§4.5#2Ὁρᾶν δὲ καὶ εἴ τι τῶν ψεκτῶν ἢ φευκτῶν εἰς δύναμιν ἢ τὸ δυνατὸν ἔθηκεν, οἷον τὸν σοφιστὴν ἢ διάβολον ἢ κλέπτην τὸν δυνάμενον τὰ ἀλλότρια ὑφαιρεῖσθαι ἢ δυνάμενον διαβάλλειν ἢ σοφίζεσθαι.
One must also see if one has placed something of those things that are blameworthy or to be avoided into a capacity or into that which is capable; as, for example, if one called a sophist, a slanderer, or a thief one who is capable of stealing other people's goods, or capable of slandering, or of sophitizing.
Οὐδεὶς γὰρ τῶν εἰρημένων τῷ δυνατὸς εἶναί τι τούτων τοιοῦτος λέγεται· δύναται μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος τὰ φαῦλα δρᾶν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ εἰσὶ τοιοῦτοι· πάντες γὰρ οἱ φαῦλοι κατὰ προαίρεσιν λέγονται.
For none of those mentioned is called such by being capable of doing any of these things; for both God and the virtuous man are capable of doing bad things, but they are not of such a kind; for all bad men are so called according to their choice.
Ἔτι πᾶσα δύναμις τῶν αἱρετῶν· καὶ γὰρ αἱ τῶν φαύλων δυνάμεις αἱρεταί, διὸ καὶ τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον ἔχειν φαμὲν αὐτάς· δυνατοὺς γὰρ εἶναι τὰ φαῦλα πράσσειν.
Furthermore, every capacity belongs to those things that are desirable; for even the capacities for bad things are desirable, which is why we say that God and the virtuous man have them; for they are capable of doing bad things.
Ὥστ᾿ οὐδενὸς ἂν εἴη ψεκτοῦ γένος ἡ δύναμις.
So that capacity would not be the genus of any blameworthy thing.
Εἰ δὲ μή, συμβήσεται τῶν ψεκτῶν τι αἱρετὸν εἶναι· ἔσται γάρ τις δύναμις ψεκτή.
Otherwise, it will happen that something of the blameworthy things is desirable; for there will be some blameworthy capacity.
Καὶ εἴ τι τῶν δι᾿ αὑτὸ τιμίων ἢ αἱρετῶν εἰς δύναμιν ἢ τὸ δυνατὸν ἢ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἔθηκεν.
And see if one has placed something of those things that are honorable or desirable for their own sake into a capacity, or into that which is capable, or into that which is productive.
Πᾶσα γὰρ δύναμις καὶ πᾶν τὸ δυνατὸν ἢ τὸ ποιητικὸν δι᾿ ἄλλο αἱρετόν.
For every capacity and everything capable or productive is desirable for the sake of something else.
Ἢ εἴ τι τῶν ἐν δύο γένεσιν ἢ πλείοσιν εἰς θάτερον ἔθηκεν.
Or if one has placed something that belongs to two or more genera into only one of them.
Ἔνια γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς ἓν γένος θεῖναι, οἷον τὸν φένακα καὶ τὸν διάβολον· οὔτε γὰρ ὁ προαιρούμενος ἀδυνατῶν δέ, οὔθ᾿ ὁ δυνάμενος μὴ προαιρούμενος δὲ διάβολος ἢ φέναξ, ἀλλ᾿ ὁ ἄμφω ταῦτα ἔχων.
For some things cannot be placed into a single genus, as, for example, a cheat and a slanderer; for neither is he who chooses but is unable, nor is he who is able but does not choose, a slanderer or a cheat, but rather he who has both of these.
Ὥστ᾿ οὐ θετέον εἰς ἓν γένος ἀλλ᾿ εἰς ἀμφότερα τὰ εἰρημένα.
So that they must not be placed into a single genus, but into both of the genera mentioned.
Ἔτι ἐνίοτε ἀνάπαλιν τὸ μὲν γένος ὡς διαφορὰν τὴν δὲ διαφορὰν ὡς γένος ἀποδιδόασιν, οἷον τὴν ἔκπληξιν ὑπερβολὴν θαυμασιότητος καὶ τὴν πίστιν σφοδρότητα ὑπολήψεως.
Furthermore, sometimes they render, conversely, the genus as a difference and the difference as a genus, as, for example, calling amazement an excess of wonder, and conviction a vehemence of belief.
Οὔτε γὰρ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ οὔθ᾿ ἡ σφοδρότης γένος, ἀλλὰ διαφορά· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ ἔκπληξις θαυμασιότης γένος, ἀλλὰ διαφορά· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ ἔκπληξις θαυμασιότης εἶναι ὑπερβάλλουσα καὶ ἡ πίστις ὑπόληψις σφοδρά, ὥστε γένος ἡ θαυμασιότης καὶ ἡ ὑπόληψις, ἡ δ᾿ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ σφοδρότης διαφορά.
For neither excess nor vehemence is a genus, but rather a difference; for amazement seems to be a wonder, but a difference [is added]; for amazement seems to be an exceeding wonder, and conviction a vehement belief, so that wonder and belief are the genus, and excess and vehemence the difference.
Ἔτι εἴ τις τὴν ὑπερβολὴν καὶ σφοδρότητα ὡς γένος ἀποδώσει, τὰ ἄψυχα πιστεύσει καὶ ἐκπλαγήσεται.
Furthermore, if anyone renders excess and vehemence as a genus, inanimate things will believe and be amazed.
Ἡ γὰρ ἑκάστου σφοδρότης, καὶ ὑπερβολὴ πάρεστιν ἐκείνῳ οὗ ἐστὶ σφοδρότης καὶ ὑπερβολή.
For the vehemence and excess of each thing are present in that of which they are the vehemence and excess.
Εἰ οὖν ἡ ἔκπληξις ὑπερβολή ἐστι θαυμασιότητος, παρέσται τῇ θαυμασιότητι ἡ ἔκπληξις, ὥσθ᾿ ἡ θαυμασιότης ἐκπλαγήσεται.
If, then, amazement is an excess of wonder, amazement will be present in wonder, so that wonder will be amazed.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ πίστις παρέσται τῇ ὑπολήψει, εἴπερ σφοδρότης ὑπολήψεώς ἐστιν, ὥστε ἡ ὑπόληψις πιστεύσει.
And similarly also conviction will be present in belief, if indeed it is a vehemence of belief, so that belief will believe.
Ἔτι συμβήσεται τῷ οὕτως ἀποδιδόντι σφοδρότητα σφοδρὰν λέγειν καὶ ὑπερβολὴν ὑπερβάλλουσαν.
Furthermore, for one who renders it thus, it will happen that he says that vehemence is vehement, and excess is exceeding.
Ἔστι γὰρ πίστις σφοδρά· εἰ οὖν ἡ πίστις σφοδρότης ἐστί, σφοδρότης ἂν εἴη σφοδρά.
For conviction is vehement; if, then, conviction is vehemence, vehemence would be vehement.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἔκπληξίς ἐστιν ὑπερβάλλουσα· εἰ οὖν ἡ ἔκπληξις ὑπερβολή ἐστιν, ὑπερβολὴ ἂν εἴη ὑπερβάλλουσα·
And similarly also amazement is exceeding; if, then, amazement is excess, excess would be exceeding.
Οὐ δοκεῖ δ᾿ οὐδέτερον τούτων, ὥσπερ οὐδ᾿ ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστητὸν οὐδὲ κίνησις κινούμενον.
But neither of these seems to be the case, just as neither is knowledge that which is known, nor movement that which is moved.
Ἐνίοτε δὲ διαμαρτάνουσι καὶ τὸ πάθος εἰς γένος τὸ πεπονθὸς τιθέντες, οἷον ὅσοι τὴν ἀθανασίαν ζωὴν ἀΐδιόν φασιν εἶναι· πάθος γάρ τι ζωῆς ἢ σύμπτωμα ἡ ἀθανασία ἔοικεν εἶναι.
Sometimes they also err by placing an affection into that which is affected as a genus, as, for example, those who say that immortality is everlasting life; for immortality seems to be a certain affection or accident of life.
Ὅτι δ᾿ ἀληθὲς τὸ λεγόμενον, δῆλον ἂν γένοιτο, εἴ τις συγχωρήσειεν ἐκ θνητοῦ τινὰ ἀθάνατον γίνεσθαι· οὐδεὶς γὰρ φήσει ἑτέραν αὐτὸν ζωὴν λαμβάνειν, ἀλλὰ σύμπτωμά τι ἢ πάθος αὐτῇ ταύτῃ παραγενέσθαι.
And that what is said is true would become clear if anyone should grant that someone becomes immortal from being mortal; for no one will say that he receives another life, but rather that a certain accident or affection has come to belong to this very life.
Ὥστ᾿ οὐ γένος ἡ ζωὴ τῆς ἀθανασίας.
So that life is not the genus of immortality.
Πάλιν εἰ τοῦ πάθους, οὗ ἐστὶ πάθος, ἐκεῖνο γένος φασὶν εἶναι, οἷον τὸ πνεῦμα ἀέρα κινούμενον.
Again, if they say that that of which it is an affection is the genus of the affection, as, for example, that wind is moving air.
Μᾶλλον γὰρ κίνησις ἀέρος τὸ πνεῦμα· ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἀὴρ διαμένει, ὅταν τε κινῆται καὶ ὅταν μένῃ.
For wind is rather a movement of air; for the same air remains both when it is moved and when it remains still.
Ὥστ᾿ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅλως ἀὴρ τὸ πνεῦμα· ἦν γὰρ ἂν καὶ μὴ κινουμένου τοῦ ἀέρος πνεῦμα, εἴπερ ὁ αὐτὸς ἀὴρ διαμένει ὅσπερ ἦν πνεῦμα.
So that wind is not air at all; for there would be wind even when the air is not moved, if indeed the same air which was wind remains.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων.
And similarly also in the other cases of this kind.
Εἰ δ᾿ ἄρα καὶ ἐπὶ τούτου δεῖ συγχωρῆσαι ὅτι ἀήρ ἐστι κινούμενος τὸ πνεῦμα, ἀλλ᾿ οὔτι κατὰ πάντων τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀποδεκτέον καθ᾿ ὧν μὴ ἀληθεύεται τὸ γένος, ἀλλ᾿ ἐφ᾿ ὅσων ἀληθῶς κατηγορεῖται τὸ ἀποδοθὲν γένος.
But if indeed in this case too one must grant that wind is moving air, yet one must not accept such a thing in all cases in which the genus is not truly predicated, but only in those where the assigned genus is truly predicated.
Ἐπ᾿ ἐνίων γὰρ οὐ δοκεῖ ἀληθεύεσθαι, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ πηλοῦ καὶ τῆς χιόνος.
For in some cases it does not seem to be truly predicated, as, for example, in the case of mud and snow.
Τὴν μὲν γὰρ χιόνα φασὶν ὕδωρ εἶναι πεπηγός, τὸν δὲ πηλὸν γῆν ὑγρῷ πεφυραμένην· ἔστι δ᾿ οὔθ᾿ ἡ χιὼν ὕδωρ οὔθ᾿ ὁ πηλὸς γῆ, ὥστ᾿ οὐκ ἂν εἴη γένος οὐδέτερον τῶν ἀποδοθέντων· δεῖ γὰρ τὸ γένος ἀληθεύεσθαι ἀεὶ κατὰ τῶν εἰδῶν.
For they say that snow is frozen water, and mud is earth kneaded with moisture; but snow is not water, nor is mud earth, so that neither of the assigned things would be a genus; for the genus must always be truly predicated of its species.
Ὁμοίως δ᾿ οὐδ᾿ ὁ οἶνός ἐστιν ὕδωρ σεσηπός, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φησὶ σαπὲν ἐν ξύλῳ ὕδωρ· ἁπλως γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὕδωρ.
And similarly also wine is not putrid water, as Empedocles says, 'water putrified in wood'; for it is simply not water.