§3.3Ἔτι τῶν ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος τὸ ἔχον τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν τοῦ μὴ ἔχοντος.
Moreover, of those under the same species, that which possesses its own proper virtue is more desirable than that which does not.
Ἄμφω δ᾿ ἐχόντων τὸ μᾶλλον ἔχον.
And if both possess it, that which possesses it in a greater degree.
Ἔτι εἰ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖ ἀγαθὸν ἐκεῖνο ᾧ ἂν παρῃ, τὸ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖ, τὸ ποιοῦν αἱρετώτερον, καθάπερ καὶ θερμότερον τὸ θερμαῖνον τοῦ μή.
Moreover, if the one makes good that in which it is present, while the other does not, that which makes it good is more desirable, just as also that which warms is warmer than that which does not.
Εἰ δ᾿ ἄμφω ποιεῖ, τὸ μᾶλλον ποιοῦν· ἢ εἰ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ κυριώτερον ποιεῖ ἀγαθόν, οἷον εἰ τὸ μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ δὲ τὸ σῶμα.
And if both make it good, that which does so in a greater degree; or if it makes that which is better and more authoritative good, as for example if the one makes the soul good and the other the body.
Ἔτι ἀπὸ τῶν πτώσεων καὶ τῶν χρήσεων καὶ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν ἔργων, καὶ ταῦτα δὲ ἀπ᾿ ἐκείνων·
Moreover, we can judge from inflectional forms, from uses, actions, and works, and also these from those; for they follow upon one another.
ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ ἀλλήλοις, οἷον εἰ τὸ δικαίως αἱρετώτερον τοῦ ἀνδρείως, καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῆς ἀνδρίας αἱρετώτερον· καὶ εἰ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῆς ἀνδρίας αἱρετώτερον, καὶ τὸ δικαίως τοῦ ἀνδρείως.
For example, if "justly" is more desirable than "courageously", then also justice is more desirable than courage; and if justice is more desirable than courage, then also "justly" is more desirable than "courageously".
Παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
Similarly also in other cases.
Ἔτι εἴ τινος τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὸ μὲν μεῖζον ἀγαθόν ἐστι τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον, αἱρετώτερον τὸ μεῖζον.
Moreover, if, in relation to some same thing, the one is a greater good and the other a lesser good, the greater is more desirable.
Ἢ εἰ μείζονος μεῖζον θάτερον.
Or if one is greater in relation to a greater thing.
Ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ δύο τινὰ τινὸς εἴη αἱρετώτερα, τὸ μᾶλλον αἱρετώτερον τοῦ ἧττον αἱρετωτέρου αἱρετώτερον.
But also, if any two things should be more desirable than something, that which is more desirable is more desirable than that which is less so.
Ἔτι οὗ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς αἱρετωτέρα, καὶ αὐτὸ αἱρετώτερον, οἷον φιλία χρημάτων· αἱρετωτέρα γὰρ ἡ τῆς φιλίας ὑπερβολὴ τῆς τῶν χρημάτων.
Moreover, that of which the excess is more desirable than the excess of the other is also itself more desirable, for example, friendship than wealth; for the excess of friendship is more desirable than that of wealth.
Καὶ οὗ μᾶλλον ἂν ἕλοιτο αὐτὸς αὑτῷ αἴτιος εἶναι ἢ οὗ ἕτερον, οἷον τοὺς φίλους τῶν χρημάτων.
And that of which one would rather be the cause of for oneself than another, as for example, friends than wealth.
Ἔτι ἐκ τῆς προσθέσεως, εἰ τῷ αὐτῷ προστιθέμενόν τι τὸ ὅλον αἱρετώτερον ποιεῖ.
Moreover, from addition: if something, when added to the same thing, makes the whole more desirable.
Εὐλαβεῖσθαι δὲ δεῖ προτείνειν ἐφ᾿ ὧν τῷ μὲν ἑτέρῳ τῶν προστιθεμένων χρῆται τὸ κοινὸν ἢ ἄλλως πως συνεργόν ἐστι, τῷ δὲ λοιπῷ μὴ χρῆται μηδὲ συνεργόν ἐστιν, οἷον πρίονα καὶ δρέπανον μετὰ τεκτονικῆς· αἱρετώτερον γὰρ ὁ πρίων συνδυαζόμενος, ἁπλῶς δὲ οὐχ αἱρετώτερον.
But one must be cautious in proposing cases where the common term uses one of the added things or it is otherwise cooperative with it, while it does not use the remaining one nor is it cooperative with it, for example, a saw and a sickle in combination with carpentry; for the saw is more desirable when joined with it, but absolutely it is not more desirable.
Πάλιν εἰ ἐλάττονι προστεθέν τι τὸ ὅλον μεῖζον ποιεῖ.
Again, if something, when added to a lesser thing, makes the whole greater.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀφαιρέσεως· οὗ γὰρ ἀφαιρεθέντος ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὸ λειπόμενον ἔλαττον, ἐκεῖνο μεῖζον αν εἴη, ὁπότε ἀφαιρεθὲν τὸ λειπόμενον ἔλαττον ποιεῖ.
Similarly also from subtraction: for that, which when subtracted from the same thing leaves a remainder that is less, would be greater, since when subtracted it makes the remainder less.
Καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν δι᾿ αὑτὸ τὸ δὲ διὰ τὴν δόξαν αἱρετόν, οἷον ὑγίεια κάλλους.
And if the one is desirable for its own sake, and the other for the sake of reputation, as for example health than beauty.
Ὅρος δὲ τοῦ πρὸς δόξαν τὸ μηδενὸς συνειδότος μὴ ἂν σπουδάσαι ὑπάρχειν.
And the definition of what is for the sake of reputation is that which one would not care to possess if no one knew of it.
Καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν δι᾿ αὑτὸ καὶ διὰ τὴν δόξαν αἱρετόν, τὸ δὲ διὰ θάτερον μόνον.
And if the one is desirable both for its own sake and for the sake of reputation, while the other is desirable only for one of the two.
Καὶ ὁπότερον μᾶλλον δι᾿ αὑτὸ τίμιον, τοῦτο καὶ βέλτιον καὶ αἱρετώτερον.
And whichever is more valued for its own sake, this is both better and more desirable.
Τιμιώτερον δ᾿ ἂν εἴη καθ᾿ αὑτό, ὃ μηδενὸς ἄλλου μέλλοντος ὑπάρξειν δι᾿ αὑτὸ αἱρούμεθα μᾶλλον.
And that would be more valued in itself which we choose rather for its own sake when nothing else is to accrue.
Ἔτι διελέσθαι ποσαχῶς τὸ αἱρετὸν λέγεται καὶ τίνων χάριν, οἷον τοῦ συμφέροντος ἢ τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ ἡδέος· τὸ γὰρ πρὸς ἅπαντα ἢ πρὸς τὰ πλείω χρήσιμον αἱρετώτερον ἂν ὑπάρχοι τοῦ μὴ ὁμοίως.
Moreover, one should distinguish in how many senses "desirable" is used, and for the sake of what, as for example, for the sake of the useful, the noble, or the pleasant; for that which is useful for all things or for most things would be more desirable than what is not so.
Τῶν δ᾿ αὐτῶν ἀμφοτέροις ὑπαρχόντων, ὁποτέρῳ μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει σκεπτέον, πότερον ἥδιον ἢ κάλλιον ἢ συμφερώτερον.
And when the same qualities belong to both, one must consider to which they belong in a greater degree, whether it is more pleasant, or nobler, or more useful.
Πάλιν τὸ τοῦ βελτίονος ἕνεκεν αἱρετώτερον, οἷον τὸ ἀρετῆς ἕνεκεν ἢ ἡδονῆς.
Again, that which is for the sake of what is better is more desirable, for example, that which is for the sake of virtue than for the sake of pleasure.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν φευκτῶν· φευκτότερον γὰρ τὸ μᾶλλον ἐμποδιστικὸν τῶν αἱρετῶν, οἷον νόσος αἴσχους· καὶ γὰρ ἡδονῆς καὶ τοῦ σπουδαῖον εἶναι κωλυτικώτερον ἡ νόσος.
Similarly also with things to be avoided; for that which is more of an obstacle to desirable things is more to be avoided, as for example, sickness than ugliness; for sickness is more of an obstacle both to pleasure and to being virtuous.
Ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίως δεικνύναι φευκτὸν καὶ αἱρετὸν τὸ προκείμενον· ἧττον γὰρ αἱρετὸν τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὃ καὶ ἕλοιτ᾿ ἄν τις ὁμοίως καὶ φύγοι, τοῦ ἑτέρου ὄντος αἱρετοῦ μόνον.
Moreover, from showing that the object proposed is equally to be avoided and to be desired; for such a thing, which one would choose and avoid equally, is less desirable, while the other is only desirable.