§5.5#2Ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ τὸ τῷ εἴδει προσθεὶς διήμαρτεν.
Sometimes, however, he errs even by adding "in species".
Δεήσει γὰρ ἓν εἶδος εἶναι τῶν λεχθέντων, ὅταν τὸ τῷ εἴδει προστεθῇ· τοῦτο δ᾿ ἐπ᾿ ἐνίων οὐ συμπίπτει, καθάπερ οὐδ᾿ ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρός.
For there will have to be one single species of the things mentioned, when "in species" is added; but this does not happen in some cases, as neither does it in the case of fire.
Οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν ἓν εἶδος τοῦ πυρός· ἕτερον γάρ ἐστι τῷ εἴδει ἄνθραξ καὶ φλὸξ καὶ φῶς, ἕκαστον αὐτῶν πῦρ ὄν.
For there is not one species of fire; for charcoal, flame, and light are different in species, each of them being fire.
Διὰ τοῦτο δ᾿ οὐ δεῖ, ὅταν τῷ εἴδει προστεθῇ, ἕτερον εἶναι εἶδος τοῦ λεχθέντος, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν μᾶλλον τοῖς δ᾿ ἧττον ὑπάρξει τὸ λεχθὲν ἴδιον, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς τὸ λεπτομερέστατον· λεπτομερέστερον γάρ ἐστι τὸ φῶς τοῦ ἄνθρακος καὶ τῆς φλογός.
And it is for this reason that there must not be another species of the thing mentioned when "in species" is added, because the mentioned property will belong more to some and less to others, as "being of the finest particles" in the case of fire; for light consists of finer particles than charcoal and flame.
Τοῦτο δ᾿ οὐ δεῖ γίνεσθαι, ὅταν μὴ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα μᾶλλον κατηγορῆται, καθ᾿ οὗ ὁ λόγος μᾶλλον, ἀληθεύεται· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἔσται, καθ᾿ οὗ ὁ λόγος μᾶλλον, καὶ τοὔνομα μᾶλλον.
But this must not happen, unless the name is also predicated more of that of which the definition is more true; otherwise, it will not be that that of which the definition is more true, the name is also more true of it.
Ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις ταὐτὸν εἶναι συμβήσεται τὸ ἴδιον τοῦ τε ἁπλῶς καὶ τοῦ μάλιστα ὄντος ἐν τῷ ἁπλῶς τοιούτῳ, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς ἔχει τὸ λεπτομερέστατον· καὶ γὰρ τοῦ φωτὸς ἔσται ταὐτὸ τοῦτο ἴδιον· λεπτομερέστατον γάρ ἐστι τὸ φῶς.
And besides these, it will happen that the property of what is simply so, and of what is most of all so in that which is simply so, will be the same, as is the case with "being of the finest particles" in the case of fire; for this same thing will also be the property of light; for light is of the finest particles.
Ἄλλου μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἀποδιδόντος τὸ ἴδιον ἐπιχειρητέον, αὐτῷ δ᾿ οὐ δοτέον ἐστὶ ταύτην τὴν ἔνστασιν, ἀλλ᾿ εὐθὺς τιθέμενον τὸ ἴδιον διοριστέον ὃν τρόπον τίθησι τὸ ἴδιον.
Therefore, if another assigns a property in this way, one must attack it; but one must not give this opening for objection oneself, but when laying down the property, one must at once define in what way he lays it down.
Ἔπειτ᾿ ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἴδιον ἔθηκεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον εἶναι ἴδιον.
Next, for refuting, if he has laid down a thing as a property of itself; for then what is laid down to be a property will not be a property.
Αὐτὸ γὰρ αὑτῷ πᾶν τὸ εἶναι δηλοῖ, τὸ δὲ τὸ εἶναι δηλοῦν οὐκ ἴδιον ἀλλ᾿ ὅρος ἐστίν.
For everything itself manifests its own essence to itself, and that which manifests the essence is not a property but a definition.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ εἴπας καλοῦ τὸ πρέπον ἴδιον εἶναι αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἴδιον ἀπέδωκε (ταὐτὸν γάρ ἐστι τὸ καλὸν καὶ πρέπον), οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ πρέπον τοῦ καλοῦ ἴδιον.
For instance, since he who said that a property of the beautiful is the fitting assigned a thing as a property of itself (for the beautiful and the fitting are the same), the fitting would not be a property of the beautiful.
Κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ μὴ αὐτὸ μὲν αὑτοῦ ἴδιον ἀπέδωκεν, ἀντικατηγορούμενον δ᾿ ἔθηκεν· ἔσται γὰρ ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον μὴ εἶναι ἴδιον.
And for establishing, if he has assigned a thing not as a property of itself, but has laid it down as counter-predicated; for then what is laid down not to be a property will be a property.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ θεὶς ζῴου ἴδιον τὸ οὐσία ἔμψυχος οὐκ αὐτὸ μὲν αὑτοῦ ἴδιον ἔθηκεν, ἀντικατηγορούμενον δ᾿ ἀποδέδωκεν, εἴη ἂν ἴδιον τοῦ ζῴου τὸ οὐσία ἔμψυχος.
For instance, since he who laid down "an animate substance" as a property of animal has not laid down a thing as a property of itself, but has assigned it as counter-predicated, "an animate substance" would be a property of animal.
Ἔπειτ᾿ ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν σκεπτέον ἐστὶν ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ τὸ τοῦ συνόλου ἴδιον μὴ ἀληθεύεται κατὰ τοῦ μέρους, ἢ εἰ τὸ τοῦ μέρους μὴ λέγεται κατὰ τοῦ σύμπαντος· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον ἴδιον εἶναι.
Next, in the case of things with like parts, one must consider, for refuting, if the property of the whole is not true of the part, or if that of the part is not said of the whole; for then what is laid down to be a property will not be a property.
Συμβαίνει δ᾿ ἐπ᾿ ἐνίων τοῦτο γίνεσθαι· ἀποδοίη γὰρ ἄν τις ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν ἴδιον ἐνίοτε μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ σύμπαν βλέψας, ἐνίοτε δ᾿ ἐπὶ τὸ κατὰ μέρος λεγόμενον αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ἐπιστήσας· ἔσται δ᾿ οὐδέτερον ὀρθῶς ἀποδεδομένον.
This happens to occur in some cases; for in assigning a property of things with like parts, one might sometimes assign it having looked to the whole, and sometimes having turned one's attention to what is said of the part; but in neither way will it have been correctly assigned.
Οἷον ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ σύμπαντος, ἐπεὶ ὁ εἴπας θαλάττης ἴδιον τὸ πλεῖστον ὕδωρ ἁλμυρὸν ὁμοιομεροῦς μέν τινος ἔθηκε τὸ ἴδιον, τοιοῦτον δ᾿ ἀπέδωκεν ὃ οὐκ ἀληθεύεται κατὰ τοῦ μέρους (οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τὶς θάλαττα τὸ πλεῖστον ὕδωρ ἁλμυρόν), οὐκ ἂν εἴη τῆς θαλάττης ἴδιον τὸ πλεῖστον ὕδωρ ἁλμυρόν.
For instance, in the case of the whole, since he who said that a property of sea is "the greatest amount of salt water" laid down the property of something with like parts, but assigned such a thing as is not true of the part (for a particular sea is not the greatest amount of salt water), "the greatest amount of salt water" would not be a property of sea.
Ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ μέρους, οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ θεὶς ἀέρος ἴδιον τὸ ἀναπνευστὸν ὁμοιομεροῦς μέν τινος εἴρηκε τὸ ἴδιον, τοιοῦτον δ᾿ ἀπέδωκεν ὃ κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀέρος ἀληθεύεται, κατὰ δὲ τοῦ σύμπαντος οὐ λέγεται (οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὁ σύμπας ἀναπνευστός), οὐκ ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀέρος ἴδιον τὸ ἀναπνευστόν.
And in the case of the part, for instance, since he who laid down "breathable" as a property of air has spoken of the property of something with like parts, but assigned such a thing as is true of a particular air, but is not said of the whole (for the whole air is not breathable), "breathable" would not be a property of air.
Κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ ἀληθεύεται μὲν καθ᾿ ἑκάστου τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν, ἔστι δ᾿ ἴδιον αὐτῶν κατὰ τὸ σύμπαν· ἔσται γὰρ ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον μὴ εἶναι ἴδιον.
And for establishing, if it is true of each of the things with like parts, and is their property in respect of the whole; for then what is laid down not to be a property will be a property.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ἀληθεύεται κατὰ πάσης τῆς γῆς τὸ κάτω φέρεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν, ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ἴδιον καὶ τῆς τινὸς γῆς κατὰ τὴν γῆν, εἴη ἂν τῆς γῆς ἴδιον τὸ κάτω φέρεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν.
For instance, since "to be carried downwards by nature" is true of all earth, and this is also a property of a particular earth in respect of earth, "to be carried downwards by nature" would be a property of earth.