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Aristotle · Topics §3.4-3.5

Topics of Desirability and Generalization of Degrees

Passage 27 of 94 · Greek

Summary

The author explains the topics for determining desirability or avoidance based on comparison, and presents methods to generalize these topics into more universal rules by altering terminology or applying definitions.

§3.4Τὰς μὲν οὖν πρὸς ἄλληλα συγκρίσεις, καθάπερ εἴρηται, ποιητέον.
Therefore, the comparisons of things with one another must be made, just as has been said.
Οἱ αὐτοὶ δὲ τόποι χρήσιμοι καὶ πρὸς τὸ δεικνύναι ὁτιοῦν αἱρετὸν ἢ φευκτόν· ἀφαιρεῖν γὰρ μόνον δεῖ τὴν πρὸς ἕτερον ὑπεροχήν.
And the same topics are useful also for showing that anything whatever is desirable or to be avoided; for one only needs to subtract the excess in relation to the other.
Εἰ γὰρ τὸ τιμιώτερον αἱρετώτερον, καὶ τὸ τίμιον αἱρετόν, καὶ εἰ τὸ χρησιμώτερον αἱρετώτερον, καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον αἱρετόν.
For if what is more valued is more desirable, then also what is valued is desirable; and if what is more useful is more desirable, then also what is useful is desirable.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσα τοιαύτην ἔχει τὴν σύγκρισιν.
Similarly also in the case of the others, as many as admit of such a comparison.
Ἐπ᾿ ἐνίων γὰρ εὐθέως κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ἕτερον σύγκρισιν καὶ ὅτι αἱρετὸν ἑκάτερον ἢ τὸ ἕτερον λέγομεν, οἷον ὅταν τὸ μὲν φύσει ἀγαθὸν τὸ δὲ μὴ φύσει λέγωμεν· τὸ γὰρ φύσει ἀγαθὸν δῆλον ὅτι αἱρετόν ἐστιν.
For in some cases we immediately assert, on the basis of comparison with the other, also that each of them or one of them is desirable, as for example when we say that the one is good by nature and the other is not by nature; for that which is good by nature is clearly desirable.
§3.5Ληπτέον δ᾿ ὅτι μάλιστα καθόλου τοὺς τόπους περὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ τοῦ μείζονος· ληφθέντες γὰρ οὕτως πρὸς πλείω χρήσιμοι ἂν εἴησαν.
And one must grasp the topics concerning the more and the greater as universally as possible; for if grasped in this way, they would be useful for more cases.
Ἔστι δ᾿ αὐτῶν τῶν εἰρημένων ἐνίους καθόλου μᾶλλον ποιεῖν μικρὸν παραλλάσσοντα τῇ προσηγορίᾳ, οἷον τὸ φύσει τοιοῦτο τοῦ μὴ φύσει τοιούτου μᾶλλον τοιοῦτο. Καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖ τὸ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖ τὸ ἔχον τοιόνδε ἢ ᾧ ἂν ὑπάρχῃ, μᾶλλον τοιοῦτο ὅ ποτε ποιεῖ ἢ ὃ μὴ ποιεῖ.
And it is possible to make some of the mentioned topics more universal by slightly altering the designation, as for example, "that which is by nature such is more such than that which is not by nature such." And if the one makes that which possesses it or that in which it is present such, while the other does not, that which makes it so is more such than that which does not.
Εἰ δ᾿ ἄμφω ποιεῖ, τὸ μᾶλλον ποιοῦν τοιοῦτο.
And if both make it so, that which makes it so in a greater degree is such.
Ἔτι εἰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τινὸς τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον τὸ δὲ ἧττον τοιοῦτο· καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν τοιούτου μᾶλλον τοιοῦτο, τὸ δὲ μὴ τοιούτου τοιοῦτον, δῆλον ὅτι τὸ πρῶτον μᾶλλον τοιοῦτο.
Moreover, if, in relation to some same thing, the one is more and the other is less such; and if the one is more such in relation to what is such, while the other is such in relation to what is not such, it is clear that the first is more such.
ἔτι ἐκ τῆς προσθέσεως, εἰ τῷ αὐτῷ προστιθέμενον τὸ ὅλον μᾶλλον ποιεῖ τοιοῦτο, ἢ εἰ τῷ ἧττον τοιούτῳ προστιθέμενον τὸ ὅλον μᾶλλον ποιεῖ τοιοῦτο.
Moreover, from addition: if, when added to the same thing, it makes the whole more such; or if, when added to what is less such, it makes the whole more such.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀφαιρέσεως· οὗ γὰρ ἀφαιρεθέντος τὸ λειπόμενον ἧττον τοιοῦτο, αὐτὸ μᾶλλον τοιοῦτο.
Similarly also from subtraction: for that, which when subtracted leaves a remainder that is less such, is itself more such.
Καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἀμιγέστερα μᾶλλον τοιαῦτα, οἷον λευκότερον τὸ τῷ μέλανι ἀμιγέστερον.
Also, those things which are less mixed with their contraries are more such; for example, that which is less mixed with black is whiter.
Ἔτι παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα πρότερον, τὸ μᾶλλον ἐπιδεχόμενον τὸν οἰκεῖον τοῦ προκειμένου λόγον, οἷον εἰ τοῦ λευκοῦ ἐστὶ λόγος χρῶμα διακριτικὸν ὄψεως, λευκότερον ὅ ἐστι μᾶλλον χρῶμα διακριτικὸν ὄψεως.
Moreover, besides what has been said before, that which admits in a greater degree the proper definition of the subject proposed; as for example, if the definition of white is "a color that pierces the vision", then that which is in a greater degree "a color that pierces the vision" is whiter.

Notes

  1. §3.4ἀφαιρεῖν — ἀφαιρεῖν is an infinitive depending on the impersonal verb δεῖ, with an implied general subject ('one'). It describes the logical process of deriving an absolute judgment (positive degree) from a comparative one (comparative degree) by 'subtracting the excess in relation to the other' (τὴν πρὸς ἕτερον ὑπεροχήν).
  2. §3.5παραλλάσσοντα — παραλλάσσοντα is the present active participle, masculine accusative singular, of παραλλάσσω. It agrees with the implied subject of the infinitive ποιεῖν (a general 'someone', τινά), which is governed by the impersonal ἔστι (meaning 'it is possible'). ἐνίους (some [of the topics], masculine plural accusative) is the direct object of ποιεῖν, and καθόλου μᾶλλον functions as the predicate.
  3. §3.5τὸ ἔχον — tὸ ἔχον (that which possesses it, neuter singular present participle) and the relative clause ᾧ ἂν ὑπάρχῃ (that in which it is present) are both direct objects of the verb ποιεῖ. τοιόνδε (such) functions as a predicative complement (second accusative) to these objects.

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Topics §3.4-3.5. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg044.humanitext-grc1:3.4-3.5

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