§4.6#2Ἀναιροῦντι μὲν οὖν καθάπερ εἴρηται χρηστέον· κατασκευάζοντι δέ, εἰ μὲν ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον τό τε ἀποδοθὲν γένος καὶ τὸ εἶδος, οὐ χρήσιμος ὁ τόπος·
Therefore, for one who is refuting, one must use the topics as has been said; but for one who is establishing, if both the assigned genus and the species admit of "more", the topic is not useful.
οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει ἀμφοτέρων ἐπιδεχομένων μὴ εἶναι θάτερον θατέρου γένος.
For nothing prevents, even though both admit of it, one not being the genus of the other.
Τό τε γὰρ καλὸν καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον, καὶ οὐδέτερον οὐδετέρου γένος.
For both the beautiful and the white admit of "more", and neither is the genus of the other.
Ἡ δὲ τῶν γενῶν καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα σύγκρισις χρήσιμος, οἷον εἰ ὁμοίως τόδε καὶ τόδε γένος, εἰ θάτερον γένος, καὶ θάτερον.
But the comparison of genera and of species with one another is useful; as, for example, if this and this are similarly a genus, if the one is a genus, the other is too.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ τὸ ἧττον καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον, οἷον εἰ τῆς ἐγκρατείας μᾶλλον ἡ δύναμις ἢ ἡ ἀρετὴ γένος, ἡ δ᾿ ἀρετὴ γένος, καὶ ἡ δύναμις.
And similarly also if it is the less and the more; as, for example, if capacity is more a genus of self-control than virtue is, and virtue is a genus, capacity is too.
τὰ δ᾿ αὐτὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἴδους ἁρμόσει λέγεσθαι.
And the same things will also fit to be said in the case of the species.
Εἰ γὰρ ὁμοίως τόδε καὶ τόδε τοῦ προκειμένου εἶδος, εἰ θάτερον εἶδος, καὶ τὸ λοιπόν· καὶ εἰ τὸ ἧττον δοκοῦν εἶδός ἐστι, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον.
For if this and this are similarly a species of the subject, if the one is a species, the remaining one is too; and if that which seems less to be a species is so, that which seems more is too.
Ἔτι πρὸς τὸ κατασκευάζειν σκεπτέον εἰ καθ᾿ ὧν ἀπεδόθη τὸ γένος, ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖται, μὴ ὄντος ἑνὸς τοῦ ἀποδοθέντος εἴδους, ἀλλὰ πλειόνων καὶ διαφόρων· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι γένος ἔσται.
Furthermore, for establishing, one must examine if the genus is predicated in the "what it is" of those things of which it was assigned, when the assigned species is not one, but more and different; for it is clear that it will be a genus.
Εἰ δ᾿ ἓν τὸ ἀποδοθὲν εἶδός ἐστι, σκοπεῖν εἰ καὶ κατ᾿ ἄλλων εἰδῶν τὸ γένος ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖται· πάλιν γὰρ συμβήσεται κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ διαφόρων αὐτὸ κατηγορεῖσθαι.
But if the assigned species is one, one must examine if the genus is predicated in the "what it is" also of other species; for again it will happen that it is predicated of more and different things.
Ἐπεὶ δὲ δοκεῖ τισὶ καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι τῶν εἰδῶν κατηγορεῖσθαι, χωριστέον τὸ γένος ἀπὸ τῆς διαφορᾶς χρώμενον τοῖς εἰρημένοις στοιχείοις, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι τὸ γένος ἐπὶ πλέον λέγεται τῆς διαφορᾶς, εἶθ᾿ ὅτι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ τί ἐστιν ἀπόδοσιν μᾶλλον ἁρμόττει τὸ γένος ἢ τὴν διαφορὰν εἰπεῖν· ὁ γὰρ ζῷον εἴπας τὸν ἄνθρωπον μᾶλλον δηλοῖ τί ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὁ πεζόν.
And since it seems to some that the difference also is predicated in the "what it is" of the species, one must distinguish the genus from the difference by using the stated elements: first, because the genus is said of a wider extent than the difference, and secondly, because in the rendering of the "what it is" it is more fitting to state the genus than the difference; for he who calls man an "animal" shows what man is more than he who calls him "pedestrian".
Καὶ ὅτι ἡ μὲν διαφορὰ ποιότητα τοῦ γένους ἀεὶ σημαίνει, τὸ δὲ γένος τῆς διαφορᾶς οὔ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ εἴπας πεζὸν ποιόν τι ζῷον λέγει, ὁ δὲ ζῷον εἴπας οὐ λέγει ποιόν τι πεζόν.
And because the difference always signifies a quality of the genus, but the genus does not signify a quality of the difference; for he who says "pedestrian" says what kind of "animal" it is, but he who says "animal" does not say what kind of "pedestrian" it is.
Τὴν μὲν οὖν διαφορὰν ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους οὕτω χωριστέον.
Thus, then, the difference must be distinguished from the genus.
Ἐπεὶ δὲ δοκεῖ τὸ μουσικόν, ᾗ μουσικόν ἐστιν, ἐπιστῆμόν τ᾿ εἶναι καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ ἐπιστήμη τις εἶναι, καὶ εἰ τὸ βαδίζον τῷ βαδίζειν κινεῖται, ἡ βάδισις κίνησίς τις εἶναι, σκοπεῖν ἐν ᾧ ἂν γένει βούλῃ τι κατασκευάσαι, τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον, οἷον εἰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ὅπερ πίστιν, εἰ ὁ ἐπιστάμενος ᾗ ἐπίσταται πιστεύει· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἡ ἐπιστήμη πίστις ἄν τις εἴη.
And since the musical person, insofar as he is musical, seems to be knowledgeable, and music seems to be a certain knowledge, and if that which walks is moved by walking, walking seems to be a certain movement, one must examine, in whatever genus one wishes to establish something, in the stated manner, as, for example, if one wishes to establish knowledge as a belief, whether the one who knows, insofar as he knows, believes; for it is clear that knowledge would then be a certain belief.
Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων.
And in the same manner also in the case of other such things.
Ἔτι ἐπεὶ τὸ παρεπόμενόν τινι ἀεὶ καὶ μὴ ἀντιστρέφον χαλεπὸν χωρίσαι τοῦ μὴ γένος εἶναι, ἂν τόδε μὲν τῷδ᾿ ἕπηται παντί, τόδε δὲ τῷδε μὴ παντί, οἷον τῇ νηνεμίᾳ ἡ ἠρεμία καὶ τῷ ἀριθμῷ τὸ διαιρετόν, ἀνάπαλιν δ᾿ οὔ (τὸ γὰρ διαιρετὸν οὐ πᾶν ἀριθμός, οὐδ᾿ ἡ ἠρεμία νηνεμία), αὐτὸν μὲν χρῆσθαι ὡς γένους ὄντος τοῦ ἀεὶ ἀκολουθοῦντος, ὅταν μὴ ἀντιστρέφῃ θάτερον, ἄλλου δὲ προτείνοντος μὴ ἐπὶ πάντων ὑπακούειν.
Furthermore, since that which always follows something and does not convert is difficult to distinguish from not being a genus—if this follows all of that, but that does not follow all of this (as, for example, stillness follows windlessness, and divisibility follows number, but not vice versa, for not everything divisible is a number, nor is every stillness windlessness)—one should oneself use the always accompanying thing as being a genus, when the other does not convert, but when another person proposes it, one should not agree in all cases.
Ἔνστασις δ᾿ αὐτοῦ ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὂν ἕπεται παντὶ τῷ γινομένῳ (τὸ γὰρ γινόμενον οὐκ ἔστι) καὶ οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει (οὐ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ μὴ ὂν γίνεται), ἀλλ᾿ ὅμως οὐκ ἔστι γένος τὸ μὴ ὂν τοῦ γινομένου· ἁπλῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἴδη.
And an objection to this is that non-being follows everything that comes to be (for that which is coming to be is not) and does not convert (for not everything that is not is coming to be), but nevertheless non-being is not the genus of that which comes to be; for absolutely there are no species of non-being.
Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ γένους, καθάπερ εἴρηται, μετιτέον.
Therefore, concerning the genus, as has been said, one must proceed.