§4.4#2Πάλιν εἰ ὡσαύτως λέγεται τὸ γένος καὶ τὸ εἶδος κατὰ τὰς πτώσεις, οἷον εἰ τινὶ ἢ τινὸς ἢ ὁσαχῶς ἄλλως.
Again, see if the genus and the species are spoken of in the same way with respect to their cases, for example, if in relation to something or of something, or in any other way.
Ὡς γὰρ τὸ εἶδος, καὶ τὸ γένος, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ διπλασίου καὶ τῶν ἐπάνω· τινὸς γὰρ καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ τὸ πολλαπλάσιον.
For as the species is spoken of, so also must the genus be, just as in the case of the double and its higher genera; for both the double and the multiple are spoken of as of something.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης· τινὸς γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴ καὶ τὰ γένη, οἷον ἥ τε διάθεσις καὶ ἡ ἕξις.
And similarly also in the case of knowledge; for both itself and its genera are spoken of as of something, for example, disposition and habit.
Ἔνστασις ὅτι ἐνιαχοῦ οὐχ οὕτως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ διάφορον καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον τινί, τὸ δ᾿ ἕτερον, γένος ὂν τούτων, οὐ τινὶ ἀλλὰ τινός· ἕτερον γάρ τινος λέγεται.
An objection is that in some cases it is not so; for while the different and the contrary are spoken of in relation to something, the other, which is a genus of these, is spoken of not in relation to something but as of something; for the other is called other of something.
Πάλιν εἰ ὁμοίως τὰ πρός τι κατὰ τὰς πτώσεις λεγόμενα μὴ ὁμοίως ἀντιστρέφει, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ διπλασίου καὶ τοῦ πολλαπλασίου.
Again, see if relatives which are spoken of in the same way with respect to their cases do not convert in the same way, just as in the case of the double and the multiple.
Ἑκάτερον γὰρ τούτων τινὸς καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀντιστροφὴν λέγεται· τινὸς γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ καὶ τὸ πολλοστημόριον.
For each of these is spoken of as of something both in itself and in respect of its conversion; for both the half and the fraction are spoken of as of something.
Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῆς ὑπολήψεως· αὗται γάρ τινος, καὶ ἀντιστρέφει ὁμοίως· τό τε ἐπιστητὸν καὶ τὸ ὑποληπτὸν τινί.
And similarly also in the case of knowledge and of belief; for these are spoken of as of something, and their conversion is similar: both the knowable and the belief-object are spoken of in relation to something.
Εἰ οὖν ἐπί τινων μὴ ὁμοίως ἀντιστρέφει, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ γένος θάτερον θατέρου.
If, then, in some cases they do not convert in the same way, it is clear that the one is not the genus of the other.
Πάλιν εἰ μὴ πρὸς ἴσα τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ γένος λέγεται· ὁμοίως γὰρ καὶ ἰσαχῶς ἑκάτερον δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῆς δωρεας καὶ τῆς δόσεως.
Again, see if the species and the genus are not spoken of in relation to equal things; for each seems to be spoken of in the same way and in an equal number of ways, just as in the case of a gift and a giving.
Ἥ τε γὰρ δωρεὰ τινὸς ἢ τινὶ λέγεται, καὶ ἡ δόσις τινὸς καὶ τινί.
For a gift is spoken of as of something or to someone, and giving is also spoken of as of something and to someone.
Ἔστι δὲ ἡ δόσις γένος τῆς δωρεᾶς· ἡ γὰρ δωρεὰ δόσις ἐστὶν ἀναπόδοτος.
And giving is the genus of a gift; for a gift is a giving without return.
Ἐπ᾿ ἐνίων δ᾿ οὐ συμβαίνει πρὸς ἴσα λέγεσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ διπλάσιον τινὸς διπλάσιον, τὸ δ᾿ ὑπερέχον καὶ τὸ μεῖζον τινὸς καὶ τινί· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ὑπερέχον καὶ τὸ μεῖζον τινὶ ὑπερέχει καὶ τινὸς ὑπερέχει.
But in some cases they do not happen to be spoken of in relation to equal things; for the double is the double of something, but the exceeding and the greater are spoken of as of something and by something; for everything that exceeds or is greater exceeds by something and exceeds something.
Ὥστ᾿ οὐ γένη τὰ εἰρημένα τοῦ διπλασίου, ἐπειδὴ οὐ πρὸς ἴσα τῷ εἴδει λέγεται.
So that the things mentioned are not genera of the double, since they are not spoken of in relation to equal things as the species is.
Ἢ οὐ καθόλου ἀληθὲς τὸ πρὸς ἴσα τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ γένος λέγεσθαι.
Or is it not universally true that the species and the genus are spoken of in relation to equal things?
Ὁρᾶν δὲ καὶ εἰ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τὸ ἀντικείμενον γένος, οἷον εἰ τοῦ διπλασίου τὸ πολλαπλάσιον καὶ τοῦ ἡμίσεος τὸ πολλοστημόριον· δεῖ γὰρ τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ ἀντικειμένου γένος εἶναι.
One must also see if the contrary of the contrary is the genus, as, for example, if the multiple is the genus of the double, the fraction must also be the genus of the half; for the contrary of the contrary must be its genus.
Εἰ οὖν τις θείη τὴν ἐπιστήμην ὅπερ αἴσθησιν, δεήσει καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν ὅπερ αἰσθητὸν εἶναι.
If, then, anyone should assert that knowledge is a sensation, it will be necessary that the knowable also be a sensible.
Οὐκ ἔστι δέ· οὐ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ἐπιστητὸν αἰσθητόν· καὶ γὰρ τῶν νοητῶν ἔνια ἐπιστητά.
But it is not; for not everything that is knowable is sensible; for indeed some of the objects of thought are knowable.
Ὥστ᾿ οὐ γένος τὸ αἰσθητὸν τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ.
Therefore, the sensible is not the genus of the knowable.
Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μή, οὐδ᾿ αἴσθησις ἐπιστήμης.
And if this is not so, neither is sensation the genus of knowledge.
Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν πρός τι λεγομένων τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐν ἐκείνοις ἢ περὶ ἐκεῖνά ἐστι πρὸς ἅ ποτε τυγχάνει λεγόμενα, οἷον ἡ διάθεσις καὶ ἡ ἕξις καὶ ἡ συμμετρία (ἐν ἄλλῳ γὰρ οὐδενὶ δυνατὸν ὑπάρχειν. τὰ εἰρημένα ἢ ἐν ἐκείνοις πρὸς ἃ λέγεται), τὰ δ᾿ οὐκ ἀνάγκη μὲν ἐν ἐκείνοις ὑπάρχειν πρὸς ἅ ποτε λέγεται, ἐνδέχεται δέ (οἷον εἰ ἐπιστητὸν ἡ ψυχή· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τὴν αὑτῆς ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν τὴν ψυχήν, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον δέ· δυνατὸν γὰρ καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ ὑπάρχειν τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην), τὰ δ᾿ ἁπλῶς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἐν ἐκείνοις ὑπάρχειν πρὸς ἅ ποτε τυγχάνει λεγόμενα, οἷον τὸ ἐναντίον ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ οὐδὲ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐν τῷ ἐπιστητῷ, ἐὰν μὴ τυγχάνῃ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν ψυχὴ ἢ ἄνθρωπος ὄν, σκοπεῖν οὖν χρὴ ἐάν τις εἰς γένος θῇ τὸ τοιοῦτον εἰς τὸ μὴ τοιοῦτον, οἷον εἰ τὴν μνήμην μονὴν ἐπιστήμης εἶπεν.
Since, of relative terms, some are of necessity in or about those things in relation to which they happen to be spoken of, as, for example, disposition, habit, and symmetry (for it is impossible for the things mentioned to exist in any other thing than in those in relation to which they are spoken of), whereas others need not of necessity exist in those things in relation to which they are spoken of, though they may (as, for example, if the soul is a knowable thing; for nothing prevents the soul from having knowledge of itself, though it is not necessary, for it is possible for this same knowledge to exist in something else), and others simply cannot exist in those things in relation to which they happen to be spoken of, as, for example, the contrary cannot exist in its contrary, nor knowledge in the knowable, unless the knowable happens to be a soul or a human being, one must therefore examine if anyone places a thing of the former kind into a genus of the latter kind, as, for example, if he said that memory is a retention of knowledge.
Πᾶσα γὰρ μονὴ ἐν τῷ μένοντι καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνο, ὥστε καὶ ἡ τῆς ἐπιστήμης μονὴ ἐν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ.
For all retention is in that which remains and about it, so that also the retention of knowledge is in knowledge.
Ἡ μνήμη ἄρα ἐν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, ἐπειδὴ μονὴ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐστίν· τοῦτο δ᾿ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται· μνήμη γὰρ πᾶσα ἐν ψυχῇ.
Memory, therefore, would be in knowledge, since it is a retention of knowledge; but this is impossible, for all memory is in the soul.
Ἔστι δ᾿ ὁ εἰρημένος τόπος καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμβεβηκὸς κοινός· οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει τῆς μνήμης γένος τὴν μονὴν εἰπεῖν ἢ συμβεβηκέναι φάσκειν αὐτῇ τοῦτο· εἰ γὰρ ὁπωσοῦν ἐστὶν ἡ μνήμη μονὴ ἐπιστήμης, ὁ αὐτὸς ἁρμόσει περὶ αὐτῆς λόγος.
This commonplace rule is also common to the accident; for it makes no difference whether one says that retention is the genus of memory, or asserts that this is an accident of it; for if memory is in any way whatever a retention of knowledge, the same argument will apply to it.