§4.5#1Πάλιν εἰ τὴν ἕξιν εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἔθηκεν ἢ τὴν ἐνέργειαν εἰς τὴν ἕξιν, οἷον τὴν αἴσθησιν κίνησιν διὰ σώματος· ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις ἕξις, ἡ δὲ κίνησις ἐνέργεια.
Again, see if one has placed a state into an activity, or an activity into a state, as, for example, if one said that sensation is a movement through the body; for sensation is a state, whereas movement is an activity.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ τὴν μνήμην ἕξιν καθεκτικὴν ὑπολήψεως εἶπεν· οὐδεμία γὰρ μνήμη ἕξις, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐνέργεια.
And similarly also if one called memory a retention of a belief; for no memory is a state, but rather an activity.
Διαμαρτάνουσι δὲ καὶ οἱ τὴν ἕξιν εἰς τὴν ἀκολουθοῦσαν δύναμιν τάττοντες, οἷον τὴν πραότητα ἐγκράτειαν ὀργῆς καὶ τὴν ἀνδρίαν καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην φόβων καὶ κερδῶν·
They also make a mistake who arrange a state into its accompanying capacity, as, for example, if they called gentleness a self-control of anger, and courage and justice a self-control of fears and gains.
ἀνδρεῖος μὲν γὰρ καὶ πρᾶος ὁ ἀπαθὴς λέγεται, ἐγκρατὴς δ᾿ ὁ πάσχων καὶ μὴ ἀγόμενος.
For the brave and the gentle man are spoken of as unaffected, whereas the self-controlled man is one who feels passion but is not led by it.
Ἴσως μὲν οὖν ἀκολουθεῖ δύναμις ἑκατέρῳ τοιαύτη, ὥστ᾿ εἰ πάθοι, μὴ ἄγεσθαι ἀλλὰ κρατεῖν· οὐ μὴν τοῦτό γ᾿ ἐστὶ τῷ μὲν ἀνδρείῳ τῷ δὲ πράῳ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὅλως μὴ πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων μηδέν.
Perhaps, indeed, a capacity of such a kind accompanies each of them so that, if he should feel passion, he is not led but controls it; yet this is not what it is to be brave or gentle, but rather not to feel any such passion at all.
Ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ τὸ παρακολουθοῦν ὁπωσοῦν ὡς γένος τιθέασιν, οἷον τὴν λύπην τῆς ὀργῆς καὶ τὴν ὑπόληψιν τῆς πίστεως.
Sometimes they also place what accompanies in any way whatever as a genus, as, for example, pain of anger, and belief of conviction.
Ἄμφω γὰρ τὰ εἰρημένα παρακολουθεῖ μὲν τρόπον τινὰ τοῖς ἀποδοθεῖσιν εἴδεσιν, οὐδέτερον δ᾿ αὐτῶν γένος ἐστίν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὀργιζόμενος λυπεῖται προτέρας ἐν αὐτῷ τῆς λύπης γενομένης· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ὀργὴ τῆς λύπης, ἀλλ᾿ ἡ λύπη τῆς ὀργῆς αἰτία, ὥσθ᾿ ἁπλῶς ἡ ὀργὴ οὐκ ἔστι λύπη.
For both the things mentioned accompany in a way the species assigned, but neither of them is its genus; for the angry man feels pain because pain has first arisen in him; for anger is not the cause of pain, but pain is the cause of anger, so that anger is simply not pain.
Κατὰ ταῦτα δ᾿ οὐδ᾿ ἡ πίστις ὑπόληψις· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόληψιν καὶ μὴ πιστεύοντα ἔχειν.
Accordingly, neither is conviction belief; for it is possible for a person to have the same belief even when he does not believe.
Οὐκ ἐνδέχεται δ᾿, εἴπερ εἶδος ἡ πίστις ὑπολήψεως· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ αὐτὸ ἔτι διαμένειν, ἄνπερ ἐκ τοῦ εἴδους ὅλως μεταβάλῃ, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τὸ αὐτὸ ζῷον ὁτὲ μὲν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ὁτὲ δὲ μή.
But this is not possible if conviction is a species of belief; for it is impossible for the same thing still to remain if it should change entirely out of its species, just as it is impossible for the same animal to be at one time a man and at another not.
Ἂν δέ τις φῇ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸν ὑπολαμβάνοντα καὶ πιστεύειν, ἐπ᾿ ἴσον ἡ ὑπόληψις καὶ ἡ πίστις ῥηθήσεται, ὥστ᾿ οὐδ᾿ ἂν οὕτως εἴη γένος· ἐπὶ πλέον γὰρ δεῖ λέγεσθαι τὸ γένος.
But if anyone says that he who believes of necessity also has conviction, then belief and conviction will be spoken of as coextensive, so that even in this way it would not be a genus; for the genus must be spoken of as more extensive.
Ὁρᾶν δὲ καὶ εἰ ἔν τινι τῷ αὐτῷ πέφυκεν ἄμφω γίνεσθαι· ἐν ᾧ γὰρ τὸ εἶδος, καὶ τὸ γένος, οἷον ἐν ᾧ τὸ λευκόν, καὶ τὸ χρῶμα, καὶ ἐν ᾧ γραμματική, καὶ ἐπιστήμη.
One must also see if both naturally arise in some same thing; for where the species is, there also is the genus, as, for example, where white is, there also is color, and where grammar is, there also is knowledge.
Ἐὰν οὖν τις τὴν αἰσχύνην φόβον εἴπῃ ἢ τὴν ὀργὴν λύπην, οὐ συμβήσεται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ γένος ὑπάρχειν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἰσχύνη ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ, ὁ δὲ φόβος ἐν τῷ θυμοειδεῖ, καὶ ἡ μὲν λύπη ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ (ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ καὶ ἡ ἡδονή), ἡ δὲ ὀργὴ ἐν τῷ θυμοειδεῖ, ὥστ᾿ οὐ γένη τὰ ἀποδοθέντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τοῖς εἴδεσι πέφυκε γίνεσθαι.
If, then, anyone says that shame is fear, or that anger is pain, it will not happen that the species and the genus exist in the same thing; for shame is in the rational part, but fear is in the spirited part, and pain is in the appetitive part (for pleasure is also in this), while anger is in the spirited part. So that the things assigned are not genera, since they do not naturally arise in the same thing as the species.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ ἡ φιλία ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ, οὐκ ἂν εἴη βούλησίς τις· πᾶσα γὰρ βούλησις ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ.
And similarly also if friendship is in the appetitive part, it would not be a certain wish; for all wish is in the rational part.
Χρήσιμος δ᾿ ὁ τόπος καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμβεβηκός· ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γὰρ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ ᾧ συμβέβηκεν, ὥστ᾿ ἂν μὴ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ φαίνηται, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ συμβέβηκεν.
This commonplace rule is also useful for the accident; for the accident and that to which it is accidental are in the same thing, so that if they do not appear to be in the same thing, it is clear that it is not an accident.
Πάλιν εἰ κατά τι τὸ εἶδος τοῦ εἰρημένου γένους μετέχει· οὐ δοκεῖ γὰρ κατά τι μετέχεσθαι τὸ γένος· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος κατά τι ζῷον, οὐδ᾿ ἡ γραμματικὴ κατά τι ἐπιστήμη·
Again, see if the species participates in some respect in the genus mentioned; for the genus does not seem to be participated in some respect; for man is not in some respect an animal, nor is grammar in some respect knowledge.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
And similarly also in the other cases.
Σκοπεῖν οὖν εἰ ἐπί τινων κατά τι μετέχεται τὸ γένος, οἷον εἰ τὸ ζῷον ὅπερ αἰσθητὸν ἢ ὁρατὸν εἴρηται.
One must therefore examine if in some cases the genus is participated in some respect, as, for example, if animal has been called that which is sensible or visible.
Κατά τι γὰρ αἰσθητὸν ἢ ὁρατὸν τὸ ζῷον· κατὰ τὸ σῶμα γὰρ αἰσθητὸν καὶ ὁρατόν, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν οὔ, ὥστ᾿ οὐκ ἂν εἴη γένος τὸ ὁρατὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τοῦ ζῴου.
For animal is sensible or visible in some respect; for it is sensible and visible in respect of its body, but in respect of its soul it is not, so that the visible and the sensible would not be the genus of animal.
Λανθάνουσι δ᾿ ἐνίοτε καὶ τὸ ὅλον εἰς τὸ μέρος τιθέντες, οἷον τὸ ζῷον σῶμα ἔμψυχον.
They also sometimes err by placing the whole into the part, as, for example, if they defined animal as an animate body.
Οὐδαμῶς δὲ τὸ μέρος τοῦ ὅλου κατηγορεῖται, ὥστ᾿ οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ σῶμα γένος τοῦ ζῴου, ἐπειδὴ μέρος ἐστίν.
But the part is in no way predicated of the whole, so that the body would not be the genus of animal, since it is a part.