον.
For many productive things are not in themselves good, but when mixed they are, or conversely, each is good, but when mixed they are bad or neither.
Μάλιστα δὲ καταφανὲς τὸ νῦν ῥηθὲν ἐπὶ τῶν ὑγιεινῶν καὶ νοσωδῶν· ἔνια γὰρ τῶν φαρμάκων οὕτως ἔχει ὥσθ᾿ ἑκάτερον μὲν εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ἐὰν δ᾿ ἄμφω δοθῇ μιχθέντα, κακόν.
And what has just been said is most manifest in the case of healthy and diseased things; for some drugs are of such a kind that each is good, but if both are given mixed, they are bad.