§5.2#2Ἔπειτ᾿ ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ πλεοναχῶς λέγεται τοῦτο οὗ τὸ ἴδιον ἀποδίδωσι, μὴ διώρισται δὲ τὸ τίνος αὐτῶν ἴδιον τίθησιν·
Next, for refuting, if that of which he assigns the property is used in several senses, and it has not been distinguished of which of them he lays down the property; for then the property will not be correctly assigned.
οὐ γὰρ ἔσται καλῶς ἀποδεδομένον τὸ ἴδιον. Δι᾿ ἃς δ᾿ αἰτίας, οὐκ ἄδηλόν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν πρότερον εἰρημένων· τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν.
For what reasons this is so is not unclear from what has been said before; for the same consequences must necessarily follow.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι τοῦτο πολλὰ σημαίνει (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν αὐτό, τὸ δ᾿ ἐπιστήμῃ χρῆσθαι αὐτό, τὸ δ᾿ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι αὐτοῦ, τὸ δ᾿ ἐπιστήμῃ χρῆσθαι αὐτοῦ), οὐκ ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι τοῦτο καλῶς ἴδιον ἀποδεδομένον μὴ διορισθέντος τοῦ τίνος τίθησιν αὐτῶν τὸ ἴδιον.
For instance, since "to know this" signifies many things (for one is its having knowledge itself, another, its using knowledge itself, another, there being knowledge of it, and another, there being use of knowledge of it), the property of "knowing this" would not be correctly assigned if it has not been distinguished of which of them he lays down the property.
Κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ μὴ λέγεται πολλαχῶς τοῦτο οὗ τὸ ἴδιον τίθησιν, ἀλλ᾿ ἔστιν ἓν καὶ ἁπλοῦν· ἔσται γὰρ καλῶς κατὰ τοῦτο κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον.
And for establishing, if that of which he lays down the property is not used in several senses, but is one and simple; for then the property will be correctly established in this respect.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος λέγεται ἕν, εἴη ἂν καλῶς κείμενον κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον τὸ ζῷον ἥμερον φύσει.
For instance, since "man" is said in one sense, "an animal by nature tame" would be a property of man correctly established in this respect.
Ἔπειτ᾿ ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ πλεονάκις εἴρηται τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ.
Next, for refuting, if the same thing has been stated several times in the property.
Πολλάκις γὰρ λανθάνουσι τοῦτο ποιοῦντες καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὅροις.
For they often do this without realizing it in properties as well, just as also in definitions.
Οὐκ ἔσται δὲ καλῶς κείμενον τὸ τοῦτο πεπονθὸς ἴδιον· ταράττει γὰρ τὸν ἀκούοντα πλεονάκις λεχθέν· ἀσαφὲς οὖν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι γίνεσθαι, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἀδολεσχεῖν δοκοῦσιν.
And the property that has suffered this will not be correctly established; for what is said several times confuses the hearer; it must therefore necessarily become unclear, and in addition to this, they seem to talk idly.
Ἔσται δὲ συμπῖπτον τὸ πλεονάκις εἰπεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ δύο τρόπους, καθ᾿ ἕνα μὲν ὅταν ὀνομάσῃ πλεονάκις τὸ αὐτό, καθάπερ εἴ τις ἴδιον ἀποδοίη πυρὸς σῶμα τὸ λεπτότατον τῶν σωμάτων (οὗτος γὰρ πλεονάκις εἴρηκε τὸ σῶμα), δεύτερον δ᾿ ἄν τις μεταλαμβάνῃ τοὺς λόγους ἀντὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων, καθάπερ εἴ τις ἀποδοίη γῆς ἴδιον οὐσία ἡ μάλιστα κατὰ φύσιν φερομένη τῶν σωμάτων εἰς τὸν κάτω τόπον, ἔπειτα μεταλάβοι ἀντὶ τῶν σωμάτων τὸ οὐσιῶν τοιωνδί· ἓν γὰρ καὶ ταὐτόν ἐστι σῶμα καὶ οὐσία τοιαδί.
And it will happen that the same thing is said several times in two ways: in one way, when one names the same thing several times, as if one should assign as a property of fire "body which is the most subtle of bodies" (for this person has said "body" several times); and in a second way, if one substitutes the definitions in place of the terms, as if one should assign as a property of earth "substance which of bodies is by nature most carried to the lower region", and then should substitute "of such substances" in place of "of bodies"; for "body" and "such substance" are one and the same.
Ἔσται γὰρ οὗτος τὸ οὐσία πλεονάκις εἰρηκώς, ὥστ᾿ οὐδέτερον ἂν εἴη καλῶς κείμενον τῶν ἰδίων.
For this person will have said "substance" several times, so that neither of the properties would be correctly established.
Κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ μηδενὶ χρῆται πλεονάκις ὀνόματι τῷ αὐτῷ· ἔσται γὰρ κατὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ἀποδεδομένον τὸ ἴδιον.
And for establishing, if one uses no term several times; for then the property will be correctly assigned in this respect.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ εἴπας ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον ζῷον ἐπιστήμης δεκτικὸν οὐ κέχρηται τῷ αὐτῷ πολλάκις ὀνόματι, εἴη ἂν κατὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ἀποδεδομένον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ἴδον.
For instance, since he who has said that the property of man is "animal receptive of knowledge" has not used the same term several times, the property of man would be correctly assigned in this respect.
Ἔπειτ᾿ ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ τοιοῦτόν τι ἀποδέδωκεν ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ ὄνομα, ὃ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει.
Next, for refuting, if he has assigned in the property some such term as belongs to all.
Ἀχρεῖον γὰρ ἔσται τὸ μὴ χωρίζον ἀπό τινων, τὸ δ᾿ ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις λεγόμενον χωρίζειν δεῖ, καθάπερ καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὅροις· οὔκουν ἔσται καλῶς κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον.
For what does not separate from some things will be useless, and what is said in properties must separate, just as also those in definitions; therefore the property will not be correctly established.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ θεὶς ἐπιστήμης ἴδιον ὑπόληψιν ἀμετάπειστον ὑπὸ λόγου, ἓν ὄν, τοιούτῳ τινὶ κέχρηται ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ τῷ ἑνὶ ὃ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἂν εἴη καλῶς κείμενον τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἴδιον.
For instance, since he who has laid down that the property of knowledge is "conception irreversible by argument, being one," has used in the property some such thing as "being one" which belongs to all, the property of knowledge would not be correctly established.
Κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ μηδενὶ κέχρηται κοινῷ, ἀλλ᾿ ἀπό τινος χωρίζοντι· ἔσται γὰρ καλῶς κείμενον κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ ἴδιον.
And for establishing, if he has used nothing common, but what separates from something; for then the property will be correctly established in this respect.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ εἴπας ζῴου ἴδιον τὸ ψυχὴν ἔχειν οὐδενὶ κέχρηται κοινῷ, εἴη ἂν κατὰ τοῦτο καλῶς κείμενον ζῴου ἴδιον τὸ ψυχὴν ἔχειν.
For instance, since he who has said that the property of animal is "to have a soul" has used nothing common, "to have a soul" would be a property of animal correctly established in this respect.
Ἔπειτ᾿ ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ πλείω ἴδια ἀποδίδωσι τοῦ αὐτοῦ, μὴ διορίσας ὅτι πλείω τίθησιν· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται καλῶς κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον.
Next, for refuting, if he assigns several properties of the same thing without having distinguished that he lays down several; for then the property will not be correctly established.
Καθάπερ γὰρ οὐδ᾿ ἐν τοῖς ὅροις δεῖ παρὰ τὸν δηλοῦντα λόγον τὴν οὐσίαν προσκεῖσθαί τι πλέον, οὕτως οὐδ᾿ ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις παρὰ τὸν ποιοῦντα λόγον ἴδιον τὸ ῥηθὲν οὐδὲν προσαποδοτέον· ἀχρεῖον γὰρ γίνεται τὸ τοιοῦτον.
For just as in definitions nothing extra must be added besides the definition that shows the essence, so also in properties nothing extra must be assigned besides the definition that makes the stated thing a property; for such a thing becomes useless.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ εἴπας ἴδιον πυρὸς σῶμα τὸ λεπτότατον καὶ κουφότατον πλείω ἀποδέδωκεν ἴδια (ἑκάτερον γὰρ κατὰ μόνου τοῦ πυρὸς ἀληθές ἐστιν εἰπεῖν), οὐκ ἂν εἴη καλῶς κείμενον ἴδιον πυρὸς σῶμα τὸ λεπτότατον καὶ κουφότατον.
For instance, since he who has said that the property of fire is "body which is the most subtle and lightest" has assigned several properties (for it is true to say each of these of fire alone), "body which is the most subtle and lightest" would not be a correctly established property of fire.
Κατασκευάζοντα δ᾿ εἰ μὴ πλείω τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὰ ἴδια ἀποδέδωκεν, ἀλλ᾿ ἕν· ἔσται γὰρ κατὰ τοῦτο καλῶς κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον.
And for establishing, if he has assigned not several properties of the same thing, but one; for then the property will be correctly established in this respect.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ εἴπας ὑγροῦ ἴδιον σῶμα τὸ εἰς ἅπαν σχῆμα ἀγόμενον ἓν ἀποδέδωκε τὸ ἴδιον ἀλλ᾿ οὐ πλείω, εἴη ἂν κατὰ τοῦτο καλῶς κείμενον τὸ τοῦ ὑγροῦ ἴδιον.
For instance, since he who has said that the property of liquid is "body that can be adapted to every shape" has assigned one property and not several, the property of liquid would be correctly established in this respect.