§5.5#1Ἔπειτ᾿ ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ τὸ φύσει ὑπάρχον βουλόμενος ἀποδοῦναι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τίθησι τῇ λέξει, ὥστε τὸ ἀεὶ ὑπάρχον σημαίνειν·
Next, for refuting, if, while wishing to assign what belongs by nature, he lays it down in such language as to signify what belongs always; for then what is laid down to be a property would seem to be upset.
δόξειε γὰρ ἂν κινεῖσθαι τὸ κείμενον εἶναι ἴδιον. Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ εἴπας ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον τὸ δίπουν βούλεται μὲν τὸ φύσει ὑπάρχον ἀποδιδόναι, σημαίνει δὲ τῇ λέξει τὸ ἀεὶ ὑπάρχον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον τὸ δίπουν· οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ἄνθρωπός ἐστι δύο πόδας ἔχων.
For instance, since he who says that a property of man is to be two-footed wishes to assign what belongs by nature, but signifies by his language what belongs always, to be two-footed would not be a property of man; for not every man is possessing two feet.
Κατασκευάζοντα δ᾿ εἰ βούλεται τὸ φύσει ὑπάρχον ἴδιον ἀποδιδόναι καὶ τῇ λέξει τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον σημαίνει· οὐ γὰρ κινήσεται κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ ἴδιον.
And for establishing, if he wishes to assign a property that belongs by nature and signifies it in this way by his language; for in this respect the property will not be upset.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον ἀποδιδοὺς τὸ ζῷον ἐπιστήμης δεκτικὸν καὶ βούλεται καὶ τῇ λέξει σημαίνει τὸ φύσει ὑπάρχον ἴδιον, οὐκ ἂν κινοῖτο κατὰ τοῦτο, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον τὸ ζῷον ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν.
For instance, since he who assigns as a property of man "an animal receptive of knowledge" both wishes and signifies by his language a property that belongs by nature, he would not be upset in this respect, as though "an animal receptive of knowledge" were not a property of man.
Ἔτι ὅσα λέγεται ὡς κατ᾿ ἄλλο τι πρῶτον ἢ ὡς πρῶτον αὐτό, ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀποδοῦναι τῶν τοιούτων τὸ ἴδιον· ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ κατ᾿ ἄλλο τι ἴδιον ἀποδῷς, καὶ κατὰ τοῦ πρώτου ἀληθεύσεται, ἐὰν δὲ τοῦ πρώτου θῇς, καὶ τοῦ κατ᾿ ἄλλο κατηγορηθήσεται.
Further, in the case of all things that are said either primarily in virtue of something else, or primarily in themselves, it is a difficult task to assign the property of such things; for if you assign the property of what belongs in virtue of something else, it will also be true of the primary thing, while if you lay down that of the primary thing, it will also be predicated of what belongs in virtue of something else.
Οἷον ἐὰν μέν τις ἐπιφανείας ἴδιον ἀποδῷ τὸ κεχρῶσθαι, καὶ κατὰ σώματος ἀληθεύσεται τὸ κεχρῶσθαι, ἐὰν δὲ σώματος, καὶ κατ᾿ ἐπιφανείας κατηγορηθήσεται.
For instance, if someone assigns "to be colored" as a property of surface, "to be colored" will also be true of body; while if he assigns it of body, it will also be predicated of surface.
Ὥστε οὐ καθ᾿ οὗ ὁ λόγος, καὶ τοὔνομα ἀληθεύσεται.
So that that of which the definition is true, the name will not also be true of it.
Συμβαίνει δ᾿ ἐν ἐνίοις τῶν ἰδίων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γίνεσθαί τινα ἁμαρτίαν παρὰ τὸ μὴ διορίζεσθαι πῶς καὶ τίνων τίθησι τὸ ἴδιον.
And it happens in some of the properties that a certain error generally arises from not defining how and of what things one lays down the property.
Ἅπαντες γὰρ ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἀποδιδόναι τὸ ἴδιον ἢ τὸ φύσει ὑπάρχον, καθάπερ ἀνθρώπου τὸ δίπουν, ἢ τὸ ὑπάρχον, καθάπερ ἀνθρώπου τινὸς τὸ τέτταρας δακτύλους ἔχειν, ἢ εἴδει, καθάπερ πυρὸς τὸ λεπτομερέστατον, ἢ ἁπλῶς, καθάπερ ζῴου τὸ ζῆν, ἢ κατ᾿ ἄλλο, καθάπερ ψυχῆς τὸ φρόνιμον, ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον, καθάπερ λογιστικοῦ τὸ φρόνιμον, ἢ ὡς τῷ ἔχειν, καθάπερ ἐπιστήμονος τὸ ἀμετάπειστον ὑπὸ λόγου (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἕτερον ἢ τῷ ἔχειν τι ἔσται ἀμετάπειστος ὑπὸ λόγου), ἢ τῷ ἔχεσθαι, καθάπερ ἐπιστήμης τὸ ἀμετάπειστον ὑπὸ λόγου, ἢ τῷ μετέχεσθαι, καθάπερ ζῴου τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι (αἰσθάνεται μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλο τι, οἷον ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ μετέχον ἤδη τοῦτο αἰσθάνεται), ἢ τῷ μετέχειν, καθάπερ τοῦ τινὸς ζῴου τὸ ζῆν.
For everyone attempts to assign the property either as what belongs by nature, as "two-footed" of man, or as what belongs actually, as "having four fingers" of a particular man, or in species, as "being of the finest particles" of fire, or simply, as "living" of animal, or in virtue of something else, as "prudent" of soul, or as primarily, as "prudent" of the rational part, or as by having, as "not to be convinced by argument" of the man of science (for in no other way than by having something will he be not to be convinced by argument), or as by being had, as "not to be convinced by argument" of science, or as by being participated in, as "sensation" of animal (for something else also senses, as man, but he senses as already participating in it), or as by participating, as "living" of a particular animal.
Μὴ προσθεὶς μὲν οὖν τὸ φύσει ἁμαρτάνει, διότι ἐνδέχεται τὸ φύσει ὑπάρχον μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἐκείνῳ ᾧ φύσει ὑπάρχει, καθάπερ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ δύο πόδας ἔχειν.
If, then, one does not add "by nature", he errs, because it is possible for what belongs by nature not to belong to that to which it belongs by nature, as "having two feet" to man.
Μὴ διορίσας δ᾿ ὅτι τὸ ὑπάρχον ἀποδίδωσιν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔσται τοιοῦτον οἷον νῦν ὑπάρχει ἐκεῖνο, καθάπερ τὸ τέτταρας δακτύλους ἔχειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον.
And if he does not define that he is assigning what belongs actually, because that thing will not always be such as it belongs now, as the man "having four fingers".
Μὴ δηλώσας δὲ διότι ὡς πρῶτον ἢ ὡς κατ᾿ ἄλλο τίθησιν, ὅτι οὐ καθ᾿ οὗ ὁ λόγος, καὶ τοὔνομα ἀληθεύσεται, καθάπερ τὸ κεχρῶσθαι, εἴτε τῆς ἐπιφανείας εἴτε τοῦ σώματος ἀποδοθὲν ἴδιον.
And if he does not show that he lays it down as primarily or in virtue of something else, because that of which the definition is true, the name will not also be true of it, as "to be colored", whether assigned as a property of surface or of body.
Μὴ προείπας δὲ διότι ἢ τῷ ἔχειν ἢ τῷ ἔχεσθαι τὸ ἴδιον ἀποδέδωκε, διότι οὐκ ἔσται ἴδιον· ὑπάρξει γάρ, ἐὰν μὲν τῷ ἔχεσθαι ἀποδιδῷ τὸ ἴδιον, τῷ ἔχοντι, ἐὰν δὲ τῷ ἔχοντι, τῷ ἐχομένῳ, καθάπερ τὸ ἀμετάπειστον ὑπὸ λόγου τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἢ τοῦ ἐπιστήμονος τεθὲν ἴδιον.
And if he does not say beforehand whether he has assigned the property by having or by being had, because it will not be a property; for it will belong, if he assigns the property by being had, to the possessor, and if by having, to what is possessed, as "not to be convinced by argument" laid down as a property of science or of the man of science.
Μὴ προσσημήνας δὲ τῷ μετέχειν ἢ τῷ μετέχεσθαι, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλοις τισὶν ὑπάρξει τὸ ἴδιον· ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ τῷ μετέχεσθαι ἀποδῷ, τοῖς μετέχουσιν, ἐὰν δὲ τῷ μετέχειν, τοῖς μετεχομένοις, καθάπερ εἰ τοῦ τινὸς ζῴου ἢ τοῦ ζῴου τιθείη τὸ ζῆν ἴδιον.
And if he does not signify in addition by participating or by being participated in, because the property will also belong to certain other things; for if he assigns it by being participated in, it will belong to those that participate, and if by participating, to those that are participated in, as if he should lay down "living" as a property of a particular animal or of animal.
Μὴ διαστείλας δὲ τὸ τῷ εἴδει, ὅτι ἑνὶ μόνῳ ὑπάρξει τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦτο ὄντων οὗ τὸ ἴδιον τίθησι· τὸ γὰρ καθ᾿ ὑπερβολὴν ἑνὶ μόνῳ ὑπάρχει, καθάπερ τοῦ πυρὸς τὸ κουφότατον.
And if he does not distinguish "in species", because the property will belong to only one of the things under that of which he lays down the property; for what is in virtue of excess belongs to one single thing alone, as "lightest" of fire.