§5.4#2Ἔπειτ᾿ ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἅμα ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἴδιον, ἀλλ᾿ ἢ ὕστερον ἢ πρότερον ἢ οὗ τοὔνομα· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον εἶναι ἴδιον, ἢ οὐδέποτε ἢ οὐκ ἀεί.
Next, for refuting, if it is not possible for the property and that of which it is the name to belong at the same time, but either is later or earlier than the other; for then what is laid down to be a property will not be a property, either never or not always.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ἐνδέχεται καὶ πρότερόν τινι ὑπάρξαι καὶ ὕστερον τὸ βαδίζειν διὰ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἢ τὸ ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ βαδίζειν διὰ τῆς ἀγορᾶς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον, ἢ οὐδέποτ᾿ ἢ οὐκ ἀεί.
For instance, since it is possible for "walking through the marketplace" to belong to someone both earlier and later than the name "man", "walking through the marketplace" would not be a property of man, either never or not always.
Κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ ἅμα ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀεὶ ὑπάρχει, μήτε ὅρος ὂν μήτε διαφορά· ἔσται γὰρ ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον μὴ εἶναι ἴδιον.
And for establishing, if they necessarily always belong at the same time, while being neither a definition nor a difference; for then what is laid down as not being a property will be a property.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ τὸ ζῷον ἐπιστήμης δεκτικὸν ἅμα ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀεὶ ὑπάρχει καὶ τὸ ἄνθρωπος, οὔτε διαφορὰ ὂν οὔθ᾿ ὅρος, εἴη ἂν τὸ ζῷον ἐπιστήμης δεκτικὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον.
For instance, since "an animal receptive of knowledge" necessarily always belongs at the same time as "man", while being neither a difference nor a definition, "an animal receptive of knowledge" would be a property of man.
Ἔπειτ᾿ ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ τῶν αὐτῶν, ᾗ ταὐτά ἐστι, μή ἐστι τὸ αὐτὸ ἴδιον· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον εἶναι ἴδιον.
Next, for refuting, if for identical things, in so far as they are identical, the same thing is not their property; for then what is laid down to be a property will not be a property.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔστι διωκτοῦ τὸ φαίνεσθαί τισιν ἀγαθὸν ἴδιον, οὐδ᾿ ἂν αἱρετοῦ εἴη ἴδιον τὸ φαίνεσθαί τισιν ἀγαθόν· ταὐτὸν γάρ ἐστι τὸ διωκτὸν καὶ τὸ αἱρετόν.
For instance, since "appearing to some to be good" is not a property of "what is to be pursued", "appearing to some to be good" would not be a property of "what is to be chosen"; for "what is to be pursued" and "what is to be chosen" are the same.
Κατασκευάζοντα δ᾿ εἰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ᾗ ταὐτό ἐστι, ταὐτὸ ἴδιον· ἔσται γὰρ ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον μὴ εἶναι ἴδιον.
And for establishing, if for the same thing, in so far as it is the same, the same thing is its property; for then what is laid down as not being a property will be a property.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ἀνθρώπου, ᾗ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι, λέγεται ἴδιον τὸ τριμερῆ ψυχὴν ἔχειν, καὶ βροτοῦ, ᾗ βροτός ἐστιν, εἴη ἂν ἴδιον τὸ τριμερῆ ψυχὴν ἔχειν.
For instance, since of man, in so far as he is man, "having a tripartite soul" is said to be a property, also of mortal, in so far as he is mortal, "having a tripartite soul" would be a property.
Χρήσιμος δ᾿ ὁ τόπος οὗτος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος· τοῖς γὰρ αὐτοῖς, ᾗ ταὐτά ἐστι, ταὐτὰ δεῖ ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν.
This topic is also useful for accident; for to identical things, in so far as they are identical, the same things must belong or not belong.
Ἔπειτ᾿ ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ τῶν αὐτῶν τῷ εἴδει μὴ ταὐτὸν ἀεὶ τῷ εἴδει τὸ ἴδιόν ἐστιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦ εἰρημένου ἔσται ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον εἶναι ἴδιον.
Next, for refuting, if for things that are the same in species, the property is not always the same in species; for then what is laid down to be a property will not be a property of the aforesaid.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ εἴδει ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἵππος, οὐκ ἀεὶ δὲ τοῦ ἵππου ἐστὶν ἴδιον τὸ ἑστάναι ὑφ᾿ αὑτοῦ, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον τὸ κινεῖσθαι ὑφ᾿ αὑτοῦ· ταὐτὸν γάρ ἐστι τῷ εἴδει τὸ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἑστάναι ὑφ᾿ αὑτοῦ, ᾗ ζῷόν ἐστιν ἑκατέρῳ αὐτῶν τῷ συμβεβηκέναι.
For instance, since "man" and "horse" are the same in species, but "standing by itself" is not always a property of "horse", "moving by itself" would not be a property of "man"; for "moving by itself" and "standing by itself" are the same in species, in so far as each of them is an animal by way of accident.
Κατασκευάζοντα δ᾿ εἰ τῶν αὐτῶν τῷ εἴδει ταὐτὸν ἀεὶ τὸ ἴδιον· ἔσται γὰρ ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον μὴ εἶναι ἴδιον.
And for establishing, if for things that are the same in species, the same property always belongs; for then what is laid down as not being a property will be a property.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ἀνθρώπου ἐστὶν ἴδιον τὸ εἶναι πεζὸν δίπουν, καὶ ὄρνιθος ἂν εἴη ἴδιον τὸ εἶναι πτηνὸν δίπουν· ἑκάτερον γὰρ τούτων ἐστὶ ταὐτὸν τῷ εἴδει, ᾗ τὰ μὲν ὡς ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος ἐστὶν εἴδη, ὑπὸ τὸ ζῷον ὄντα, τὰ δὲ ὡς γένους διαφοραί, τοῦ ζῴου.
For instance, since a property of "man" is "to be a two-footed pedestrian", a property of "bird" would be "to be a two-footed winged creature"; for each of these is the same in species, in so far as some are species under the same genus, being under "animal", and others are differences of the genus, of "animal".
Οὗτος δ᾿ ὁ τόπος ψευδής ἐστιν, ὅταν τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τῶν λεχθέντων ἑνί τινι μόνῳ ὑπάρχῃ εἴδει, τὸ δ᾿ ἕτερον πολλοῖς, καθάπερ τὸ πεζὸν τετράπουν.
But this topic is false when one of the aforesaid belongs to one single species alone, and the other to many, as "four-footed pedestrian".
Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον πολλαχῶς λέγεται, ἔργον ἐστὶ σοφιστικῶς λαμβάνοντι ἑνὸς ἀποδοῦναι καὶ μόνου τινὸς τὸ ἴδιον.
Since "the same" and "different" are said in many ways, it is a difficult task to assign the property of one single thing to someone who takes terms sophistically.
Τὸ γὰρ ὑπάρχον τινὶ ᾧ συμβέβηκέ τι, καὶ τῷ συμβεβηκότι ὑπάρξει λαμβανομένῳ μετὰ τοῦ ᾧ συμβέβηκεν, οἷον τὸ ὑπάρχον ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ὑπάρξει, ἂν ᾖ λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος, καὶ τὸ λευκῷ δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ ὑπάρχον καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ὑπάρξει.
For what belongs to something to which an accident belongs will also belong to the accident taken together with that to which it belongs; for instance, what belongs to "man" will also belong to "white man", if there is a white man, and what belongs to "white man" will also belong to "man".
Διαβάλλοι δ᾿ ἄν τις τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ἰδίων, τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἄλλο μὲν καθ᾿ αὑτὸ ποιῶν ἄλλο δὲ μετὰ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος, οἷον ἄλλο μὲν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι λέγων ἄλλο δὲ λευκὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἔτι δὲ ἕτερον ποιῶν τὴν ἕξιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν λεγόμενον.
One might refute most properties by making the subject one thing by itself and another together with the accident; for instance, by saying that "man" is one thing and "white man" is another, and further by making the state and what is said according to the state different.
Τὸ γὰρ τῇ ἕξει ὑπάρχον καὶ τῷ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν λεγομένῳ ὑπάρξει, καὶ τὸ τῷ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν λεγομένῳ ὑπάρχον καὶ τῇ ἕξει ὑπάρξει.
For what belongs to the state will also belong to what is said according to the state, and what belongs to what is said according to the state will also belong to the state.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ ἐπιστήμων κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην λέγεται διακεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἴδιον τὸ ἀμετάπειστον ὑπὸ λόγου· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐπιστήμων ἔσται ἀμετάπειστος ὑπὸ λόγου.
For instance, since the man of science is said to be disposed according to science, "to be not to be convinced by argument" would not be a property of science; for the man of science will also be not to be convinced by argument.
Κατασκευάζοντα δὲ ῥητέον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἕτερον ἁπλῶς τὸ ᾧ συμβέβηκε καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς μετὰ τοῦ ᾧ συμβέβηκε λαμβανόμενον, ἀλλ᾿ ἄλλο λέγεται τῷ ἕτερον εἶναι αὐτοῖς τὸ εἶναι· οὐ ταὐτὸν γάρ ἐστιν ἀνθρώπῳ τε τὸ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ λευκῷ.
And for establishing, one must say that the thing to which the accident belongs and the accident taken together with that to which it belongs are not simply different, but are said to be different in that their essence is different; for "to be man" is not the same as "to be a white man" for a white man.
Ἔτι δὲ θεωρητέον ἐστὶ παρὰ τὰς πτώσεις, λέγοντα διότι οὔθ᾿ ὁ ἐπιστήμων ἔσται τὸ ἀμετάπειστον ὑπὸ λόγου ἀλλ᾿ ὁ ἀμετάπειστος ὑπὸ λόγου, οὔθ᾿ ἡ ἐπιστήμη τὸ ἀμετάπειστον ὑπὸ λόγου ἀλλ᾿ ἡ ἀμετάπειστος ὑπὸ λόγου· πρὸς γὰρ τὸν πάντως ἐνιστάμενον πάντως ἀντιτακτέον ἐστίν.
Further, one must observe according to grammatical inflections, saying that neither will the man of science be "not to be convinced by argument" but "not to be convinced by argument", nor will science be "not to be convinced by argument" but "not to be convinced by argument"; for against one who objects in every way, one must resist in every way.