§4.4#1Πάλιν ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοίως ἐχόντων πρὸς ἄλληλα, οἷον τὸ ἡδὺ ὁμοίως ἔχει πρὸς τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὸ ὠφέλιμον πρὸς τἀγαθόν·
Again, in the case of things which are similarly related to one another, as, for example, the pleasant is similarly related to pleasure as the useful is to the good; for each is productive of each.
ἑκάτερον γὰρ ἑκατέρου ποιητικόν. Εἰ οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἡδονὴ ὅπερ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὅπερ ὠφέλιμον ἔσται· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἀγαθοῦ ἂν εἴη ποιητικόν, ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν.
If, then, pleasure is what is good, the pleasant will also be what is useful; for it is clear that it would be productive of the good, since pleasure is a good.
Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν γενέσεων καὶ φθορῶν, οἷον εἰ τὸ οἰκοδομεῖν ἐνεργεῖν, τὸ ᾠκοδομηκέναι ἐνηργηκέναι, καὶ εἰ τὸ μανθάνειν ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι, καὶ τὸ μεμαθηκέναι ἀναμεμνῆσθαι, καὶ εἰ τὸ διαλύεσθαι φθείρεσθαι, τὸ διαλελύσθαι ἐφθάρθαι καὶ ἡ διάλυσις φθορά τις.
And similarly also in the case of generations and destructions, as, for example, if to build is to active, to have built is to have actived; and if to learn is to remember, to have learned is to have remembered; and if to be dissolved is to be destroyed, to have been dissolved is to have been destroyed, and dissolution is a certain destruction.
Καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν γενητικῶν δὲ καὶ φθαρτικῶν ὡσαύτως, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δυνάμεων καὶ χρήσεων, καὶ ὅλως καθ᾿ ὁποιανοῦν ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀναιροῦντι καὶ κατασκευάζοντι σκεπτέον, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῆς γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς ἐλέγομεν.
And similarly in the case of things productive and destructive, and in the case of capacities and uses, and altogether one must examine in accordance with any kind of similarity both for one who refutes and for one who establishes, just as we were saying in the case of generation and destruction.
Εἰ γὰρ τὸ φθαρτικὸν διαλυτικόν, καὶ τὸ φθείρεσθαι διαλύεσθαι· καὶ εἰ τὸ γενητικὸν ποιητικόν, τὸ γίνεσθαι ποιεῖσθαι καὶ ἡ γένεσις ποίησις.
For if what is destructive is what is dissolvent, to be destroyed is also to be dissolved; and if what is productive is what is creative, to be generated is to be created, and generation is a certain creation.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δυνάμεων καὶ χρήσεων· εἰ γὰρ ἡ δύναμις διάθεσις, καὶ τὸ δύνασθαι διακεῖσθαι, καὶ εἴ τινος ἡ χρῆσις ἐνέργεια, τὸ χρῆσθαι ἐνεργεῖν καὶ τὸ κεχρῆσθαι ἐνηργηκέναι.
Similarly also in the case of capacities and uses; for if capacity is a disposition, to be capable is also to be disposed; and if the use of something is an activity, to use is also to active, and to have used is to have actived.
Ἂν δὲ στέρησις ᾖ τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ εἴδει, διχῶς ἔστιν ἀνελεῖν, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἐν τῷ ἀποδοθέντι γένει τὸ ἀντικείμενον· ἢ γὰρ ἁπλῶς ἐν οὐδενὶ γένει τῷ αὐτῷ ἡ στέρησις, ἢ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἐσχάτῳ, οἷον εἰ ἡ ὄψις ἐν ἐσχάτῳ γένει τῇ αἰσθήσει, ἡ τυφλότης οὐκ ἔσται αἴσθησις.
If, however, the contrary to the species is a privation, one can refute in two ways: first, if the contrary is in the assigned genus; for either the privation is simply in no same genus at all, or not in the proximate genus, as, for example, if sight is in the proximate genus, sensation, blindness will not be a sensation.
Δεύτερον δ᾿ εἰ καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῷ εἴδει ἀντίκειται στέρησις, μή ἐστι δὲ τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἐν τῷ ἀντικειμένῳ, οὐδ᾿ ἂν τὸ ἀποδοθὲν ἐν τῷ ἀποδοθέντι εἴη.
Second, if privation is contrary both to the genus and to the species, and the contrary is not in the contrary, neither would the assigned species be in the assigned genus.
Ἀναιροῦντι μὲν οὖν καθάπερ εἴρηται χρηστέον, κατασκευάζοντι δὲ μοναχῶς· εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἐν τῷ ἀντικειμένῳ, καὶ τὸ προκείμενον ἐν τῷ προκειμένῳ ἂν εἴη, οἷον εἰ ἡ τυφλότης ἀναισθησία τις, ἡ ὄψις αἴσθησίς τις.
Therefore, for one who refutes, one must use these as has been said, but for one who establishes, in only one way: for if the contrary is in the contrary, the proposed species would also be in the proposed genus; for example, if blindness is a certain insensibility, sight is a certain sensation.
Πάλιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀποφάσεων σκοπεῖν ἀνάπαλιν, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος ἐλέγετο, οἷον εἰ τὸ ἡδὺ ὅπερ ἀγαθόν, τὸ μὴ ἀγαθὸν οὐχ ἡδύ.
Again, in the case of negations, one must examine them in the reverse order, just as was said in the case of accident; for example, if the pleasant is what is good, what is not good is not pleasant.
Εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοι, εἴη ἄν τι καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἡδύ.
For if this were not so, something which is not good would be pleasant.
Ἀδύνατον δέ, εἴπερ τὸ ἀγαθὸν γένος τοῦ ἡδέος, εἶναί τι μὴ ἀγαθὸν ἡδύ· ὧν γὰρ τὸ γένος μὴ κατηγορεῖται, οὐδὲ τῶν εἰδῶν οὐδέν.
But it is impossible, if indeed the good is the genus of the pleasant, for something which is not good to be pleasant; for of whatever the genus is not predicated, none of the species is predicated either.
Καὶ κατασκευάζοντι δὲ ὡσαύτως σκεπτέον· εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἀγαθὸν οὐχ ἡδύ, τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαθόν, ὥστε γένος τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ ἡδέος.
And for one who establishes, one must examine in the same way; for if what is not good is not pleasant, the pleasant is good, so that the good is the genus of the pleasant.
Ἐὰν δ᾿ ᾖ πρός τι τὸ εἶδος, σκοπεῖν εἰ καὶ τὸ γένος πρός τι· εἰ γὰρ τὸ εἶδος τῶν πρός τι, καὶ τὸ γένος, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ διπλασίου καὶ πολλαπλασίου· ἑκάτερον γὰρ τῶν πρός τι.
And if the species is a relative, one must see whether the genus is also a relative; for if the species is one of the relatives, the genus is too, as in the case of the double and the multiple; for each of them is a relative.
Εἰ δὲ τὸ γένος τῶν πρός τι, οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ εἶδος· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμη τῶν πρός τι, ἡ δὲ γραμματικὴ οὔ.
But if the genus is a relative, it is not necessary that the species should be so too; for knowledge is a relative, but grammar is not.
Ἢ οὐδὲ τὸ πρότερον ῥηθὲν ἀληθὲς ἂν δόξειεν· ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ ὅπερ καλὸν καὶ ὅπερ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀρετὴ τῶν πρός τι, τὸ δ᾿ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν οὐ τῶν πρός τι ἀλλὰ ποιά.
Or indeed even the former statement would not seem to be true; for virtue is what is beautiful and what is good, and while virtue is a relative, the good and the beautiful are not relatives but qualities.
Πάλιν εἰ μὴ πρὸς ταὐτὸ λέγεται τὸ εἶδος καθ᾿ αὑτό τε καὶ κατὰ τὸ γένος, οἷον εἰ τὸ διπλάσιον ἡμίσεος λέγεται διπλάσιον, καὶ τὸ πολλαπλάσιον ἡμίσεος δεῖ λέγεσθαι.
Again, see if the species is not spoken of in relation to the same thing both in itself and in respect of its genus; for example, if the double is called double of a half, the multiple also must be called multiple of a half.
Εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ πολλαπλάσιον γένος τοῦ διπλασίου.
If not, the multiple would not be the genus of the double.
Ἔτι εἰ μὴ πρὸς ταὐτὸ κατά τε τὸ γένος λέγεται καὶ κατὰ πάντα τὰ τοῦ γένους γένη.
Moreover, if it is not spoken of in relation to the same thing both in respect of the genus and in respect of all the genera of the genus.
Εἰ γὰρ τὸ διπλάσιον ἡμίσεος πολλαπλάσιόν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ὑπερέχον ἡμίσεος ῥηθήσεται, καὶ ἁπλῶς κατὰ πάντα τὰ ἐπάνω γένη πρὸς τὸ ἥμισυ ῥηθήσεται.
For if the double of a half is a multiple, it will also be spoken of as exceeding the half, and simply in respect of all the higher genera it will be spoken of in relation to the half.
Ἔνστασις ὅτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη καθ᾿ αὑτὸ καὶ κατὰ τὸ γένος πρὸς ταὐτὸ λέγεσθαι· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστητοῦ λέγεται, ἕξις δὲ καὶ διάθεσις οὐκ ἐπιστητοῦ ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς.
An objection is that it is not necessary to be spoken of in relation to the same thing both in itself and in respect of its genus; for knowledge is called knowledge of the knowable, but habit and disposition are not called of the knowable, but of the soul.