§5.1## Ε.
Πότερον δ᾿ ἴδιον ἢ οὐκ ἴδιόν ἐστι τὸ εἰρημένον, διὰ τῶνδε σκεπτέον.
Whether the assigned property is a property or not a property must be examined through the following.
Ἀποδίδοται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον ἢ καθ᾿ αὑτὸ καὶ ἀεὶ ἢ πρὸς ἕτερον καὶ ποτέ, οἷον καθ᾿ αὑτὸ μὲν ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῷον ἥμερον φύσει, πρὸς ἕτερον δὲ οἷον ψυχῆς πρὸς σῶμα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν προστακτικὸν τὸ δ᾿ ὑπηρετικόν ἐστιν, ἀεὶ δὲ οἷον θεοῦ τὸ ζῷον ἀθάνατον, ποτὲ δ᾿ οἷον τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου τὸ περιπατεῖν ἐν τῷ γυμνασίῳ. Ἔστι δὲ τὸ πρὸς ἕτερον ἴδιον ἀποδιδόμενον ἢ δύο προβλήματα ἢ τέτταρα.
A property is assigned either in itself and always, or relatively to something else and at some time; for example, in itself, that of man, "an animal by nature tame"; relatively to something else, as that of the soul to the body, that "the one is commanding and the other serving"; always, as that of God, "an immortal animal"; and at some time, as that of a particular man, "walking in the gymnasium." A property assigned relatively to something else is either two problems or four.
Ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ἀποδῷ τοῦ δ᾿ ἀρνήσηται ταὐτὸ τοῦτο, δύο μόνον προβλήματα γίνονται, καθάπερ τὸ ἀνθρώπου πρὸς ἵππον ἴδιον ὅτι δίπουν ἐστίν. Καὶ γὰρ ὅτι ἄνθρωπος οὐ δίπουν ἐστὶν ἐπιχειροίη τις ἄν, καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἵππος δίπουν· ἀμφοτέρως δ᾿ ἂν κινοῖ τὸ ἴδιον.
For if one assigns it of the one and denies it of the other, only two problems arise, just as the property of man relatively to horse, "being two-footed." For one could attack both that man is not two-footed and that the horse is two-footed; and in either way one would upset the property.
Ἐὰν δ᾿ ἑκατέρου ἑκάτερον ἀποδῷ καὶ ἑκατέρου ἀπαρνηθῇ, τέτταρα προβλήματα ἔσται, καθάπερ τὸ ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον πρὸς ἵππον, ὅτι τὸ μὲν δίπουν τὸ δὲ τετράπουν ἐστίν. Καὶ γὰρ ὅτι ἄνθρωπος οὐ δίπουν καὶ ὅτι τετράπουν πέφυκεν ἔστιν ἐπιχειρεῖν, καὶ διότι ὁ ἵππος δίπουν καὶ διότι οὐ τετράπουν οἷόν τ᾿ ἐπιχειρεῖν.
But if one assigns each of each and denies each of each, there will be four problems, just as the property of man relatively to horse, "that the one is two-footed and the other four-footed." For one can attack both that man is not two-footed and that he is by nature four-footed, and it is possible to attack both that the horse is two-footed and that it is not four-footed.
Ὅπως δ᾿ οὖν δειχθέντος ἀναιρεῖται τὸ προκείμενον.
In whatever way, then, this is shown, the proposition is refuted.
Ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν καθ᾿ αὑτὸ ἴδιον ὃ πρὸς ἅπαντα ἀποδίδοται καὶ παντὸς χωρίζει, καθάπερ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῷον θνητὸν ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν. Τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἕτερον ὃ μὴ ἀπὸ παντὸς ἀλλ᾿ ἀπό τινος τακτοῦ διορίζει, καθάπερ ἀρετῆς πρὸς ἐπιστήμην, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐν πλείοσι, τὸ δ᾿ ἐν λογιστικῷ μόνον καὶ τοῖς ἔχουσι λογιστικὸν πέφυκε γίνεσθαι. Τὸ δ᾿ ἀεὶ ὃ κατὰ πάντα χρόνον ἀληθεύεται καὶ μηδέποτ᾿ ἀπολείπεται, καθάπερ τοῦ ζῴου τὸ ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος συγκείμενον. Τὸ δὲ ποτὲ ὃ κατά τινα χρόνον ἀληθεύεται καὶ μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀεὶ παρέπεται, καθάπερ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου τὸ περιπατεῖν ἐν ἀγορᾷ. Ἔστι δὲ τὸ πρὸς ἄλλο ἴδιον ἀποδοῦναι τὸ διαφορὰν εἰπεῖν ἢ ἐν ἅπασι καὶ ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις, οἷον ἐν ἅπασι μὲν καὶ ἀεί, καθάπερ τὸ ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον πρὸς ἵππον ὅτι δίπουν· ἄνθρωπος μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ πᾶς ἐστὶ δίπους, ἵππος δ᾿ οὐδείς ἐστι δίπους οὐδέποτε.
A property in itself is that which is assigned relatively to all things and distinguishes from everything, just as that of man, "a mortal animal capable of receiving knowledge." A relative property is that which distinguishes not from everything but from some definite thing, just as that of virtue relatively to knowledge, "that the one is by nature produced in more things, and the other only in the rational part and in those that have the rational part." An always property is that which is true at all times and is never absent, just as that of an animal, "being composed of soul and body." A temporary property is that which is true at some time and does not follow of necessity always, just as that of a particular man, "walking in the marketplace." To assign a property relatively to another thing is to state a difference either in all cases and always, or for the most part and in most cases; for example, in all cases and always, just as the property of man relatively to horse, "being two-footed"; for man is always and every man is two-footed, and no horse is ever two-footed.
Ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις, καθάπερ τὸ λογιστικοῦ ἴδιον πρὸς ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ θυμικὸν τῷ τὸ μὲν προστάττειν τὸ δ᾿ ὑπηρετεῖν· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ λογιστικὸν πάντοτε προστάττει, ἀλλ᾿ ἐνίοτε καὶ προστάττεται, οὔτε τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ θυμικὸν ἀεὶ προστάττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστάττει ποτέ, ὅταν ᾖ μοχθηρὰ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.
And for the most part and in most cases, just as the property of the rational part relatively to the appetitive and the spirited parts, "by the one commanding and the other serving"; for neither does the rational part always command, but sometimes it is also commanded, nor are the appetitive and spirited parts always commanded, but they also command sometimes, when the soul of the man is depraved.
Τῶν δ᾿ ἰδίων ἐστὶ λογικὰ μάλιστα τά τε καθ᾿ αὑτὰ καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ τὰ πρὸς ἕτερον.
Of properties, those in themselves, those always, and those relative to something else are the most dialectical.
Τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἕτερον ἴδιον πλείω προβλήματά ἐστι, καθάπερ εἴπομεν καὶ πρότερον· ἢ γὰρ δύο ἢ τέτταρα ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνονται τὰ προβλήματα· πλείους οὖν οἱ λόγοι γίνονται πρὸς ταῦτα.
For a relative property constitutes more problems, as we said before; for the problems of necessity become either two or four; therefore, more arguments arise in relation to these.
Τὸ δὲ καθ᾿ αὑτὸ καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ πρὸς πολλὰ ἔστιν ἐπιχειρεῖν ἢ πρὸς πλείους χρόνους παρατηρεῖν, τὸ μὲν καθ᾿ αὑτὸ πρὸς πολλά· πρὸς ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν ὄντων δεῖ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ τὸ ἴδιον, ὥστ᾿ εἰ μὴ πρὸς ἅπαντα χωρίζεται, οὐκ ἂν εἴη καλῶς ἀποδεδομένον τὸ ἴδον.
But it is possible to attack a property in itself and an always property in relation to many things, or to observe them in relation to more times: a property in itself in relation to many things, for the property must belong to it in relation to each of existing things, so that if it does not distinguish from all, the property would not have been well assigned.
Τὸ δ᾿ ἀεὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς χρόνους τηρεῖν· κἂν γὰρ εἰ μὴ ὑπάρχει κἂν εἰ μὴ ὑπῆρξε κἂν εἰ μὴ ὑπάρξει, οὐκ ἔσται ἴδιον.
And an always property must be observed in relation to many times; for both if it does not belong, and if it did not belong, and if it will not belong, it will not be a property.
Τὸ δὲ ποτὲ οὐκ ἐν ἄλλοις ἢ πρὸς τὸν νῦν λεγόμενον χρόνον ἐπισκοποῦμεν· οὔκουν εἰσὶ λόγοι πρὸς αὐτὸ πολλοί.
But a temporary property we examine not in relation to other times but in relation to the time now spoken of; therefore, there are not many arguments in relation to it.
λογικὸν δὲ τοῦτ᾿ ἐστὶ πρόβλημα πρὸς ὃ λόγοι γένοιντ᾿ ἂν καὶ συχνοὶ καὶ καλοί.
And a dialectical problem is that in relation to which numerous and good arguments could arise.
Τὸ μὲν οὖν πρὸς ἕτερον ἴδιον ῥηθὲν ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τόπων ἐπισκεπτέον ἐστίν, εἰ τῷ μὲν συμβέβηκε τῷ δὲ μὴ συμβέβηκεν· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀεὶ καὶ τῶν καθ᾿ αὑτὸ διὰ τῶνδε θεωρητέον.
Therefore, a property stated relatively to something else must be examined from the topics concerning the accident, as to whether it belongs as an accident to the one and does not belong as an accident to the other; but concerning those always and those in themselves, we must observe through the following.