§3.2#2Ἄλλος τόπος, τὸ ἐγγύτερον τἀγαθοῦ βέλτιον καὶ αἱρετώτερον.
Another topic: what is closer to the good is better and more desirable.
Καὶ τὸ ὁμοιότερον τἀγαθῷ, οἷον ἡ δικαιοσύνη δικαίου.
And what is more similar to the good, for example, justice than a just man.
Καὶ τὸ τῷ βελτίονι αὑτοῦ ὁμοιότερον, καθάπερ τὸν Αἴαντα τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως φασὶ βελτίω τινὲς εἶναι, διότι ὁμοιότερος τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ.
And what is more similar to what is better than itself, just as some say Ajax is better than Odysseus because he is more similar to Achilles.
Ἔνστασις τούτου ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθές· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει, μὴ ᾗ βέλτιστος ὁ. Ἀχιλλεύς, ταύτῃ ὁμοιότερον εἶναι τὸν Αἴαντα, τοῦ ἑτέρου ὄντος μὲν ἀγαθοῦ μὴ ὁμοίου δέ.
An objection to this is that it is not true; for nothing prevents Ajax from being more similar to Achilles not in that respect in which Achilles is best, while the other is good but not similar.
Σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἰ ἐπὶ τὸ γελοιότερον εἴη ὅμοιον, καθάπερ ὁ πίθηκος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, τοῦ ἵππου μὴ ὄντος ὁμοίου· οὐ γὰρ κάλλιον ὁ πίθηκος, ὁμοιότερον δὲ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ.
One should also consider whether the similarity might be to something more ridiculous, just as an ape is similar to a human, while a horse is not; for an ape is not more beautiful, but is more similar to a human.
Πάλιν ἐπὶ δυοῖν εἰ τὸ μὲν τῷ βελτίονι τὸ δὲ τῷ χείρονι ὁμοιότερον, εἴη ἂν βέλτιον τὸ τῷ βελτίονι ὁμοιότερον.
Again, of two things, if one is more similar to the better and the other to the worse, that which is more similar to the better would be better.
Ἔχει δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἔνστασιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τὸ μὲν τῷ βελτίονι ἠρέμα ὅμοιον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ τῷ χείρονι σφόδρα, οἷον εἰ ὁ μὲν Αἴας τῷ Ἀχιλλει ἠρέμα, ὁ δ᾿ Ὀδυσσεὺς τῷ Νέστορι σφόδρα.
But this also has an objection; for nothing prevents the one from being slightly similar to the better, and the other very similar to the worse, as for example if Ajax is slightly similar to Achilles, and Odysseus very similar to Nestor.
Καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν τῷ βελτίονι ὅμοιον ἐπὶ τὰ χείρω ὅμοιον εἴη, τὸ δὲ τῷ χείρονι ἐπὶ τὰ βελτίω, καθάπερ ἵππος ὄνῳ καὶ πίθηκος ἀνθρώπῳ.
And if that which is similar to the better is similar in respect of worse qualities, and that which is similar to the worse in respect of better qualities, just as a horse to an ass and an ape to a human.
Ἄλλος, τὸ ἐπιφανέστερον τοῦ ἧττον τοιούτου, καὶ τὸ χαλεπώτερον· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἀγαπῶμεν ἔχοντες ἃ μὴ ἔστι ῥᾳδίως λαβεῖν.
Another: what is more conspicuous than what is less so, and what is more difficult; for we cherish more having things that are not easy to get.
Καὶ τὸ ἰδιαίτερον τοῦ κοινοτέρου.
And what is more peculiar than what is more common.
Καὶ τὸ τοῖς κακοῖς ἀκοινωνητότερον· αἱρετώτερον γὰρ ᾧ μηδεμία δυσχέρεια ἀκολουθεῖ ἢ ᾧ ἀκολουθεῖ.
And what is more unassociated with evils; for that which no difficulty accompanies is more desirable than that which it does.
Ἔτι εἰ ἁπλῶς τοῦτο τούτου βέλτιον, καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον τῶν ἐν τούτῳ βέλτιον τοῦ ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ βελτίστου, οἷον εἰ βέλτιον ἄνθρωπος ἵππου, καὶ ὁ βέλτιστος ἄνθρωπος τοῦ βελτίστου ἵππου βελτίων.
Moreover, if absolutely this is better than that, then also the best of the things in this is better than the best of the things in the other, for example, if a human is better than a horse, the best human is also better than the best horse.
Καὶ εἰ τὸ βέλτιστον τοῦ βελτίστου βέλτιον, καὶ ἁπλῶς τοῦτο τούτου βέλτιον, οἷον εἰ ὁ βέλτιστος ἄνθρωπος τοῦ βελτίστου ἵππου βελτίων, καὶ ἁπλῶς ἄνθρωπος ἵππου βελτίων.
And if the best is better than the best, then absolutely also this is better than that, for example, if the best human is better than the best horse, then absolutely also a human is better than a horse.
Ἔτι ὧν ἔστι τοὺς φίλους μετασχεῖν, αἱρετώτερα ἢ ὧν μή.
Moreover, those things in which friends can share are more desirable than those in which they cannot.
Καὶ ἃ πρὸς τὸν φίλον πρᾶξαι μᾶλλον βουλόμεθα ἢ ἃ πρὸς τὸν τυχόντα, ταῦτα αἱρετώτερα, οἷον τὸ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ εὖ ποιεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ δοκεῖν· τοὺς γὰρ φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν βουλόμεθα μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖν, τοὺς δὲ τυχόντας ἀνάπαλιν.
And those things which we would rather do to a friend than to any chance person are more desirable, for example, doing what is just and doing good rather than seeming to do so; for we wish to do good to our friends rather than to seem to do so, but to chance persons the reverse.
Καὶ τὰ ἐκ περιουσίας τῶν ἀναγκαίων βελτίω, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ αἱρετώτερα· βέλτιον γὰρ τοῦ ζῆν τὸ εὖ ζῆν, τὸ δὲ εὖ ζῆν ἐστὶν ἐκ περιουσίας, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαῖον.
And things that come from superabundance are better than necessary things, and sometimes also more desirable; for living well is better than living, and living well is from superabundance, while living itself is necessary.
Ἐνίοτε δὲ τὰ βελτίω οὐχὶ καὶ αἱρετώτερα· οὐ γὰρ εἰ βελτίω, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ αἱρετώτερα· τὸ γοῦν φιλοσοφεῖν βέλτιον τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαι, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχ αἱρετώτερον τῷ ἐνδεεῖ τῶν ἀναγκαίων.
But sometimes the better is not also more desirable; for it is not necessary, if it is better, that it is also more desirable; at any rate, philosophizing is better than making money, but it is not more desirable for one who is in want of the necessaries of life.
Τὸ δ᾿ ἐκ περιουσίας ἐστίν, ὅταν ὑπαρχόντων τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἄλλα τινὰ προσκατασκευάζηταί τις τῶν καλῶν.
And a thing is from superabundance when, the necessary things being present, one goes on to acquire certain other beautiful things.
Σχεδὸν δὲ ἴσως αἱρετώτερον τὸ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι, βέλτιον δὲ τὸ ἐκ περιουσίας.
And perhaps, generally speaking, the necessary is more desirable, while that which is from superabundance is better.
Καὶ ὃ μὴ ἔστι παρ᾿ ἄλλου πορίσασθαι ἢ ὃ ἔστι καὶ παρ᾿ ἄλλου, οἷον πέπονθεν ἡ δικαιοσύνη πρὸς τὴν ἀνδρίαν.
And what cannot be procured from another rather than what can also be procured from another, as is the case of justice in relation to courage.
Καὶ εἰ τόδε μὲν ἄνευ τοῦδε αἱρετόν, τόδε δὲ ἄνευ τοῦδε μή, οἷον δύναμις ἄνευ φρονήσεως οὐχ αἱρετόν, φρόνησις δ᾿ ἄνευ δυνάμεως αἱρετόν.
And if this is desirable without that, but that is not desirable without this, for example, power without prudence is not desirable, but prudence without power is desirable.
Καὶ δυοῖν εἰ θάτερον ἀρνούμεθα, ἵνα τὸ λοιπὸν δόξῃ ἡμῖν ὑπάρχειν, ἐκεῖνο αἱρετώτερον ὃ βουλόμεθα δοκεῖν ὑπάρχειν, οἷον φιλοπονεῖν ἀρνούμεθα, ἵν᾿ εὐφυεῖς εἶναι δόξωμεν.
And of two things, if we deny the one in order that the remaining one may seem to belong to us, that one is more desirable which we wish to seem to belong to us, as for example we deny that we are industrious in order that we may seem to be naturally gifted.
Ἔτι οὗ τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ ἧττον ἐπιτιμητέον δυσφοροῦσι, τοῦτο αἱρετώτερον.
Moreover, that for whose absence people are less to be blamed for being distressed, this is more desirable.
Καὶ οὗ τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ μὴ δυσφοροῦντι μᾶλλον ἐπιτιμητέον, τοῦτο αἱρετώτερον.
And that for whose absence one who is not distressed is more to be blamed, this is more desirable.