§5.3#2Ἔπειτ᾿ ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ τοιοῦτο ἀποδέδωκε τὸ ἴδιον, ὃ φανερὸν μή ἐστιν ἄλλως ὑπάρχον ἢ αἰσθήσει· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται καλῶς κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον.
Next, for refuting, if he has assigned such a property as is not manifest except by perception; for then the property will not be correctly established.
Ἅπαν γὰρ τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἔξω γινόμενον τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἄδηλον γίνεται· ἀφανὲς γάρ ἐστιν εἰ ἔτι ὑπάρχει, διὰ τὸ τῇ αἰσθήσει μόνον γνωρίζεσθαι.
For everything that is perceived by sense becomes unclear when it gets outside perception; for it is doubtful whether it still belongs, because of its being known only by perception.
Ἔσται δ᾿ ἀληθὲς τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀεὶ παρακολουθούντων.
And this will be true in the case of those things that do not of necessity always accompany.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ θέμενος ἡλίου ἴδιον ἄστρον φερόμενον ὑπὲρ γῆς τὸ λαμπρότατον τοιούτῳ κέχρηται ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ τῷ ὑπὲρ γῆς φέρεσθαι, ὃ τῇ αἰσθήσει γνωρίζεται, οὐκ ἂν εἴη καλῶς τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου ἀποδεδομένον ἴδιον· ἄδηλον γὰρ ἔσται, ὅταν δύῃ ὁ ἥλιος, εἰ φέρεται ὑπὲρ γῆς, διὰ τὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν τότε ἀπολείπειν ἡμᾶς.
For instance, since he who has laid down as the property of the sun "the brightest star that moves above the earth" has used in the property such a thing as "to move above the earth", which is known by perception, the property of the sun would not be correctly assigned; for it will be unclear, when the sun sets, whether it moves above the earth, because perception then fails us.
Κατασκευάζοντα δ᾿ εἰ τοιοῦτον ἀποδέδωκε τὸ ἴδιον, ὃ μὴ τῇ αἰσθήσει φανερόν ἐστιν ἢ ὃ αἰσθητὸν ὂν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχον δῆλόν ἐστιν· ἔσται γὰρ κατὰ τοῦτο καλῶς κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον.
And for establishing, if he has assigned such a property as is not manifest to perception, or which, being perceived by sense, is clearly present of necessity; for then the property will be correctly established in this respect.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ θέμενος ἐπιφανείας ἴδιον ὃ πρῶτον κέχρωσται αἰσθητῷ μέν τινι προσκέχρηται τῷ κεχρῶσθαι, τοιούτῳ δ᾿ ὃ φανερόν ἐστιν ὑπάρχον ἀεί, εἴη ἂν κατὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ἀποδεδομένον τὸ τῆς ἐπιφανείας ἴδιον.
For instance, since he who has laid down as the property of a surface "that which is first coloured" has made use of a certain sensible thing, namely "being coloured", but of such a kind as is clearly always present, the property of a surface would be correctly assigned in this respect.
Ἔπειτ᾿ ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ τὸν ὅρον ὡς ἴδιον ἀποδέδωκεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται καλῶς κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον.
Next, for refuting, if he has assigned the definition as a property; for then the property will not be correctly established.
οὐ γὰρ δεῖ δηλοῦν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τὸ ἴδιον.
For the property ought not to declare the essence.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ εἴπας ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι σημαῖνον ἀποδέδωκε τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον καλῶς ἀποδεδομένον.
For instance, since he who has said that the property of man is "a two-footed pedestrian animal" has assigned as the property of man that which signifies the essence, the property of man would not be correctly assigned.
Κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ ἀντικατηγορούμενον μὲν ἀποδέδωκε τὸ ἴδιον, μὴ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι δὲ δηλοῦν. Ἔσται γὰρ κατὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ἀποδεδομένον τὸ ἴδιον.
And for establishing, if he has assigned the property as something counter-predicated, yet not declaring the essence; for then the property will be correctly assigned in this respect.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ θεὶς ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον ζῷον ἥμερον φύσει ἀντικατηγορούμενον μὲν ἀποδέδωκε τὸ ἴδιον, οὐ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι δὲ δηλοῦν, εἴη ἂν κατὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ἀποδεδομένον τὸ ἴδιον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.
For instance, since he who has laid down as the property of man "an animal naturally gentle" has assigned the property as something counter-predicated, yet not declaring the essence, the property of man would be correctly assigned in this respect.
Ἔπειτ᾿ ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ μὴ εἰς τὸ τί ἐστιν ὁ θεὶς ἀποδέδωκε τὸ ἴδιον.
Next, for refuting, if the proposer has not assigned the property into the "what it is".
Δεῖ γὰρ τῶν ἰδίων, καθάπερ καὶ τῶν ὅρων, τὸ πρῶτον ἀποδίδοσθαι γένος, ἔπειθ᾿ οὕτως ἤδη προσάπτεσθαι τὰ λοιπά, καὶ χωρίζειν.
For in properties, just as in definitions, the first genus must be assigned, and then in this way the remaining things must already be attached and distinguish it.
Ὥστε τὸ μὴ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον κείμενον ἴδιον οὐκ ἂν εἴη καλῶς ἀποδεδομένον.
So a property not established in this manner would not be correctly assigned.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ εἴπας ζῴου ἴδιον τὸ ψυχὴν ἔχειν οὐκ ἔθηκεν εἰς τὸ τί ἐστι τὸ ζῷον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη καλῶς κείμενον τὸ τοῦ ζῴου ἴδιον.
For instance, since he who has said that the property of animal is "to have a soul" has not placed it into the "what it is" of animal, the property of animal would not be correctly established.
Κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἴ τις εἰς τὸ τί ἐστι θεὶς οὗ τὸ ἴδιον ἀποδίδωσι, τὰ λοιπὰ προσάπτει· ἔσται γὰρ κατὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ἀποδεδομένον τὸ ἴδιον.
And for establishing, if anyone, having placed it into the "what it is" of that of which he assigns the property, attaches the remaining things; for then the property will be correctly assigned in this respect.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ θεὶς ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον ζῷον ἐπιστήμης δεκτικὸν εἰς τὸ τί ἐστι θεὶς ἀπέδωκε τὸ ἴδιον, εἴη ἂν κατὰ τοῦτο καλῶς κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.
For instance, since he who has laid down as the property of man "an animal receptive of knowledge" has assigned the property having placed it into the "what it is", the property of man would be correctly established in this respect.