§5.2#1Πρῶτον μὲν εἰ μὴ καλῶς ἀποδέδοται τὸ ἴδιον ἢ καλῶς.
First, whether the property has been assigned correctly or not correctly.
Τοῦ δὲ μὴ καλῶς ἢ καλῶς ἐστὶν ἓν μέν, εἰ μὴ διὰ γνωριμωτέρων ἢ γνωριμωτέρων κεῖται τὸ ἴδιον, ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἰ μὴ διὰ γνωριμωτέρων, κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ διὰ γνωριμωτέρων.
Of its being assigned not correctly or correctly, one point is whether the property is established through what is not more familiar or more familiar; refuting if it is not through more familiar things, and establishing if it is through more familiar things.
Τοῦ δὲ μὴ διὰ γνωριμωτέρων ἐστὶ τὸ μέν, εἰ ὅλως ἀγνωστότερόν ἐστι τὸ ἴδιον ὃ ἀποδίδωσι τούτου οὗ τὸ ἴδιον εἴρηκεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται καλῶς κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον.
Of being not through more familiar things, one is if the property which he assigns is altogether more unknown than that of which he has stated the property; for then the property will not be correctly established.
Γνώσεως γὰρ ἕνεκα τὸ ἴδιον ποιούμεθα· διὰ γνωριμωτέρων οὖν ἀποδοτέον· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται κατανοεῖν ἱκανῶς μᾶλλον.
For we make a property for the sake of knowledge; therefore it must be assigned through more familiar things; for in this way it will be possible to understand it more adequately.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ θεὶς πυρὸς ἴδιον εἶναι τὸ ὁμοιότατον ψυχῇ ἀγνωστοτέρῳ κέχρηται τοῦ πυρὸς τῇ ψυχῇ (μᾶλλον γὰρ ἴσμεν τί ἐστι πῦρ ἢ ψυχή), οὐκ ἂν εἴη καλῶς κείμενον ἴδιον πυρὸς τὸ ὁμοιότατον ψυχῇ.
For instance, since he who has laid down that the property of fire is "the most similar to soul" has used "soul", which is more unknown than fire (for we know better what fire is than what soul is), "the most similar to soul" would not be a correctly established property of fire.
Τὸ δ᾿, εἰ μὴ γνωριμώτερόν ἐστι τόδε τῷδ᾿ ὑπάρχον.
The other is if it is not more familiar that this belongs to that.
Δεῖ γὰρ μὴ μόνον εἶναι γνωριμώτερον τοῦ πράγματος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι τῷδ᾿ ὑπάρχον γνωριμώτερον ὑπάρχει.
For it must not only be more familiar than the thing, but also that it belongs to this must be more familiarly belonging.
Ὁ γὰρ μὴ εἰδὼς εἰ τῷδ᾿ ὑπάρχει, οὐδ᾿ εἰ τῷδ᾿ ὑπάρχει μόνῳ γνωριεῖ, ὥσθ᾿ ὁποτέρου τούτων συμβάντος ἀσαφὲς γίνεται τὸ ἴδιον.
For he who does not know whether it belongs to this will not even know whether it belongs to this alone, so that if either of these occurs, the property becomes unclear.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ θεὶς πυρὸς ἴδιον τὸ ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ ψυχὴ πέφυκεν εἶναι ἀγνωστοτέρῳ κέχρηται τοῦ πυρὸς τῷ εἰ ἐν τούτῳ ὑπάρχει ψυχὴ καὶ εἰ ἐν πρώτῳ ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἂν εἴη καλῶς κείμενον ἴδιον πυρὸς τὸ ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ ψυχὴ πέφυκεν εἶναι.
For instance, since he who has laid down that the property of fire is "that in which soul is by nature first" has used what is more unknown than fire, namely, whether soul belongs to this and whether it belongs to it first, "that in which soul is by nature first" would not be a correctly established property of fire.
Κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ διὰ γνωριμωτέρων κεῖται τὸ ἴδιον, καὶ εἰ διὰ γνωριμωτέρων καθ᾿ ἑκάτερον τῶν τρόπων.
And establishing, if the property is established through more familiar things, and if through more familiar things in each of the ways.
Ἔσται γὰρ καλῶς κατὰ τοῦτο κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον· τῶν γὰρ κατασκευαστικῶν τόπων τοῦ καλῶς οἱ μὲν κατὰ τοῦτο μόνον οἱ δ᾿ ἁπλῶς δείξουσιν ὅτι καλῶς.
For the property will be correctly established in this respect; for of the constructive topics for correct assignment, some will show that it is correct in this respect only, others simply.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁ εἴπας ζῴου ἴδιον τὸ αἴσθησιν ἔχειν διὰ γνωριμωτέρων καὶ γνωριμώτερον ἀποδέδωκε τὸ ἴδιον καθ᾿ ἑκάτερον τῶν τρόπων, εἴη ἂν καλῶς ἀποδεδομένον κατὰ τοῦτο τοῦ ζῴου ἴδιον τὸ αἴσθησιν ἔχειν.
For instance, since he who has said that the property of animal is "to have sensation" has assigned the property through more familiar things and as more familiar in each of the ways, "to have sensation" would be a property of animal correctly assigned in this respect.
Ἔπειτ᾿ ἀνασκευάζοντα μὲν εἴ τι τῶν ὀνομάτων τῶν ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ ἀποδεδομένων πλεοναχῶς λέγεται ἢ καὶ ὅλος ὁ λόγος πλείω σημαίνει· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται καλῶς κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον.
Next, for refuting, if any of the terms assigned in the property is used in several senses, or if even the whole definition signifies several things; for then the property will not be correctly established.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι πλείω σημαίνει, ἓν μὲν τὸ αἴσθησιν ἔχειν ἓν δὲ τὸ αἰσθήσει χρῆσθαι, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τοῦ ζῴου ἴδιον καλῶς κείμενον τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι πεφυκός.
For instance, since "to perceive" signifies several things, one being "to have sensation" and another "to use sensation", "being by nature percipient" would not be a property of animal correctly established.
Διὰ τοῦτο δ᾿ οὐ χρηστέον ἐστὶν οὔτ᾿ ὀνόματι πλεοναχῶς λεγομένῳ οὔτε λόγῳ τῷ τὸ ἴδιον σημαίνοντι, διότι τὸ πλεοναχῶς λεγόμενον ἀσαφὲς ποιεῖ τὸ ῥηθέν, ἀποροῦντος τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐπιχειρεῖν πότερον λέγει τῶν πλεοναχῶς λεγομένων· τὸ γὰρ ἴδιον τοῦ μαθεῖν χάριν ἀποδίδοται.
And for this reason, one must not use either a term used in several senses or a definition that signifies the property, because what is used in several senses makes what is said unclear, since the person who is about to attack is in doubt as to which of the several senses he means; for the property is assigned for the sake of learning.
Ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἔλεγχόν τινα γίνεσθαι τοῖς οὕτως ἀποδιδοῦσι τὸ ἴδιον, ὅταν ἐπὶ τοῦ διαφωνοῦντός τις ποιῇ τὸν συλλογισμὸν τοῦ πλεοναχῶς λεγομένου.
In addition to these, it is necessary that a certain refutation occurs to those who assign the property in this way, when someone makes his syllogism based on the discordant meaning of the term used in several senses.
Κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ μὴ πλείω σημαίνει μήτε τῶν ὀνομάτων μηδὲν μήθ᾿ ὅλος ὁ λόγος· ἔσται γὰρ καλῶς κατὰ τοῦτο κείμενον τὸ ἴδιον.
And for establishing, if neither any of the terms nor the whole definition signifies several things; for then the property will be correctly established in this respect.
Οἷον ἐπεὶ οὔτε τὸ σῶμα πολλὰ δηλοῖ οὔτε τὸ εὐκινητότατον εἰς τὸν ἄνω τόπον οὔτε τὸ σύνολον τὸ ἐκ τούτων συντιθέμενον, εἴη ἂν καλῶς κείμενον κατὰ τοῦτο πυρὸς ἴδιον σῶμα τὸ εὐκινητότατον εἰς τὸν ἄνω τόπον.
For instance, since neither "body", nor "most easily movable into the upper region", nor the whole compounded of these points to several things, "body most easily movable into the upper region" would be a property of fire correctly established in this respect.