§6.10Ἔτι εἰ τῶν ὁμοίων τοῦ ὀνόματος πτώσεων αἱ ὅμοιαι τοῦ λόγου πτώσεις ἐφαρμόττουσιν, οἷον εἰ ὠφέλιμον τὸ ποιητικὸν ὑγιείας, ὠφελίμως τὸ ποιητικῶς ὑγιείας καὶ ὠφεληκὸς τὸ πεποιηκὸς ὑγίειαν.
Moreover, see whether the similar inflections of the definition fit the similar inflections of the term; for example, if "beneficial" is "that which is productive of health", "beneficially" must be "in a manner productive of health", and "that which has benefited" must be "that which has produced health".
Σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἰδέαν εἰ ἐφαρμόσει ὁ λεχθεὶς ὅρος.
One must also examine, in relation to the Idea, whether the rendered definition will fit it.
Ἐπ᾿ ἐνίων γὰρ οὐ συμβαίνει, οἷον ὡς Πλάτων ὁρίζεται τὸ θνητὸν προσάπτων ἐν τοῖς τῶν ζῴων ὁρισμοῖς· ἡ γὰρ ἰδέα οὐκ ἔσται θνητή, οἷον αὐτοάνθρωπος, ὥστ᾿ οὐκ ἐφαρμόσει ὁ λόγος ἐπὶ τὴν ἰδέαν.
For in some cases this does not happen, as for instance when Plato defines by attaching "mortal" in his definitions of living beings; for the Idea (for example, "man-himself") will not be mortal, so that the definition will not fit the Idea.
Ἁπλῶς δ᾿ οἷς πρόσκειται τὸ ποιητικὸν ἢ παθητικόν, ἀνάγκη διαφωνεῖν ἐπὶ τῆς ἰδέας τὸν ὅρον· ἀπαθεῖς γὰρ καὶ ἀκίνητοι δοκοῦσιν αἱ ἰδέαι τοῖς λέγουσιν ἰδέας εἶναι.
Simply speaking, in all cases where "active" or "passive" is attached, the definition must necessarily conflict in the case of the Idea; for to those who assert that there are Ideas, the Ideas seem to be impassive and motionless.
Πρὸς δὲ τούτους καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι χρήσιμοι.
And against these people, such arguments are useful.
Ἔτι εἰ τῶν καθ᾿ ὁμωνυμίαν λεγομένων ἕνα λόγον ἁπάντων κοινὸν ἀπέδωκεν.
Moreover, see whether, in the case of homonymous terms, he has rendered a single definition common to them all.
Συνώνυμα γὰρ ὧν εἷς ὁ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος, ὥστ᾿ οὐδενὸς τῶν ὑπὸ τοὔνομα ὁ ἀποδοθεὶς ὅρος, εἰ δὴ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ ὁμώνυμον ἐφαρμόττει.
For those things are synonymous of which the definition corresponding to the name is one, so that the rendered definition would be the definition of none of the things falling under the name, if indeed it fits all the homonymous things alike.
Πέπονθε δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ Διονυσίου τῆς ζωῆς ὅρος, εἴπερ ἐστὶ κίνησις γένους θρεπτοῦ σύμφυτος παρακολουθοῦσα· οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον τοῦτο τοῖς ζῴοις ἢ τοῖς φυτοῖς ὑπάρχει· ἡ δὲ ζωὴ οὐ καθ᾿ ἓν εἶδος δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, ἀλλ᾿ ἑτέρα μὲν τοῖς ζῴοις ἑτέρα δὲ τοῖς φυτοῖς ὑπάρχειν.
This is also what happens to Dionysius' definition of life, if it is "a motion of a nourishing genus, innate and accompanying"; for this belongs no more to animals than to plants, whereas life does not seem to be spoken of according to a single species, but one kind belongs to animals and another to plants.
Ἐνδέχεται μὲν οὖν καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν οὕτως ἀποδοῦναι τὸν ὅρον ὡς συνωνύμου καὶ καθ᾿ ἓν εἶδος πάσης τῆς ζωῆς λεγομένης· οὐδὲν δὲ κωλύει καὶ συνορῶντα τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν, καὶ θατέρου βουλόμενον τὸν ὁρισμὸν ἀποδοῦναι, λαθεῖν μὴ ἴδιον ἀλλὰ κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν λόγον ἀποδόντα.
Now, it is indeed possible to render the definition in this way intentionally, as though all life were spoken of synonymously and according to a single species; but nothing prevents someone, even while perceiving the homonymy and wishing to render the definition of one of them, from failing to notice that he has rendered a definition not peculiar to one but common to both.
Ἀλλ᾿ οὐδὲν ἧττον, εἰ ὁποτερωσοῦν πεποίηκεν, ἡμάρτηκεν.
Nevertheless, in whichever way he has done it, he has made a mistake.
Ἐπεὶ δ᾿ ἔνια λανθάνει τῶν ὁμωνύμων, ἐρωτῶντι μὲν ὡς συνωνύμοις χρηστέον (οὐ γὰρ ἐφαρμόσει ὁ θατέρου ὅρος ἐπὶ θάτερον, ὥστε δόξει οὐχ ὡρίσθαι κατὰ τρόπον· δεῖ γὰρ ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ συνώνυμον ἐφαρμόττειν), αὐτῷ δ᾿ ἀποκρινομένῳ διαιρετέον.
But since some homonyms escape notice, the questioner should treat them as synonyms (for the definition of one will not fit the other, so that it will seem not to have been properly defined; for a definition must fit everything that is synonymous), whereas he who answers must make a division.
Ἐπεὶ δ᾿ ἔνιοι τῶν ἀποκρινομένων τὸ μὲν συνώνυμον ὁμώνυμόν φασιν εἶναι, ὅταν μὴ ἐφαρμόττῃ ἐπὶ πᾶν ὁ ἀποδοθεὶς λόγος, τὸ δ᾿ ὁμώνυμον συνώνυμον, ἐὰν ἐπ᾿ ἄμφω ἐφαρμόττῃ, προδιομολογητέον ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων ἢ προσυλλογιστέον ὅτι ὁμώνυμον ἢ συνώνυμον, ὁπότερον ἂν ᾖ· μᾶλλον γὰρ συγχωροῦσιν οὐ προορῶντες τὸ συμβησόμενον.
But since some of those who answer say that a synonym is homonymous when the rendered definition does not fit everything, and that a homonym is synonymous if it fits both, one must reach a prior agreement on such matters or draw a prior conclusion whether it is homonymous or synonymous, whichever it may be; for they are more likely to concede when they do not foresee what will result.
Ἂν δὲ μὴ γενομένης ὁμολογίας φῇ τις τὸ συνώνυμον ὁμώνυμον εἶναι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐφαρμόττειν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸν ἀποδοθέντα λόγον, σκοπεῖν εἰ ὁ τούτου λόγος ἐφαρμόττει καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπά· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι συνώνυμον ἂν εἴη τοῖς λοιποῖς.
If, without an agreement having been made, someone asserts that a synonym is homonymous because the rendered definition does not fit this case as well, one must examine whether the definition of this case fits the rest as well; for it is clear that it would then be synonymous with the rest.
Εἰ δὲ μή, πλείους ἔσονται ὁρισμοὶ τῶν λοιπῶν· δύο γὰρ οἱ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγοι ἐφαρμόττουσιν ἐπ᾿ αὐτά, ὅ τε πρότερον ἀποδοθεὶς καὶ ὁ ὕστερον.
But if not, there will be more than one definition of the rest; for two definitions corresponding to the name will fit them, namely, the one rendered before and the one rendered later.
Πάλιν εἴ τις ὁρισάμενος τῶν πολλαχῶς τι λεγομένων, καὶ τοῦ λόγου μὴ ἐφαρμόττοντος ἐπὶ πάντα, ὅτι μὲν ὁμώνυμον μὴ λέγοι, τὸ δ᾿ ὄνομα μὴ φαίη ἐπὶ πάντα ἐφαρμόττειν, ὅτι οὐδ᾿ ὁ λόγος, ῥητέον πρὸς τὸν τοιοῦτον ὅτι τῇ μὲν ὀνομασίᾳ δεῖ χρῆσθαι τῇ παραδεδομένῃ καὶ παρεπομένῃ καὶ μὴ κινεῖν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἔνια δ᾿ οὐ λεκτέον ὁμοίως τοῖς πολλοῖς.
Again, if someone, having defined one of the things spoken of in multiple ways, and the definition not fitting everything, should not say that it is homonymous, but should deny that the name fits everything because the definition does not fit either, one must say to such a person that we must use the terminology handed down and established and not alter such things, although some things are not to be spoken of in the same way as the multitude.