§5.4#1Πότερον μὲν οὗν καλῶς ἢ οὐ καλῶς ἀποδέδοται τὸ ἴδιον, διὰ τῶνδε σκεπτέον.
Whether, then, a property has been correctly or incorrectly assigned must be considered through these means.
Πότερον δ᾿ ἴδιόν ἐστιν ὅλως τὸ εἰρημένον ἢ οὐκ ἴδιον, ἐκ τῶνδε θεωρητέον.
But whether that which has been stated is a property at all or not, must be observed from the following.
Οἱ γὰρ ἁπλῶς κατασκευάζοντες τὸ ἴδιον ὅτι καλῶς κεῖται τόποι οἱ αὐτοὶ ἔσονται τοῖς ἴδιον ὅλως ποιοῦσιν· ἐν ἐκείνοις οὖν ῥηθήσονται.
For those topics which simply establish that the property is correctly laid down will be the same as those that make it a property at all; they will therefore be stated among them.
Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἀνασκευάζοντα ἐπιβλέπειν ἐφ᾿ ἕκαστον οὗ τὸ ἴδιον ἀποδέδωκεν, [οἷον] εἰ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχει, ἢ εἰ μὴ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀληθεύεται, ἢ εἰ μή ἐστιν ἴδιον ἑκάστου αὐτῶν κατ᾿ ἐκεῖνο οὗ τὸ ἴδιον ἀποδέδωκεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον εἶναι ἴδιον.
First, then, for refuting, one must look at each individual instance of that of which he has assigned the property, and see whether it belongs to none, or is not true in this respect, or whether it is not a property of each of them in respect of that of which he has assigned the property; for then what is laid down to be a property will not be a property.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ κατὰ τοῦ γεωμετρικοῦ οὐκ ἀληθεύεται τὸ ἀνεξαπάτητον εἶναι ὑπὸ λόγου (ἀπατᾶται γὰρ ὁ γεωμετρικὸς ἐν τῷ ψευδογραφεῖσθαι), οὐκ ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἐπιστήμονος ἴδιον τὸ μὴ ἀπατᾶσθαι ὑπὸ λόγου.
For instance, since it is not true of the geometrician that he is "not to be deceived by an argument" (for a geometrician is deceived when describing a false figure), "not to be deceived by an argument" would not be a property of the man of science.
Κατασκευάζοντα δ᾿ εἰ κατὰ παντὸς ἀληθεύεται καὶ κατὰ τοῦτ᾿ ἀληθεύεται· ἔσται γὰρ ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον εἶναι ἴδιον.
And for establishing, if it is true of every instance, and true in this respect; for then what is laid down to be a property will be a property.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ τὸ ζῷον ἐπιστήμης δεκτικὸν κατὰ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀληθεύεται καὶ ᾗ ἄνθρωπος, εἴη ἂν ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον τὸ ζῷον ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν.
For instance, since "an animal receptive of knowledge" is true of every man and in so far as he is a man, "an animal receptive of knowledge" would be a property of man.
Ἔστι δ᾿ ὁ τόπος οὗτος ἀνασκευάζοντι μέν, εἰ μὴ καθ᾿ οὗ τοὔνομα, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἀληθεύεται, καὶ εἰ μὴ καθ᾿ οὗ ὁ λόγος, καὶ τοὔνομα ἀληθεύεται· κατασκευάζοντι δέ, εἰ καθ᾿ οὗ τοὔνομα, καὶ ὁ λόγος, καὶ εἰ καθ᾿ οὗ ὁ λόγος, καὶ τοὔνομα κατηγορεῖται.
This topic is, for refuting, if the definition is not true of that of which the name is true, and if the name is not true of that of which the definition is true; and for establishing, if the definition is predicated of that of which the name is predicated, and if the name is predicated of that of which the definition is predicated.
Ἔπειτ᾿ ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ μὴ καθ᾿ οὗ τοὔνομα, καὶ ὁ λόγος, καὶ εἰ μὴ καθ᾿ οὗ ὁ λόγος, καὶ τοὔνομα λέγεται· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον ἴδιον εἶναι.
Next, for refuting, if the definition is not said of that of which the name is said, and if the name is not said of that of which the definition is said; for then what is laid down to be a property will not be a property.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ζῷον ἐπιστήμης μετέχον ἀληθεύεται κατὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὁ δ᾿ ἄνθρωπος οὐ κατηγορεῖται, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον ζῷον ἐπιστήμης μετέχον.
For instance, since "an animal partaking of knowledge" is true of God, but "man" is not predicated of God, "an animal partaking of knowledge" would not be a property of man.
Κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ καθ᾿ οὗ ὁ λόγος, καὶ τοὔνομα κατηγορεῖται, καὶ καθ᾿ οὗ τοὔνομα, καὶ ὁ λόγος κατηγορεῖται· ἔσται γὰρ ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον μὴ εἶναι ἴδιον.
And for establishing, if the name is predicated of that of which the definition is predicated, and the definition is predicated of that of which the name is predicated; for then what is laid down as not being a property will be a property.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ καθ᾿ οὗ τὸ ψυχὴν ἔχειν, τὸ ζῷον ἀληθεύεται, καὶ καθ᾿ οὗ τὸ ζῷον, τὸ ψυχὴν ἔχειν, εἴη ἂν τὸ ψυχὴν ἔχειν τοῦ ζῴου ἴδιον.
For instance, since "animal" is true of that of which "having a soul" is true, and "having a soul" is true of that of which "animal" is true, "having a soul" would be a property of "animal".
Ἔπειτ᾿ ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἴδιον ἀπέδωκε τοῦ ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ λεγομένου· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον ἴδιον.
Next, for refuting, if he has assigned the subject as a property of what is said in the subject; for then what is laid down as a property will not be a property.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ ἀποδοὺς ἴδιον τοῦ λεπτομερεστάτου σώματος τὸ πῦρ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀποδέδωκε τοῦ κατηγορουμένου ἴδιον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ πῦρ σώματος τοῦ λεπτομερεστάτου ἴδιον.
For instance, since he who has assigned "fire" as the property of "the most subtle body" has assigned the subject as the property of the predicate, "fire" would not be a property of "the most subtle body".
Διὰ τοῦτο δ᾿ οὐκ ἔσται τὸ ὑποκείμενον τοῦ ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ἴδιον, ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ πλειόνων ἔσται καὶ διαφόρων τῷ εἴδει ἴδιον.
And the subject will not be the property of what is in the subject for this reason, that the same thing will be the property of several things different in species.
Τῷ γὰρ αὐτῷ πλείω τινὰ διάφορα τῷ εἴδει ὑπάρχει κατὰ μόνου λεγόμενα, ὧν ἔσται πάντων ἴδιον τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ἐάν τις οὕτω τιθῆται τὸ ἴδιον.
For to the same thing there belong several things different in species which are said of it alone, of all of which the subject will be the property, if anyone lays down the property in this way.
Κατασκευάζοντα δ᾿ εἰ τὸ ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ἀπέδωκεν ἴδιον τοῦ ὑποκειμένου. Ἔσται γὰρ ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον μὴ εἶναι ἴδιον, ἐάνπερ κατὰ μόνων κατηγορῆται, ὧν εἴρηται τὸ ἴδιον.
And for establishing, if he has assigned what is in the subject as a property of the subject; for then what is laid down as not being a property will be a property, if indeed it is predicated of those things alone of which the property is said.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ εἴπας γῆς ἴδιον σῶμα τὸ βαρύτατον τῷ εἴδει τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἀπέδωκε τὸ ἴδιον κατὰ μόνου λεγόμενον τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ ὡς τὸ ἴδιον κατηγορεῖται, εἴη ἂν τὸ τῆς γῆς ἴδιον ὀρθῶς κείμενον.
For instance, since he who has said that the property of earth is "the heaviest body in species" has assigned the property of the subject as something said of the thing alone, and it is predicated as a property, the property of earth would be correctly laid down.
Ἔπειτ᾿ ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ κατὰ μέθεξιν ἀπέδωκε τὸ ἴδιον· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον εἶναι ἴδιον.
Next, for refuting, if he has assigned the property by participation; for then what is laid down to be a property will not be a property.
Τὸ γὰρ κατὰ μέθεξιν ὑπάρχον εἰς τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι συμβάλλεται· εἴη δ᾿ ἂν τὸ τοιοῦτο διαφορά τις κατά τινος ἑνὸς εἴδους λεγομένη.
For that which belongs by participation contributes to the essence; and such a thing would be a certain difference predicated of some one species.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ εἴπας ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον τὸ πεζὸν δίπουν κατὰ μέθεξιν ἀπέδωκε τὸ ἴδιον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τἀνθρώπου ἴδιον τὸ πεζὸν δίπουν.
For instance, since he who has said that the property of man is "a two-footed pedestrian" has assigned the property by participation, "a two-footed pedestrian" would not be a property of man.
Κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ μὴ κατὰ μέθεξιν ἀπέδωκε τὸ ἴδιον, μηδὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι δηλοῦν, ἀντικατηγορουμένου τοῦ πράγματος· ἔσται γὰρ ἴδιον τὸ κείμενον μὴ εἶναι ἴδιον.
And for establishing, if he has assigned the property not by participation nor as declaring the essence, while the thing is counter-predicated; for then what is laid down as not being a property will be a property.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ θεὶς ζῴου ἴδιον τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι πεφυκὸς οὔτε κατὰ μέθεξιν ἀπέδωκεν ἴδιον οὔτε τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι δηλοῦν, ἀντικατηγορουμένου τοῦ πράγματος, εἴη ἂν ζῴου ἴδιον τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι πεφυκός.
For instance, since he who has laid down as the property of animal "that which is by nature capable of sensation" has assigned the property neither by participation nor as declaring the essence, while the thing is counter-predicated, "that which is by nature capable of sensation" would be a property of animal.