§5.3#1Ἔπειτ᾿ ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ αὐτῷ προσκέχρηται οὗ τὸ ἴδιον ἀποδίδωσιν, ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τινί· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται καλῶς κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον.
Next, for refuting, if he has made use of the subject itself of which he assigns the property, or of some of its belongings; for then the property will not be correctly established.
Τοῦ γὰρ μαθεῖν χάριν ἀποδίδοται τὸ ἴδιον· αὐτὸ μὲν οὖν αὑτῷ ὁμοίως ἄγνωστόν ἐστι, τὸ δέ τι τῶν αὐτοῦ ὕστερον·
For the property is assigned for the sake of understanding; now the subject itself is equally unknown as itself, and any of its belongings is posterior; therefore it is not more known.
οὔκουν ἐστὶ γνωριμώτερον. Ὥστ᾿ οὐ γίνεται διὰ τούτων μᾶλλόν τι μαθεῖν.
Consequently, it does not happen that anything is more understood through these.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ εἴπας ζῴου ἴδιον οὐσίαν ἧς εἶδός ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος τινὶ προσκέχρηται τῶν τούτου, οὐκ ἂν εἴη καλῶς κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον.
For instance, since he who has said that the property of animal is "substance of which man is a species" has used some of its belongings, the property would not be correctly established.
Κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ μήτε αὐτῷ μήτε τῶν αὐτοῦ μηδενὶ χρῆται. Ἔσται γὰρ καλῶς κατὰ τοῦτο κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον.
And for establishing, if he uses neither the subject itself nor any of its belongings; for then the property will be correctly established in this respect.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ θεὶς ζῴου ἴδιον τὸ ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος συγκείμενον οὔτε αὐτῷ οὔτε τῶν αὐτοῦ οὐδενὶ προσκέχρηται, εἴη ἂν καλῶς κατὰ τοῦτο ἀποδεδομένον τὸ τοῦ ζῴου ἴδιον.
For instance, since he who has laid down that the property of animal is "that which is composed of soul and body" has used neither the subject itself nor any of its belongings, the property of animal would be correctly assigned in this respect.
Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων σκεπτέον ἐστὶ τῶν μὴ ποιούντων ἢ ποιούντων γνωριμώτερον, ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἴ τινι προσκέχρηται ἢ ἀντικειμένῳ ἢ ὅλως ἅμα τῇ φύσει ἢ ὑστέρῳ τινί· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται καλῶς κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον.
In the same way, one must also consider in the case of other things that do not or do make a thing more known: for refuting, if he has made use of something either opposite, or altogether simultaneous by nature, or posterior; for then the property will not be correctly established.
Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀντικείμενον ἅμα τῇ φύσει, τὸ δ᾿ ἅμα τῇ φύσει καὶ τὸ ὕστερον οὐ ποιεῖ γνωριμώτερον.
For the opposite is simultaneous by nature, and what is simultaneous by nature and what is posterior do not make a thing more known.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ εἴπας ἀγαθοῦ ἴδιον ὃ κακῷ μάλιστ᾿ ἀντίκειται, τῷ ἀντικειμένῳ προσκέχρηται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καλῶς ἀποδεδομένον τὸ ἴδιον.
For instance, since he who has said that the property of good is "that which is most opposite to bad" has made use of the opposite of good, the property of good would not be correctly assigned.
Κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ μηδενὶ προσκέχρηται μήτ᾿ ἀντικειμένῳ μήτε ὅλως ἅμα τῇ φύσει μήθ᾿ ὑστέρῳ· ἔσται γὰρ κατὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ἀποδεδομένον τὸ ἴδιον.
And for establishing, if he has made use of nothing either opposite, or altogether simultaneous by nature, or posterior; for then the property will be correctly assigned in this respect.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ θεὶς ἐπιστήμης ἴδιον ὑπόληψιν τὴν πιστοτάτην οὐδενὶ προσκέχρηται οὔτ᾿ ἀντικειμένῳ οὔθ᾿ ἅμα τῇ φύσει οὔθ᾿ ὑστέρῳ, εἴη ἂν κατὰ τοῦτο καλῶς κείμενον τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἴδιον.
For instance, since he who has laid down that the property of knowledge is "conception which is the most trustworthy" has made use of nothing either opposite, or simultaneous by nature, or posterior, the property of knowledge would be correctly established in this respect.
Ἔπειτ᾿ ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ τὸ μὴ ἀεὶ παρεπόμενον ἴδιον ἀποδέδωκεν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ὃ γίνεταί ποτε μὴ ἴδιον· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται καλῶς εἰρημένον τὸ ἴδιον.
Next, for refuting, if he has assigned a property that does not always accompany, but that which at some time becomes not a property; for then the property will not be correctly stated.
Οὔτε γὰρ ἐφ᾿ ᾧ καταλαμβάνομεν ὑπάρχον αὐτό; κατὰ τούτου καὶ τοὔνομα ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀληθεύεται· οὔτ᾿ ἐφ᾿ ᾧ καταλαμβάνεται μὴ ὑπάρχον, κατὰ τούτου ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐ ῥηθήσεται τοὔνομα.
For neither in the case of that which we apprehend it to belong to, is the name also necessarily true of it; nor in the case of that which it is apprehended not to belong to, will the name necessarily not be said of it.
Ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις οὐδ᾿ ὅτε ἀποδέδωκε τὸ ἴδιον, ἔσται φανερὸν εἰ ὑπάρχει, εἴπερ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν οἷον ἀπολείπειν.
And furthermore, in addition to this, not even when he has assigned the property will it be manifest whether it belongs, if it is of such a kind as to leave the subject.
Οὔκουν ἔσται σαφὲς τὸ ἴδιον.
Therefore, the property will not be clear.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ θεὶς ζῴου ἴδιον τὸ κινεῖσθαί ποτε καὶ ἑστάναι τοιοῦτον ἀποδέδωκε τὸ ἴδιον ὃ οὐ γίνεταί ποτε ἴδιον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη καλῶς κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον.
For instance, since he who has laid down that the property of animal is "to move at some time and to stand still" has assigned such a property as at some time becomes not a property, the property would not be correctly established.
Κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀεὶ ὂν ἴδιον ἀποδέδωκεν· ἔσται γὰρ καλῶς κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον κατὰ τοῦτο.
And for establishing, if he has assigned a property that is of necessity always present; for then the property will be correctly established in this respect.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ θεὶς ἀρετῆς ἴδιον ὃ τὸν ἔχοντα ποιεῖ σπουδαῖον τὸ ἀεὶ παρεπόμενον ἴδιον ἀποδέδωκεν, εἴη ἂν κατὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ἀποδεδομένον τὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἴδιον.
For instance, since he who has laid down that the property of virtue is "that which makes its possessor excellent" has assigned a property that always accompanies, the property of virtue would be correctly assigned in this respect.
Ἔπειτ᾿ ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ τὸ νῦν ἴδιον ἀποδιδοὺς μὴ διωρίσατο ὅτι τὸ νῦν ἴδιον ἀποδίδωσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται καλῶς κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον.
Next, for refuting, if in assigning a property of the present moment he has not distinguished that he assigns a property of the present moment; for then the property will not be correctly established.
Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἔθος γινόμενον ἅπαν διορισμοῦ προσδεῖται· εἰώθασι δ᾿ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πάντες τὸ ἀεὶ παρακολουθοῦν ἴδιον ἀποδιδόναι.
For first, everything that occurs contrary to custom requires a distinction; and everyone is accustomed for the most part to assign a property that always accompanies.
Δεύτερον δὲ ἄδηλός ἐστιν ὁ μὴ διορισάμενος εἰ τὸ νῦν ἴδιον ἐβούλετο θεῖναι· οὔκουν δοτέον ἐστὶν ἐπιτιμήσεως σκῆψιν.
Secondly, he who has not made the distinction is unclear as to whether he wished to lay down a property of the present moment; therefore, one must not give him an excuse to escape censure.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ θέμενος τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον τὸ καθῆσθαι μετά τινος τὸ νῦν ἴδιον τίθησιν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη καλῶς τὸ ἴδιον ἀποδεδωκώς, εἴπερ μὴ διορισάμενος εἶπεν.
For instance, since he who has laid down as the property of a certain man "to sit with someone" sets down a property of the present moment, he would not have correctly assigned the property, if indeed he said so without having made the distinction.
Κατασκευάζοντα δ᾿ εἰ τὸ νῦν ἴδιον ἀποδιδοὺς διορισάμενος ἔθηκεν ὅτι τὸ νῦν ἴδιον τίθησιν· ἔσται γὰρ καλῶς κείμενον κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ ἴδιον.
And for establishing, if in assigning a property of the present moment he has laid it down having made the distinction that he sets down a property of the present moment; for then the property will be correctly established in this respect.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ εἴπας τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον τὸ περιπατεῖν νῦν διαστειλάμενος ἔθηκε τοῦτο, καλῶς ἂν εἴη κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον.
For instance, since he who has said that the property of a certain man is "to walk now" has laid this down having made the distinction, the property would be correctly established.