§3.6#1Ἂν δ᾿ ἐπὶ μέρους καὶ μὴ καθόλου τὸ πρόβλημα τεθῇ, πρῶτον μὲν οἱ εἰρημένοι καθόλου κατασκευαστικοὶ ἢ ἀνασκευαστικοὶ τόποι πάντες χρήσιμοι.
the problem is set as particular and not universal, first of all, all the previously mentioned universal topics for establishing or overthrowing are useful.
Καθόλου γὰρ ἀναιροῦντες ἢ κατασκευάζοντες καὶ ἐπὶ μέρους δείκνυμεν· εἰ γὰρ παντὶ ὑπάρχει, καὶ τινί, καὶ εἰ μηδενί, οὐδὲ τινί.
For by overthrowing or establishing universally, we also show it particularly; for if it belongs to all, it also belongs to some, and if to none, neither does it belong to any.
Μάλιστα δ᾿ ἐπίκαιροι καὶ κοινοὶ τῶν τόπων οἵ τ᾿ ἐκ τῶν ἀντικειμένων καὶ τῶν συστοίχων καὶ τῶν πτώσεων· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔνδοξον τὸ ἀξιῶσαι, εἰ πᾶσα ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν, καὶ λύπην πᾶσαν εἶναι κακόν, τῷ εἴ τις ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν, καὶ λύπην εἶναί τινα κακόν.
But the most opportune and common of the topics are those from contraries, coordinates, and inflections; for it is equally conformable to accepted opinion to claim that, if all pleasure is good, all pain is also bad, as to claim that, if some pleasure is good, some pain is also bad.
Ἔτι εἴ τις αἴσθησις μή ἐστι δύναμις, καὶ ἀναισθησία τις οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδυναμία.
Moreover, if some sensation is not a capacity, some insensibility also is not an incapacity.
Καὶ εἴ τι ὑποληπτὸν ἐπιστητόν, καὶ ὑπόληψίς τις ἐπιστήμη.
And if some object of opinion is an object of knowledge, some opinion also is knowledge.
Πάλιν εἴ τι τῶν ἀδίκων ἀγαθόν, καὶ τῶν δικαίων τι κακόν· καὶ εἴ τι τῶν δικαίως κακόν, καὶ τῶν ἀδίκως τι ἀγαθόν.
Again, if some of the unjust things are good, some of the just things also are bad; and if some of the things done justly are bad, some of the things done unjustly also are good.
Καὶ εἴ τι τῶν ἡδέων φευκτόν, ἡδονή τις φευκτόν.
And if some of the pleasant things are to be avoided, some pleasure is also to be avoided.
Κατὰ ταὐτὰ δὲ καὶ εἴ τι τῶν ἡδέων ὠφέλιμον, ἡδονή τις ὠφέλιμον.
And in the same way, if some of the pleasant things are beneficial, some pleasure is also beneficial.
Καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν φθαρτικῶν δὲ καὶ τῶν γενέσεων καὶ φθορῶν ὡσαύτως.
And the same holds also in the case of destructive things, and of generations and destructions.
Εἰ γάρ τι φθαρτικὸν ἡδονῆς ἢ ἐπιστήμης ὂν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, εἴη ἄν τις ἡδονὴ ἢ ἐπιστήμη τῶν κακῶν.
For if something that is destructive of pleasure or of knowledge is good, some pleasure or knowledge would be among bad things.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ φθορά τις ἐπιστήμης τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ ἡ γένεσις τῶν κακῶν, ἔσται τις ἐπιστήμη τῶν κακῶν, οἷον εἰ τὸ ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι ἅ τις αἰσχρὰ ἔπραξε τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ τὸ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι τῶν κακῶν, εἴη ἂν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἅ τις αἰσχρὰ ἔπραξε τῶν κακῶν.
Similarly also, if some destruction of knowledge is among good things, or its generation is among bad things, some knowledge will be among bad things; as for example, if forgetting what disgraceful things one has done is among good things, or remembering them is among bad things, knowing what disgraceful things one has done would be among bad things.
Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ἐν ἅπασι γὰρ ὁμοίως τὸ ἔνδοξον.
And likewise also in the case of the others; for in all of them the accepted opinion is similar.
Ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον καὶ ὁμοίως.
Moreover, from the more, the less, and the likewise.
Εἰ γὰρ μᾶλλον μὲν τῶν ἐξ ἄλλου γένους τι τοιοῦτο ἐκείνων δὲ μηδέν ἐστιν, οὐδ᾿ ἂν τὸ εἰρημένον εἴη τοιοῦτον, οἷον εἰ μᾶλλον μὲν ἐπιστήμη τις ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδονή, μηδεμία δ᾿ ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθόν, οὐδ᾿ ἂν ἡδονὴ εἴη.
For if some member of another genus is more such, and yet none of those is such, neither would the one mentioned be such; as for example, if some knowledge is more good than pleasure, and yet no knowledge is good, neither would pleasure be good.
Καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἧττον ὡσαύτως· ἔσται γὰρ καὶ ἀναιρεῖν καὶ κατασκευάζειν, πλὴν ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ὁμοίως ἀμφότερα, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἧττον κατασκευάζειν μόνον, ἀνασκευάζειν δὲ οὔ.
And from the likewise and the less in the same way; for it will be possible both to overthrow and to establish, except that from the likewise both are possible, but from the less only establishing is possible, and not overthrowing.
Εἰ γὰρ ὁμοίως δύναμίς τις ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ἔστι δέ τις δύναμις ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν.
For if some capacity and knowledge are equally good, and some capacity is good, knowledge is also good.
Εἰ δὲ μηδεμία δύναμις, οὐδ᾿ ἐπιστήμη.
But if no capacity is good, neither is knowledge.
Εἰ δ᾿ ἧττον δύναμίς τις ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἐπιστήμη, ἔστι δέ τις δύναμις ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐπιστήμη.
And if some capacity is less good than knowledge, and some capacity is good, knowledge is also good.
Εἰ δὲ μηδεμία δύναμις ἀγαθόν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐπιστήμην μηδεμίαν εἶναι ἀγαθόν.
But if no capacity is good, it is not necessary that no knowledge is good.
Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι κατασκευάζειν μόνον ἐκ τοῦ ἧττον ἔστιν.
It is clear, therefore, that from the less it is possible only to establish.
Οὐ μόνον δ᾿ ἐξ ἄλλου γένους ἔστιν ἀνασκευάζειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λαμβάνοντι τὸ μάλιστα τοιοῦτον, οἷον εἰ κεῖται ἐπιστήμη τις ἀγαθόν, δειχθείη δ᾿ ὅτι φρόνησις οὐκ ἀγαθόν, οὐδ᾿ ἄλλη οὐδεμία ἔσται, ἐπεὶ οὐδ᾿ ἡ μάλιστα δοκοῦσα.
And it is possible to overthrow not only from another genus, but also from the same, by taking that which is most such; as for example, if it is laid down that some knowledge is good, but it is shown that prudence is not good, no other will be good either, since not even the one which seems most so is good.
Ἔτι ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, ὁμοίως ἀξιώσαντα, εἱ ἑνί, καὶ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον εἰ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας, εἰ δ᾿ αὕτη μή, μηδὲ τὰς ἄλλας.
Moreover, from hypothesis, by claiming likewise that if it belongs to one, it belongs or does not belong to all; as for example, if the soul of man is immortal, the other souls are also, but if this is not, neither are the others.
Εἰ μὲν οὖν ὑπάρχειν τινὶ κεῖται, δεικτέον ὅτι οὐχ ὑπάρχει τινί· ἀκολουθήσει γὰρ διὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τὸ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν.
If, therefore, it is laid down that it belongs to something, it must be shown that it does not belong to something; for it will follow through the hypothesis that it belongs to nothing.
Εἰ δέ τινι μὴ ὑπάρχον κεῖται, δεικτέον ὅτι ὑπάρχει τινί· καὶ γὰρ οὕτως ἀκολουθήσει τὸ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχειν.
But if it is laid down that it does not belong to something, it must be shown that it belongs to something; for in this way also it will follow that it belongs to all.
Δῆλον δ᾿ ἐστὶν ὅτι ὁ ὑποτιθέμενος ποιεῖ τὸ πρόβλημα καθόλου ἐπὶ μέρους τεθέν· τὸν γὰρ ἐπὶ μέρους ὁμολογοῦντα καθόλου ἀξιοῖ ὁμολογεῖν, ἐπειδή, εἰ ἑνί, καὶ πᾶσιν ὁμοίως ἀξιοῖς ὑπάρχειν.
And it is clear that the one who makes a hypothesis makes the problem universal when it was set as particular; for he claims that the one who admits it particularly should admit it universally, since he claims that if it belongs to one, it belongs likewise to all.